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Abstract 
 
In recent years, sub-national human rights institutions (‘SNHRIs’)  – defined as 
independent non-judicial governmental institutions that possess a sub-national mandate, and 
whose mission includes the implementation of human rights norms – have proliferated in all 
regions of  the world. Yet, the precise role of SNHRIs and the nature of their interactions with 
other international human rights actors and norms has received relatively little attention. The 
seven articles that comprise this thesis take a first step toward filling this gap by examining the 
emerging place of SNHRIs in the international human rights regime. The first article defines and 
typologises SNHRIs, allowing for a more systematic study of SNHRIs in the rest of the thesis 
and future research. The next five articles focus on answering three principal research questions. 
First, what role do SNHRIs occupy in the international human rights regime and how do they 
interact with other human rights actors? Second, what are the implications of SNHRIs’ 
emergence as an increasingly relevant actor in the international human rights regime? Third, how 
can the participation of SNHRIs in the international human rights regime be managed optimally 
so as to maximize the added value that they can bring to the international human rights regime? 
As a secondary matter, these articles also engage in a comparative analysis between SNHRIs and 
National Human Rights Institutions (‘NHRIs’), asking to what extent SNHRIs are similar to or 
different from NHRIs in their relationships with the international human rights regime.  
Specifically, these five articles address the relationship between SNHRIs and NHRIs 
(chapter 3); the participation of SNHRIs in UN mechanisms (chapter 4); the relationship between 
SNHRIs and their international peers through networking (chapter 5); the implementation of 
international law by SNHRIs (chapter 6), and finish with a case study of the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office, focusing on its relationships with other human rights bodies and the 
sources of human rights norms utilised (chapter 7). The final article, in chapter 8, examines the 
advantages and disadvantages of establishing an SNHRI in a jurisdiction that already possesses 
an NHRI. These articles show that SNHRIs do not exist in isolation from the broader 
international human rights regime, but rather engage with national and international bodies and 
norms in a variety of interesting ways. SNHRI engagement with other elements of the 
international human rights system presents benefits for SNHRIs, as well as for other actors. 
However, there is room for improvement in the nature of SNHRI interaction with other elements 
of the international human rights regime, and several specific measures are proposed to ensure a 
more coherent and mutually beneficial relationship. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 
 
 
1.1 Thesis Introduction  
The international human rights regime has long been loosely conceptualized as a three-
level system, composed of global (UN), regional, and national-level institutions and norms.1 Of 
course, this was never an entirely accurate conception: local governments have long been at the 
heart of human rights implementation, 2  and independent municipal commissions have been 
addressing human rights issues since the 1920s.3 Today, it is even less so. In all regions of the 
world, sub-national actors have become increasingly involved in human rights promotion and 
protection. In many parts of the world, Sub-National Human Rights Institutions (‘SNHRIs’) – 
which I define in chapter 2 of this thesis as independent non-judicial governmental institutions 
that possess a sub-national mandate, and whose mission includes the implementation of human 
rights norms – have come to play important roles in human rights promotion and protection.  
Despite their increasing prominence, SNHRIs have yet to be studied in any systematic 
manner. The articles making up this thesis are intended to take an initial step towards filling this 
gap by addressing three related research questions. First, how do NHRIs currently interact with 
other important actors in the international human rights regime? Second, what are the 
implications of SNHRI interaction or lack of interaction with other human rights actors? Third, 
how can the relationship between SNHRIs and other international human rights actors be 
improved? 
1.2 SNHRIs: An Introduction   
While the term ‘sub-national human rights institution’ has been employed on occasion in 
recent years by the UN and other actors, it has not yet entered wide circulation.4 Thus, before 
                                                          
1 See Yash Ghai, ‘Human Rights and Social Development: Toward Democratization and Social Justice’,  
Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper No. 5 (UN Research Institute for Social 
Development 2001) 6 (‘The national, regional and international levels constitute the global system of 
rights.’);  David Held, ‘The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed’ in David 
Held and Anthony McGrew (eds) Global Transformations (Stanford U Press 1999) 167 (‘The human 
rights regime consists of overlapping global, regional, and national institutions and conventions.’); Rainer 
Arnold, ‘Introduction’ in Rainer Arnold (ed) The Universalism of Human Rights (Springer 2013) xxi 
(book investigates ‘the substantial reach of human rights on national, regional, and universal levels’ and 
‘the convergence of the three levels of human rights protection’); Li-Ann Thio, ‘Implementing Human 
Rights in ASEAN Countries: “Promises to Keep and Miles to Go Before I Sleep”’ (1999) 2 Yale Hum 
Rts & Dev J 1, 7 (advocating ‘a three-tier national/regional/international approach to advancing human 
rights protection’).  
2 Conrad Mugoya Bosire, ‘Local Governments and Human Rights: Building Institutional Links for the 
Effective Protection and Realisation of Human Rights in Africa’ (2011) 11 Afr Hum Rts L J 147, 149 
(‘local government functions are at the core of the realisation of certain basic and fundamental human 
rights obligations’).  
3  See Kenneth Saunders and Hyo Eun Bang, ‘A Historical Perspective on US Human Rights 
Commissions,’ Executive Sessions Papers: Human Rights Commissions and Criminal Justice (June 2007) 
7; Pamela Rice and Milton Greenberg, ‘Municipal Protection of Human Rights’ (1952) Wisc L Rev 679. 
4 For examples of public usage of the term ‘sub-national human rights institution’, see eg, Report by the 
Secretary General: National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, A/66/274 (8 
August 2011) para 95; Address by Navanetham Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights, to the 
 
 
delving into my research questions in greater depth, a brief introduction to the concept is 
warranted. 5 As defined above, SNHRIs can be considered as the sub-national equivalent of 
national human rights institutions (‘NHRIs’), and the two institutional types share many of the 
same characteristics. As is the case with NHRIs, SNHRIs are distinguished by their 
independence: they are governmental bodies, but do not operate under the direction of the 
executive.  
Within the broad SNHRI category are included institutions such as human rights 
commissions, human rights ombudsmen, human rights boards, personeros, defensores del pueblo, 
difensores civicos, médiateurs, etc., as well as institutions that specialize in particular rights such 
as anti-discrimination, the rights of children, or the rights of the disabled. SNHRIs currently exist 
at virtually all administrative levels, from cities and counties to provinces and vast autonomous 
regions. The number of active SNHRIs today is unclear, but certainly there are many thousands, 
as measured by the broad definition used in this thesis. A non-comprehensive list of numbers of 
SNHRIs in selected countries and regions is provided in Annex I, based on data from published 
sources and association membership lists. As this list shows, SNHRIs are widespread in North 
America, Latin America and Europe, and have a significance presence in several Asian nations. 
1.2.1 SNHRI Proliferation 
SNHRIs around the world have considerably different institutional histories. While the 
emergence of NHRIs around the world was largely a product of normative diffusion and 
international pressure during the twenty years following the 1993 elaboration of the Paris 
Principles, SNHRIs have been established as a result of widely varying impulses over the course 
of a longer time period.6 Many times the motives for SNHRI establishment have been more 
intertwined with local politics than global affairs. When looked at globally, however, at least 
four historical patterns are evident when looking at waves of SNHRI proliferation. First, many 
jurisdictions in the common law world established commissions to address local discrimination 
and inter-group harmony issues. In the US, such commissions were often established by cities 
and states in the wake of race riots and protests in the 1940s and 1950s, eventually being 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Annual Meeting of the Coordinating Council of Sub-national Ombudspersons of the Russian Federation, 
‘National Human Rights Protection Systems: The First Ports of Call’ (18 February 2011) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News ID=10798> accessed 18 July 
2016; Leilani Farha, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context’, UN 
Doc A/HRC/28/62, para 76(j) (2014); Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, ‘The Parliamentary 
Committee as Promoter of Human Rights: The UK’s Joint Committee on Human Rights’ (2007) 17.  
5 A comprehensive definition and typology of the term is provided in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
6 Regarding NHRI proliferation, see Sonia Cardenas, ‘Adaptive States: The Proliferation of National 
Human Rights Institutions’, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Working Paper T-01-04 (2001) 3; 
Dongwook Kim, ‘International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of Nationl 
Human Rights Institutions’ (2013) 67 Int’l Org 505. The role of the UN in promoting NHRI 
establishment has been particularly important. Thomas Pegram, ‘Global Human Rights Governance and 
Orchestration: National Human Rights Institutions as Intermediaries’ (2015) 21(3) Eur J Int’l Rel 595, 
603 (‘The massive influx of OHCHR resources to NHRI promotion is well-documented … OHCHR 
engages in orthodox training and capacity-building programmes for NHRIs, alongside other UN agencies, 
UNCTs and NHRI regional partners’). 
 
 
promulgated more widely during the 1960s civil rights movement and as a result of later efforts 
to sustain social change.7 Canadian provinces also developed anti-discrimination commissions 
during the 1960s and 1970s, prior to the establishment of any NHRI at the federal level, as did 
Australian states, starting in 1977.8 In addition to the civil rights concerns of the day, the early 
emphasis on equality rights may also reflect federal divisions of labour in these countries, with 
classic fundamental freedoms (free speech, religion, due process, etc.) and social needs thought 
to be more effectively addressed through national-level legislation and constitutional 
adjudication. Over time, however, some of these common law bodies have expanded their 
mandates to cover a broader range of human rights issues, while others continue to focus solely 
on non-discrimination and equality rights.9 
Second, over the course of the past several decades, the work of existing ombudsman and 
similar independent watchdog institutions have in many cases steadily shifted such that 
ombudspersons now commonly and explicitly implement human rights norms in ways that 
would have been unusual prior to the 1990s. Thus, according to Carlens and Verbeeck, the role 
and missions of ombudsman institutions in Europe can vary widely, but there is a ‘noticeable 
shift in the position of the Ombudsman from a mere mediator towards a protector of fundamental 
rights’.10 This shift in focus has not necessarily been accompanied by any change in formal 
mandate; rather, it is now normal for ombudsman institutions to explicitly cite human rights 
norms and work towards rights protection even if their organic laws do not mention human 
rights.11 Today, at least in the European context, it is in fact possible to say that virtually all 
ombudsman institutions use human rights standards (among other normative sources).12 It is less 
clear, however, whether the full range of civil, economic, social and cultural rights are 
commonly implemented by ombudsman institutions; perhaps because of their institutional 
histories, ombudsmen still tend to emphasise the enforcement of non-discrimination rights, as a 
requirement of ‘fairness’ in administration.  
A third wave of SNHRIs has come as a result of the decentralization requirements (or 
pressures) of human rights implementation in federal states. In several countries, upon the 
establishment of an NHRI, it was clear that SNHRIs would need to be established as well, 
                                                          
7 Saunders and Bang (n 3) 5.  
8 Robert Bryan Howe &and David Johnson, Restraining Equality: Human Rights Commissions in Canada 
(U Toronto Press 2000) 9–12. 
9 Wolman, Sub-National Human Rights Institutions and the Domestication of International Human Rights 
Law, supra note 13, at 115. 
10 Ivo Carlens and Bengt Verbeeck, ‘The Ombudsman: Master Bridge Builder or Quixotic Defender of 
Human Rights’, Paper for EGPA Conference (2010) 19. One can see a similar shift over time for 
Personeros in the Colombian system. Winifred Tate, Colombian State Human Rights Policies 48(8) 
Anthropology News (Nov. 2007) 25, 25 (‘Originally designed as part of local checks against corruption 
and other forms of official abuse, personeros were increasingly charged with “human rights” oversight in 
the mid-1980s’). 
11 Linda Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance, and the International Human Rights System (Brill 
2004) 86; Anita Stuhmcke, ‘Australian Ombudsmen and Human Rights’ (2011) 66 AIAL Forum 43. 
12 See, e.g., Milan Remac, ‘Standards of Ombudsman Assessment: A New Normative Concept?’ (2013) 9 
Utrecht L. Rev. 62, 66. 
 
 
because federalism restrictions would not allow the NHRI to effectively watch over sub-national 
government entities. Thus, the laws establishing NHRIs in India and Russia authorize the 
establishment of SNHRIs by states,13 while the Austrian constitutional provision establishing its 
ombudsman office requires that provinces set up an analogous ombudsman institution if they do 
not want to make use of the federal one.14 In a few other countries, such as the UK, a true NHRI 
never emerged, with SNHRIs separately being established in the various devolved and 
autonomous regions. In many other federal or decentralized states, an NHRI was initially 
established at the national level, but over time local pressures led to municipal or provincial 
governments following suit, either to fill a gap for NHRIs unable to effectively influence sub-
national entities, or in some cases to supplement or replace those NHRIs at the sub-national 
level.15 An analogous decentralizing pressure for SNHRI establishment has at times been present 
at the sub-national level, where provincial-level authorities have urged (or required) 
municipalities to establish their own SNHRIs at the more local level.16  
Finally, and most recently, a number of SNHRIs have been established as part of the 
‘human rights cities’ movement over the past twenty years. The first so-called ‘human rights 
cities’ emerged from the work of the People’s Movement for Human Rights Learning 
(‘PDHRE’), an NGO engaged in trans-national grass-roots human rights activism that 
successfully led communities to work towards letting ‘a human rights framework guide the 
development of the life of the community’.17  Rosario, in Argentina, was the first human rights 
city established through PDHRE’s work, in 1997.18 Since that time, dozens of other cities have 
since followed suit, some using the PDHRE methodology and many other communities simply 
declaring themselves to be ‘human rights cities’ without PDHRE involvement. 19 Sometimes 
these declarations came as a result of civil society-driven initiative, like in Rosario, but in other 
places (such as Barcelona and Graz), local authorities were the driving forces for this 
                                                          
13  The Protection of Human Rights Act of 1993, no 10 of 1994 [amended], ch 5 [India]; Federal 
Constitutional Law on the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, No. 1-FKZ (Feb. 
26, 1997) (Russia). 
14 Austrian Federal Constitution, art 148(i). 
15 This has been the trend in Spain and Latin American countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Paraguay. See, Defensor del Pueblo de España, The Book of the Ombudsman 188 (Defensor del 
Pueblo de España 2003). 
16 ‘Crear Oficinas de Derechos Humanos en los Municipios: López Badillo’ La Jornada de Oriente (13 
February 2013) <http://www.lajornadadeoriente.com.mx/2014/02/13/crear-oficinas-de-derechos-
humanos-en-los-municipios-lopez-badillo/> accessed 28 October 2016 (urging that human rights 
commissions be set up in municipalities in the Mexican state of Puebla); Iowa Code sec 216.19 (2015) 
(mandating human rights commissions in municipalities with over 29,000 inhabitants).   
17  PDHRE, ‘Human Rights Learning and Human Rights Cities: Achievements Report’ (2007) 3 
<http://www.pdhre.org/achievements-HR-cities-mar-07.pdf> accessed 31 October 2016. 
18 ibid, 7. 
19 One list presented by the organizers of the World Human Rights Cities Forum counted fifty cities and 
other sub-national jurisdictions as ‘human rights cities’. 2014 World Human Rights Cities Forum, 
Guidance Document at Expert Workshop on Local Government and Human Rights (15 May 2014) 19. 
 
 
movement.20 Motivations for the human rights cities movement vary for each community; some 
officials may consider human rights to be a promising standard to base policies or a useful 
umbrella to unite various actors and interests, while others may desire to engage in city branding 
or access international networks and funding sources.21  The influence of the human rights cities 
movement has been global in scope, and there are representative human rights cities on every 
continent, representing both the developing and developed world and coming from diverse 
political and legal systems.22 These cities have over time organised in a number of overlapping 
networks,23 and have ended up developing (or adopting) a variety of new norms and guiding 
principles.24 
To date, there is no standard definition of a human rights city; according to Oomen, it can 
simply be defined as ‘an urban entity or local government that explicitly bases its policies, or 
some of them, on human rights as laid down in international treaties, and, in doing so, 
distinguishes itself from other local authorities’.25 Human rights cities go about implementing 
human rights in a range of different ways. Many have established SNHRIs; some examples 
include the Sakai (Japan) Human Rights Committee, the Barcelona (Spain) Human Rights 
Observatory, the Human Rights Commission of Kaohsiung City (Taiwan), the Graz (Austria) 
Human Rights Council, and the Human Rights Commission of Seongbuk-Gu (Korea).26 The 
functions and make-up of these SNHRIs vary widely, but they tend to share a broad human 
rights focus (rather than simply concentrating on discrimination), inspiration from international 
rather than national sources, and strong connections with civil society. Not all human rights cities 
have involved the establishment of SNHRIs, though; some cities have concentrated on the 
elaboration of human rights charters, or have instituted policies of human rights budgeting or 
other types of monitoring.27  
1.2.2 SNHRI Functions 
As is the case with NHRIs, SNHRIs come in many different types and sizes, as shown in 
more detail in Chapter 2. In general, however, SNHRIs currently engage in all the different roles 
                                                          
20 Charlotte Berends et al (eds), Human Rights Cities: Motivations, Mechanisms, Implications (University 
College Roosevelt 2013) 11. 
21 Barbara Oomen, ‘Rights and the City: Does the Localization of Human Rights Contribute to Equality?’ 
in Marjolein van den Brink et al (eds), Equality and human rights: nothing but trouble?, Liber amicorum 
Titia Loenen, SIM Special no 38, SIM (2015) 404. 
22  2014 World Human Rights Cities Forum (n 19) 19. 
23 Examples include the UNESCO International Coalition of Cities Against Racism, United Cities and 
Local Governments, and the UN Global Compact Cities Programme.  
24 Regional or global normative documents include the European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human 
Rights in the City, the World Charter for the Right to the City, the EUROCITIES Integrating Cities 
Charter, and the Global Charter-Agenda for Human Rights in the City.  
25 Barbara Oomen and Moritz Baumgärtel, ‘Human Rights Cities’, in A Mihr and M Gibney (eds), The 
Sage Handbook of Human Rights (Sage 2014) 710. 
26 2014 World Human Rights Cities Forum (n 19) 20-28. 
27 Oomen (n 21) 404. 
 
 
that are commonly seen in NHRIs. 28  This includes promotional functions, such as holding 
awareness campaigns, seminars and workshops, issuing reports and press releases, developing 
human rights curricula, training relevant government officials, and engaging with the community 
through various media. It also includes protective functions, such as conducting human rights 
investigations, engaging in alternative dispute resolution, human rights monitoring, conducting 
public inquiries, receiving individual complaints, and seeking remedies through the court system 
where warranted. NHRI and SNHRIs alike also provide advice to governments and parliaments, 
cooperate and coordinate with other actors, from civil society, government, and the international 
arena, and – in some cases – address the human rights needs of conflict and post-conflict 
societies.29 
There are, however, certain major differences in the functioning of NHRIs and SNHRIs. 
Perhaps because of their (on average) smaller size and budgets, SNHRIs tend to be less likely to 
engage in expensive or time-consuming interventions such as filing or intervening in court 
cases.30 While some SNHRIs are heavily involved in trans-national networking and participating 
in international human rights mechanisms, the level of international engagement is far less than 
that of NHRIs, for reasons that are discussed in greater depth in Chapters 4 and 5. Perhaps most 
importantly, SNHRIs are not subject to the Paris Principles on NHRIs, which incentivise a 
certain level of comprehensiveness in NHRI functioning.31 It is, therefore, relatively common to 
see SNHRIs that only engage in certain tasks (and not others), such as monitoring, complaint-
handling, or awareness-raising, while it is also quite common to see SNHRIs with a restrictive 
subject mandate, focusing on (for example) children’s rights, racial discrimination, or the rights 
of women.32 
1.2.3 SNHRI Effectiveness 
SNHRIs have the potential to extend the reach of international human rights norms and 
institutions to local communities and improve the responsiveness of international bodies to local 
needs. Yet, in many cases it is difficult to know whether they are reaching that potential. In 
contrast to NHRIs, there has been little empirical research of SNHRI effectiveness, nor even 
                                                          
28 Regarding NHRI functions, see, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 
National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities (UN 2010) 22-28. 
29 Some examples of SNHRIs established in the conflict or post-conflict context include the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission, the Mindanao Regional Human Rights Commission, and the 
Independent Human Rights Commission of Kurdistan. 
30 There are certainly instances of very large or well-budgeted SNHRIs, some of which have litigation 
experience, this is far less common than with NHRIs, for many of which court interventions are regular 
occurrences. See, generally, Andrew Wolman, ‘National Human Rights Institutions and the Courts in the 
Asia-Pacific Region’ (2013) 19 Asia Pacific L Rev 237.  
31 Specifically, NHRIs (if they want to be accredited by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights 
Institutions) must engage in human rights promotion and protection (although not necessarily complaint-
handling), encourage legislative incorporation of rights and ratification of human rights treaties, and do all 
this throughout the entirety of a country’s territory and for all human rights subjects. Principles Relating 
to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
[Paris Principles], adopted 20 December 1993, UN GA Res 48/134, A/RES/48/141 (1993).  
32 See chapter 2 for examples of these various types of SNHRIs. 
 
 
adequate conceptualisation of what effectiveness would necessarily entail, or how it would be 
measured. While existing research on effectiveness may be insufficient, it is still possible to give 
some examples of SNHRIs in different parts of the world that are reputed to be effective or 
ineffective, as a way of illustrating the potential of such offices to make a difference in human 
rights outcomes, but also the challenges that they face in order to do so.  
In the US, the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission has been cited for its 
contribution to human rights monitoring and promotion (at least, as measured by output, which is 
easier to measure than human rights outcomes).33 Since 1980, the Commission has annually 
compiled reports on hate crimes in LA County, which it distributes to policy-makers, community 
groups and enforcement agencies. It partnered with the US State Department in the preparatory 
sessions to the 2001 World Conference on Racism, and ended up attending the conference, even 
in the absence of US national representation. It has recommended that the LA County Board of 
Supervisors support bills for a moratorium on the death penalty and the establishment of an 
investigatory commission on the internment of Latin Americans of Japanese descent during 
World War II. In the Latin American context, the Mexico City Human Rights Commission also 
has a reputation for being particularly ambitious and independent in its work.34 According to its 
former president, the Commission has provided education and training to around 220,000 people 
per year and employs 110 lawyers to process claims 365 days a year, 24 % of which come from 
Mexico City’s jails.35 
On the other hand, there are a number of examples of SNHRIs that have been criticised 
for lacking independence or effectiveness, although there is a lack of research here too, regarding 
the precise reasons for their difficulties. For example, state human rights commissions in India 
have often been dismissed for their ineffectiveness, primarily due to a lack of adequate staffing.36 
Meanwhile, some of the regional human rights ombudspersons in the Russian Federation have 
been criticised for their low level of complaint resolution, for lacking independence, and for 
authoritarian tendencies in rights interpretations, as is perhaps unsurprising given the generally 
challenging environment for human rights implementation in Russia in recent years. 37  The 
                                                          
33  See, Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute, ‘State and Local Human Rights Agencies: 
Recommendations for Advancing Opportunity and Equality Through an International Human Rights 
Framework’ (2009) 10. 
34 Interview with OHCHR Staff Member, 13 Sep 2013. 
35 Emilio Alvarez Icaza Longoria, ‘Address at the Executive Session on Human Rights Commissions and 
Criminal Justice’ (12 May 2006) 19 <http://www.hrccj.org/pdfs/emilio_alvarez_transcript1.pdf> accessed 
17 October 2016. 
36 See, National Human Rights Commission of India, ‘NHRC-India Submission to the UN Human Rights 
Council for India’s Second Universal Periodic Review’ 
<http://www.nhrc.nic.in/disparchive.asp?fno=2523> accessed 17 October 2016 (stating that most of the 
Indian State Human Rights Commissions are still inchoate and need to be strengthened); Preeti Mehra, 
‘Commission and their Omissions’ The Hindu (4 March 2014) <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-
ed/commissions-and-their-omissions/article5747146.ece> accessed 17 October 2016 (noting the absence 
of specialists in State Human Rights Commissions and that ‘in most cases, the staff of the commissions 
comprised largely of peons, drivers and assistants.’) 
37 Emma Gilligan, ‘Human Rights Ombudsman in Russia: The Evolution of Horizontal Accountability’ 
(2010) 32 Hum Rts Q 575, 597-598; Andreas Fogelklou, ‘The Regional Ombudsman as a Western 
 
 
human rights ombudsman of Kosovo is a post-conflict SNHRI that is seen to be weak due to a 
lack of political support and financial independence.38 
1.3 Statement of Research 
 Pursuant to 2015 University of Antwerp Faculty of Law regulations on doctoral theses by 
bundle, this doctoral thesis is comprised of seven journal articles, in addition to the introduction 
and conclusion chapters. Five of the articles have already been published, while two others are 
forthcoming. The first of these articles (chapter 2 of this thesis) introduces the SNHRI concept 
and proposes an SNHRI definition and typology. 39  Specifically, I argue that independent 
governmental human rights bodies at the sub-national level comprise a meaningful group that 
can be understood as a sub-national counterpart to National Human Rights Institutions. In 
accordance with the term’s growing usage among human rights practitioners, I label these bodies 
as SNHRIs. I then stipulate and justify a general SNHRI definition and a scientific typology of 
SNHRIs based on administrative level, institutional form, and breadth of mandate. This article is 
intended to accomplish three objectives. First, it provides an SNHRI operational definition and 
typology for this doctoral thesis and justifies the study of SNHRIs as a meaningful concept apart 
from other related institutional concepts. Second, by developing a generally applicable SNHRI 
definition and typology, it is intended to facilitate further research into SNHRIs. Third, by 
clarifying terminology related to SNHRIs, the article is intended to provide a vocabulary to 
practitioners for talking about the relatively new SNHRI concept in a way that can be more 
easily understood. 
 The next five chapters comprise articles that explore different aspects of the relationship 
between SNHRIs and other institutions and norms present in the international human rights 
regime. While each of these articles takes a somewhat different approach, they share a focus on 
one or more of the three research questions addressed in this thesis: the descriptive (typological) 
question of how SNHRIs currently interact with other elements of the human rights regime; the 
analytical question of what are the implications of these interactions, and the prescriptive 
question of how these interactions can be optimized from a human rights perspective. Chapter 3 
presents an empirical comparison of how SNHRIs interact with NHRIs in federal states. 40 I 
conclude that there is so far a wide variety of methods for addressing federal division of power 
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and responsibility concerns. Strict forms of dual federalism are rarely embraced however, and 
the relationship between national and sub-national institutions, where both exist, has been 
characterised by both episodic cooperation and significant tensions. 
 In chapter 4, I explore SNHRI participation in the UN human rights regime.41 I show that 
while SNHRIs are often viewed as distinctly local bodies with little connection to global human 
rights procedures and mechanisms, in fact this conception is not entirely accurate. While some 
SNHRIs are purely focused on acting internally to their jurisdiction, many others can and do 
participate in the UN human rights regime through both the charter-based and treaty-based 
mechanisms. I argue that such participation is beneficial for the UN human rights system, and 
propose ways that the UN can encourage SNHRI engagement. 
 Chapter 5 explores the role that transgovernmental networks play for SNHRIs, and 
contrast that to the role that such networks have played for the development of NHRIs.42 I argue 
that while some SNHRIs are able to derive benefits from their membership in ombudsman 
associations, SNHRIs are currently missing out on many of the other benefits that NHRIs derive 
from their membership in the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 
(‘GANHRI’, formerly known as the International Coordinating Committee of National Human 
Rights Institutions) and its affiliated networks. I therefore propose that GANHRI establish a 
separate membership category for SNHRIs, with membership conditioned on compliance with a 
set of principles based on the Paris Principles, but revised so as to be applicable to sub-national 
bodies. 
 Chapter 6 turns to the question of how SNHRIs make use of international law norms in 
their work. 43  I argue that some (but not all) SNHRIs are increasingly involved in the 
domestication of international human rights law through their quasi-judicial resolution of 
disputes, promotion of governmental compliance with international norms; promotion of 
international norms in civil society; promotion of the use of international norms by the courts, 
and use of international norms as standards in human rights monitoring. I explore the 
implications of these actions, and conclude that the use of international law by SNHRIs is largely 
beneficial from a human rights perspective.  
In chapter 7 I conduct a case study of the development of one SNHRI – the Seoul Human 
Rights Ombudsperson Office – and how this institution relates to the existing international 
human rights regime.44 Specifically, the case study addresses three distinct issues, namely the 
degree to which the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office reflects local versus national or 
international influences, the types of institutional relationships it has with other human rights 
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actors, and the degree to which it implements local versus national or international human rights 
norms. 
Finally, chapter 8 applies conceptual findings from political science research on 
decentralisation, together with (where possible) empirical findings on local human rights 
implementation, to examine the advantages and disadvantages of establishing an SNHRI in a 
jurisdiction that already possesses an NHRI. This leads to conclusions on which types of 
jurisdictions are most likely to gain value from the establishment of an SNHRI. This chapter is 
followed by a brief conclusion, which sums up my findings from these articles, and their 
practical and theoretical implications, and proposes new directions for future SNHRI research. 
1.4 Research Questions  
 This thesis explores the place of SNHRIs in the international human rights regime, using 
Keohane and Nye’s broad definition of an international regime as the ‘networks of rules, norms, 
and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects,’ in a particular issue-area, in this 
case human rights.45 The thesis attempts to answer three broad questions. First: how do SNHRIs 
currently interact with other important actors in the international human rights regime? This 
element of the research is largely typological and structural in nature. I do not attempt to quantify 
the precise numbers of SNHRIs that participate in or engage with other elements of the 
international human rights regime in particular ways; rather I concentrate on fleshing out the 
types of interactions that currently are taking place, as well as touching upon the types of 
interactions that are not yet common but could potentially emerge in the future. While addressing 
this first question, a sub-question that is present throughout is how SNHRIs resemble and differ 
from NHRIs in their interactions with the broader human rights system. This injects an element 
of comparative analysis into the research, and leads to comparative findings that are analysed in 
the rest of the thesis. 
The second research question addressed in this thesis is: what are the implications of 
SNHRI interaction or lack of interaction with other human rights actors? This section pays 
particular attention to the question of how SNHRIs can add value to the work of the existing 
range of human rights actors, and how existing actors can contribute to the success of SNHRIs. 
This element of my thesis employs a range of legal, political, and sociological frameworks to 
analyse the implications of SNHRI engagement. The particular type of analysis varies in each 
article; while analysis of the relationship between SNHRIs and NHRIs and the relationship 
between SNHRIs and the United Nations system largely relies on conceptual frameworks from 
theories of federalism and subsidiarity, the article on SNHRI use of international norms makes 
more use of the literature on norm diffusion and localization, and the article on SNHRI 
transnational networking engages with theories of trans-governmentalism from Slaughter and 
others. 
The third research question that I address is: how can the relationship between SNHRIs 
and other international human rights actors be improved? Specifically, how can SNHRIs and the 
other elements of the human rights system develop a synergistic and coherent relationship that 
contributes to the shared goal of improving respect for human rights at the ground level? This 
element of the thesis will be more prescriptive. Building on the descriptive and analytical 
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findings, I propose concrete measures that can be taken both by SNHRIs themselves and by other 
domestic and international actors. This exercise is responsive to a widely felt need for greater 
systemic coherence; as Thomas Hammarberg put is, ‘[t]he main challenge is now to enhance the 
interaction between international, national and local authorities, to promote systematic human 
rights planning, where local and national needs are matched coherently with agreed international 
norms.’46 
It is important to note that while I attempt to provide a broad perspective on the 
relationship between SNHRIs and the international community, my research does not 
comprehensively cover all possible relationships between SNHRIs and other existing human 
rights actors or norms. Notably, it does not investigate how civil society organisations interact 
with SNHRIs, and whether such interactions are different in any meaningful way than how civil 
society organisations interact with NHRIs. Nor does it address whether and how regional human 
rights organisations are interacting with SNHRIs. In particular, research into the Council of 
Europe’s relationship with SNHRIs would be interesting, given that organisation’s prominent 
advocacy of local human rights implementation and principles of subsidiarity over the past three 
decades.47 SNHRI engagement with particular types of international human rights norms such as 
economic and social rights could also be a subject of productive future research. In theory, one 
could expect economic and social rights to be of particular interest to SNHRIs, given that such 
rights are frequently impacted by local regulations. 48  The degree to which SNHRIs can 
effectively address corporate human rights responsibility or migrant rights issues provides 
similarly rich grounds for future study. 
1.5 Significance of Study 
 The articles comprising this thesis are significant in three important respects. First, these 
articles find that the SNHRI concept is a relevant institutional type for analysis, and that SNHRIs 
exist as a global phenomenon (with many local variations), rather than as purely local or national 
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institutional types. This contrasts with previous research on the subject, which (as described 
below) has tended to concentrate on a single institution or institutional type in isolation from the 
broader human rights regime. While researchers have been reluctant to discuss SNHRIs as a 
global phenomenon, this thesis shows that global and regional governance institution, such as the 
UN, have been ahead of the curve in recognizing the distinctiveness of SNHRIs and struggling to 
make a place for them in their established structures. In this respect, my study most resembles 
the first generation of NHRI research, which helped establish NHRIs as a discrete and important 
institutional type.49 Accordingly, the thesis is intended to provide a helpful point of departure for 
future SNHRI research (as was the case with the early NHRI studies). 
Second, my thesis examines SNHRIs in the light of two decades of intensive research 
into NHRIs, and their evolution, impact, and effectiveness. This is not done uncritically; indeed, 
a running theme throughout this thesis will be whether SNHRIs should be thought of (and treated) 
as mini-NHRIs, or whether they are distinctive in meaningful ways beyond their sub-national 
mandate. Thus, in many respects, this thesis will compare the role of NHRIs and the role of 
SNHRIs, and where relevant will discuss whether (and how) research findings with respect to 
NHRIs might also be applicable to SNHRIs. While NHRI researchers have occasionally touched 
on sub-national institutions, especially in their comparative studies, this thesis will for the first 
time apply the wide body of NHRI knowledge specifically to sub-national institutions.   
Third, this study applies a range of recent theoretical and conceptual findings from the 
political science, socio-legal and legal anthropology fields to SNHRIs in a manner which has not 
previously been attempted. In particular, this thesis will incorporate work on subsidiarity and 
localization of human rights (in chapter 6); federalism and decentralization (in chapter 3), and 
trans-governmental networks (in chapter 5). Past studies of SNHRIs, on the other hand, have 
tended to examine their significance from a federalism framework or according to the domestic 
legal concepts of their home countries. By incorporating a range of interdisciplinary research 
concepts and theoretical understandings, this thesis will provide a more nuanced and 
multidisciplinary perspective on the place of SNHRIs in the international human rights regime. 
Concretely, the articles in this thesis contribute to our knowledge about the relationship 
of SNHRIs to NHRIs and the international human rights regime and also provide the basis for 
improving the management of that regime across all of its levels. My primary conclusion will be 
the following: such institutions are not currently – and should not in the future be – isolated, 
local bodies, acting apart from the broader international human rights regime. Rather, they often 
possess a variety of institutional and normative links with other important human rights actors, 
and such linkages must be managed appropriately in order to optimize the common end goal of 
human rights promotion and protection.  
1.6 Research Methods 
1.6.1 Research Approach 
Broadly speaking, in these articles, I am engaged in an institutional analysis of the 
interactions of SNHRIs with different actors and norms in the international human rights regime, 
according to a variety of conceptual frameworks (expanded upon below) from political science, 
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international law and socio-legal studies.50 Consistent with the ‘global governance’ framework 
that informs much of this work, I do not analyse SNHRIs in isolation, but rather as constituent 
elements of a dynamic global human rights system, whose work has broader implications. As a 
result of my analyses in these articles, I come to conclusions that are both typological in nature 
(i.e., the types of engagement with the UN that are being undertaken by SNHRIs) and normative 
(i.e., the desirability of such engagement). While my studies analyse the types of international 
law used by SNHRIs and the frequency of such usage, it does not involve classic legal analysis, 
that is to say the analysis of the legality of particular facts under particular international law 
norms. Rather, it is focused on understanding the roles of SNHRIs as law-developing, law-
implementing, and law-transforming institutions. 
 Although the methodology for each article is discussed in more detail in the articles 
themselves, the research for this thesis in broad terms relies on a case-oriented approached, 
which is supported by subsidiary comparative analysis. According to Pascal Vennesson, a case is 
a ‘phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualized and analysed empirically as a manifestation 
of a broader class of phenomena or events.’51 Here, the SNHRI as an institutional form is the 
phenomenon that is studied. While this thesis concentrates on classifying types of SNHRIs (in 
chapter 2), it is possible to move up what Giovanni Sartori terms the ‘ladder of abstraction’ and 
conclude that SNHRIs are a type of the larger class of governmental human rights institution or, 
more broadly, a type of governmental administrative institution.52 Thus, I apply the theoretical 
approaches devised from work on the operations of other governmental human rights institutions 
and (more broadly) administrative institutions to analyse the relationship of SNHRIs with the 
broader international human rights regime and the usage of international norms.  
 The articles in this thesis also take a comparative approach by comparing SNHRI 
engagement with the broader international human rights regime and NHRI engagement with the 
international human rights regime. In his classic work on social science methods, Sartori has 
argued that one can only compare within classes.53 From this perspective, NHRIs and SNHRIs 
are appropriate entities for comparison because they are both members of the higher class of 
'domestic human rights institutions', as mentioned above. The comparison will relate to both the 
institutional relationships undertaken by SNHRIs and NHRIs and also the usage of international 
law norms. This comparison will also involve explanation of why these two members of the 
same class have had different experiences with their engagement with the rest of the international 
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human rights regime, and whether the differences (or similarities) are justified by theories of 
human rights implementation.  
1.6.2 Data Sources 
Wherever possible, the articles in this thesis are based on materials published by SNHRIs 
themselves. This includes, most notably, the statutes and decrees that establish SNHRIs and 
define their mandates; annual and ad hoc reports produced by SNHRIs, and SNHRI press 
releases and awareness-raising documents. This information was largely available at the websites 
of SNHRIs, although the amount of information available varies quite significantly from 
institution to institution. The websites of trans-governmental associations of SNHRIs (such as 
the International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies or the Asociación Defensores 
del Pueblo de la República Argentina) also constituted an important source of information on 
SNHRIs and their activities. In addition, SNHRI recommendations in response to individual 
petitions provided an interesting data source in several cases, although only a relatively small 
percentage of SNHRIs comprehensively publish recommendations on their websites. It is rare for 
non-anglophone SNHRI documents or websites to be translated into English (in contrast with 
NHRI publications, which are often available in English, even in non-English speaking 
countries). 54 There is, therefore, somewhat of an emphasis on English, French, and Spanish 
language sources in this thesis, reflecting those languages in which I have reading proficiency. In 
some instances, however, I have had foreign language materials translated into English by a 
research assistant (for example, Korean-language material related to the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office). For my case study of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson, published 
materials were supplemented by semi-structured interviews of relevant actors from the Seoul 
Human Rights Ombudsperson office and the associated Seoul Human Rights Center. 
 Secondary sources have also been used in many cases to gain more information about 
SNHRI practices. While there has not been a large amount of conceptual or comparative studies 
of SNHRIs, there have been a number of useful case studies on SNHRIs in particular countries 
(or, less often, of particular SNHRIs), generally produced by scholars from those countries and 
geared towards domestic practitioners more than international observers. These studies (which 
are discussed below) provided rich supplemental data sources in several cases, particularly 
regarding SNHRIs in the United States, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and Spain. 
1.7 Literature Review 
1.7.1 Literature Focusing on SNHRIs 
Compared to the abundant literature on NHRIs, there have been relatively few studies 
specifically focused on SNHRIs. In some countries, this may be a product of their relatively 
recent appearance. Elsewhere, it is perhaps more a reflection of the general reluctance to study 
local administrative organs, which are sometimes seen as less important than national or 
international actors.55 In particular, there have been few studies that look at SNHRIs in multiple 
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countries.56 Rather, the existing literature is largely composed of single institution case studies 
and studies of particular forms of SNHRI in a single country.  
Examples of SNHRI case studies include Melissa Crouch’s case study of the Yogyakarta 
Local Ombudsman,57 Joshua Stark’s study of the Kerala Ombudsman,58 Sung Soo Hong’s case 
study of the Seoul Human Rights Commission, 59  and Rafael Torres Hinojosa’s detailed 
institutional examination of the Tamaulipas Human Rights Commission. 60  Often these case 
studies conclude with an evaluation of the SNHRI’s performance, although the SNHRI literature 
has not yet addressed the important question of how best to evaluate SNHRI performance to the 
same degree that has been done for NHRIs. Articles on SNHRI forms in particular countries 
have likewise generally been descriptive case studies, often starting with an overview of the 
historical evolution of the particular institutional type, followed by an overview of current 
practices and issues. Examples of this type of research include R. Bryan Howe and David 
Johnson’s study of Canadian human rights commissions,61 Marco A. Quiroz Vitale’s article on 
Italian ombudspersons,62 Zulima Sánchez Sánchez’s article on local defensores del pueblo in 
Spain,63 Lawrence Beer’s early study of the local human rights commissioner system in Japan,64 
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and a number of studies on local human rights commissions in the United States.65 Some articles 
have been more policy-oriented, exploring particular problems facing SNHRIs or more broadly 
questioning whether SNHRIs are appropriate in a particular country.66   
While these strands of the literature have mainly shied away from close examination of 
the relationships between SNHRIs and other aspects of the international human rights regime, 
there are a few notable exceptions. Two studies of Personeros Municipales in Colombia have 
discussed their use of international law.67 In addition, Risa Kaufman and others have written in 
some detail on the relationship between US state and local human rights commissions and the 
international human rights regime.68 While these studies were confined to single countries, they 
provided valuable data for my more globally oriented research. 
1.7.2 Literature discussing SNHRIs in other contexts 
 In addition to the relatively few studies focusing solely on SNHRIs, there is a wider range 
of books and articles that discuss SNHRIs in the context of broader themes. These studies can be 
divided into three broad types. First, it is quite common for NHRI-focused research to also 
address SNHRIs (although often just tangentially). Second, there are studies of institutional types, 
such as the defensor del pueblo or ombudsman, that discuss the functioning or evolution of these 
institutions at both the national and sub-national levels. Third, there is a more recent research 
track that investigates how local areas can best promote and protect human rights; this research 
at times also explores the use of SNHRIs.  
 Within the NHRI-focused literature, SNHRIs are rarely addressed in great depth, 
although they are sometimes discussed in passing. In Chains of Justice by Sonia Cardenas, for 
example, the evolution of U.S. state and local human rights commissions is examined in the 
context of the historic precursors to NHRIs, while the rest of the book concentrates on national 
level institutions.69 In some cases, SNHRIs from autonomous or devolved regions are given 
particular attention in NHRI studies, in part because they are sometimes categorized as NHRIs. 
Thus, in Julie Mertus’ Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human Rights 
Institutions, there are case studies of five domestic human rights institutions; four of which are 
NHRIs and one (the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission) an SNHRI. 70 The Northern 
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Ireland Human Rights Commission was also one of three SNHRIs that were compared with 
NHRIs in a recent study of institutional performance by Sarah Spencer and Colin Harvey.71 This 
literature sometimes implicitly assumes that SNHRIs are functionally the same as NHRIs, an 
assumption that I question in this thesis. 
 A second group of studies are focused on studying aspects of human rights institutions in 
a particular country, addressing both national and sub-national institutions in this context. For 
example, Monica Beltrán Gaos, in her book on the National Human Rights Commission of 
Mexico, devotes a chapter to Mexican State Human Rights Commissions and another chapter to 
the relationship between State Commissions and the National Human Rights Commission.72 In 
the US context, there have been numerous studies on state and local human rights policy dating 
back several decades; this work often analyzes state and local human rights commissions in a 
broader context.73 These and similar studies constituted useful resources for understanding the 
institutional make-up of particular SNHRIs, as well as their relationships with other domestic 
actors, such as NHRIs or the court system.  
 The third research strand that has touched upon SNHRIs (although usually just in passing) 
has been a relatively recent set of articles and books focusing on the implementation of human 
rights at the local level. Much of this literature has been relatively advocacy-oriented, such as the 
evaluations of ‘Human Rights Cities’ produced by The People’s Movement for Human Rights 
Learning. 74  While the ‘Human Rights Cities’ concept tends to focus more on civil society 
elements than governmental institutions, some of these cities have established municipal 
SNHRIs. 75  Particular mention should be made of research programs carried out by the 
International Council on Human Rights Policy (‘ICHRP’) and the Human Rights Institute at 
Columbia University that have produced groundbreaking work on local human rights 
implementation. ICHRP conducted a research project on the links between human rights and 
local governments, resulting in five working papers and a 2002 report.76 Since 2010, the Human 
Rights Institute at Columbia University has been actively researching human rights at the local 
level through the ongoing Bringing Human Rights Home research and advocacy project, which 
has so far resulted in eight reports along with a book and several articles on state and local 
human rights implementation. 77 In 2013, the UN Human Rights Council also requested the 
Human Rights Council Advisory Committee to prepare ‘a research-based report on the role 
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of local government in the promotion and protection of human rights’; this report was 
issued in 2015.78 While these strands of local rights research sometimes only touch the surface of 
SNHRIs, they often bring up interesting conceptual justifications for human rights 
implementation at the local level and sometimes consider local human rights implementation as a 
global concern.  
1.7.3 Literature on the Place of NHRIs in the International Human Rights Regime 
 While SNHRIs have so far mostly been studied in isolation from the broader human 
rights system, the same cannot be said for NHRIs. In fact, over the past decade there has been a 
wide range of research into the relationship between NHRIs and other elements of the 
international human rights regime. Many of these studies fall into the ‘NHRI and…’ category; 
that is to say that they analyse the relationship between NHRIs and another important actor in the 
human rights world. These would include books and articles on NHRI and the UN,79 NHRIs and 
the African regional human rights system,80 NHRIs and civil society organizations,81 and NHRIs 
and the courts.82 These empirical studies have established that NHRIs are a well-accepted part of 
the current human rights system and have over the past decade solidified their status as important 
actors at the global and regional levels. They have specifically demonstrated the increasingly 
prominent contribution of NHRIs to Human Rights Council discussions, both individually and 
through their regional and global networks.83 
Another set of studies has focused more on the role of NHRIs in transmitting 
international human rights norms to the local level and (in some accounts) developing local 
issues into the language of human rights. This strand of the literature has produced valuable 
works from political science, legal, and sociological perspectives.84 Among the most influential 
studies are those by Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram investigating the socio-legal 
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mechanisms by which NHRIs actually bring about social change.85 The articles in my thesis owe 
much to the findings of both these research tracks, and in a sense can be interpreted as an 
investigation into whether those findings are also true for SNHRIs.  
1.8 Conceptual Background 
 The articles in this thesis draw from a number of different theories and concepts in the 
international law and political science literature. The three most prominent research frameworks 
that are drawn upon are those of global governance, decentralisation, and localisation. Here, I 
will briefly introduce the concepts from these frameworks that are most relevant to this thesis. In 
the conclusion chapter, I will discuss in more depth precisely how these concepts have been 
employed and what the implications of my research are for their further development. 
1.8.1 Global Governance  
At the broadest level, the articles constituting this thesis draw from and build upon the 
global governance strand of political science literature. The term ‘global governance’ first 
emerged in the 1990s in the influential works of James Rosenau, who used the term to refer to 
‘systems of rule at all levels of human activity—from the family to the international 
organization—in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has trans-national 
repercussions.’ 86  In the following years, the concept of ‘global governance’ entered the 
mainstream of the international relations field, although it evolved to encompass multiple senses 
and meanings.87  Thus, global governance has in recent years been characterized as a descriptive 
term, a theory, a framework, and a perspective or view.88 In all of these senses, however, global 
governance signalled an increasing openness to viewing international politics as more than 
merely the domain of the Westphalian nation-state.89 
While the global governance framework may have a range of senses in different contexts, 
one way in which it has been used (and that I will use here) is to refer to a set of analytical 
perspectives that differ from traditional international relations work. In this context, Dingwerth 
and Pattberg identify four particular traits of global governance research. 90  First, it is not 
primarily concerned with inter-state politics, but rather views states as one of many influential 
actors at the international level, including corporations, NGOs, and other non-state and quasi-
state actors.91 Second, it views the international political order as a multi-level system, where 
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‘local, national, regional, and global political processes are inseparably linked.’92 Third, global 
governance research does not favour a particular form or mechanism of governance, such as 
power relations, inter-state bargaining, norms, or advocacy networks, but rather sees each of 
these governance forms existing alongside one another, without a set hierarchy or organizing 
principle. 93  Fourth, global governance research addresses the emergence of new forms of 
authority in world politics, apart from sovereign states.94  Thus, according to Dingwerth and 
Pattberg, academic research that adopts a global governance perspective often asks questions 
such as: ‘What dynamics characterize the two spheres [transnational and international]? What 
factors determine whether actors seek to achieve their goals through one sphere and not through 
the other? And what kind of interactions exist between the two spheres?’95 Unlike mainstream 
international relations research, global governance research often takes on fundamental 
normative questions, as well, such as ‘what forms of organization and governance should prevail, 
how scarce resources should be allocated, and what kind of policy ought to be put in place’.96  
1.8.2 Decentralisation and Subsidiarity  
 While the analytic focus of this thesis is the relationship between SNHRIs and the rest of 
the international human rights regime, it also draws from a broader multi-disciplinary literature 
on sub-national human rights implementation, especially when exploring the ways in which 
SNHRIs can best contribute to human rights governance.  
In the domestic legal context, many political science and law scholars have investigated 
local human rights implementation through the lenses of federalism and decentralisation theories. 
The broad question of whether (and when) federalism is good or bad for human rights 
implementation has been addressed quite intensely by lawyers and political scientists in the 
United States for many years. 97  More recently, this branch of research has delved more 
specifically into questions of how the federalist system effects US compliance with human rights 
treaties.98 Similar literatures exist for other federal or decentralised countries, and there have also 
been a number of more conceptual studies on federalism and rights.99 However, the real world 
helpfulness of these studies is not clear; federal systems tend to be idiosyncratic, with widely 
differing jurisprudences and traditions of inter-level relations in different countries, and general 
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rules may be difficult to find.100 Federalism has also been seen by some as a useful lens for 
studying the international human rights regime.101 
In the international law literature, the principle of subsidiarity has been of particular 
importance in justifying a robust role for local government in the human rights field. 102 
Subsidiarity has been most prominently used in the European Union context, where it has been 
defined in the Lisbon Treaty to hold that for issue areas where the EU and member States share 
authority, the states should make decisions unless EU action would ensure higher comparative 
efficiency or more effectively achieve specific objectives.103 The principle of subsidiarity has 
over the past decade been increasingly utilized outside of the European context as a way of 
framing questions of power and competency delegation at the international and domestic levels, 
oftentimes in such a way as to prioritize local governance.104 Thus, according to Bosire, the 
subsidiarity principle ‘calls on national governments to refrain from taking over functions that 
are best or most appropriately performed by local government [and] local government is best 
suited to fulfil fundamental human rights such as participation and involvement’. 105  Paolo 
Carozzo has been particularly influential in applying subsidiarity to human rights governance, 
claiming that subsidiarity should be recognized as a structural principle of human rights law that 
promotes respect for pluralism while remaining deeply consonant with the substantive vision of 
human dignity and the universal common good expressed by human rights norms. 106 While 
current interpretations of the principle of subsidiarity are heavily debated, the literature on 
subsidiarity does help shed light on some of the questions addressed in this thesis surrounding 
the appropriate role of SNHRIs in the broader international rights regime. 
1.8.3 Human Rights Localisation 
Meanwhile, in recent years a number of sociolegal studies of local rights implementation 
have investigated the means by which international human rights norms are transmitted to the 
local level, some of which have focused specifically on the role of national or sub-national 
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human rights institutions.107 These studies often stress the importance of local human rights 
implementation for improving conditions on the ground.108 They also tend to view the element of 
struggle as important for human rights vindication109 and sometimes see local values as critical 
in opposing a globalisation that itself threatens human rights, and especially economic and social 
rights. These studies have introduced the concept of ‘localisation’, which was first defined by 
Amitav Acharya as ‘the active construction [of new norms] through discourse, framing, grafting, 
and cultural selection of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing 
significant congruence with local beliefs and practices’.110  
Localisation has since been reconceived by Koen De Feyter to imply ‘taking the human 
rights needs as formulated by local people (in response to the impact of economic globalization 
on their lives) as the starting point both for the further interpretation and elaboration of human 
rights norms, and for the development of human rights action, at all levels ranging from the 
domestic to the global.’ 111  This framework has been used to develop a methodology for 
investigating the relevance of human rights to contemporary issues of poverty, exclusion and 
marginalisation.112 De Feyter stresses that localisation ‘depends on cooperation between actors at 
different levels.’113 Tom Zwart has similarly embraced a local implementation of human rights 
norms (in the developing world) with a model that he calls the ‘receptor approach’114  According 
to Zwart, the receptor approach identifies core elements of the global human rights regime and 
analogous phenomena in the societies of implementing states. Where possible, analogous social 
arrangements are then employed to comply with human rights obligations, without explicitly 
relying on legal rights norms. 
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Local human rights implementation (and its implications for the broader human rights 
regime) have also been analysed from a legal anthropology perspective, most prominently by 
Sally Merry. Through a series of detailed case studies, Merry proposed the concept of 
vernacularisation to characterise the process whereby international human rights norms are 
transmitted from the global sphere to local areas and the way in which local issues and problems 
become rephrased in human rights terms.115 Through the vernacularisation process, new ideas 
are framed in ways that are resonant with pre-existing ideas of justice and order, while 
preserving their essential attributes and potential to transform unequal or unjust local social 
relations and circumstances.116 Put simply, vernacularisers ‘‘take the ideas and practices of one 
group and present them in terms that another group will accept’’. 117 To Merry, this process 
should be encouraged, as vernacularisation is in fact necessary for human rights to be effective 
and seen as legitimate in new environments. 118  Merry sees the ‘translators’ who develop 
localized norms as the key actors in the vernacularisation process. 119 Translators must both 
translate up, reframing local grievances by portraying them as human rights violations, and 
translate down, reframing international norms in locally relevant terms.120 Generally, they are 
individuals who ‘‘straddle the global and the local and act as intermediaries between these two 
arenas’’121 and can include local activists, NGO staff, social movement activists, human rights 
lawyers, and academics.122  
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Annex I: Number of SNHRIs in selected countries and regions 
Country SNHRIs Type(s) Source 
Argentina At least 35 Regional and Local Human 
Rights Ombudsmen  
Asociación Defensores del 
Pueblo de la República 
Argentina (2016)123 
Australia 8 State and Territorial Human 
Rights and Anti-discrimination 
Commissions 
Report to UN Human Rights 
Committee (2016)124 
California At least  52 Local (city and county) human 
rights commissions 
California Association of 
Human Relations 
Organizations (2016)125 
Canada At least 11 Provincial and Territorial human 
rights commissions 
Canadian Association of 
Statutory Human Rights 
Agencies (2016)126 
Catalunya 40 Local human rights ombudsmen  Molin (2010)127 
Colombia At least 
1,102 
Local and regional human rights 
ombudsmen  
Federación Nacional de 
Personeros de Colombia 
(2016)128 
Council of 
Europe 
region 
‘close to 
1,000’ 
Local human rights and classical 
ombudsmen 
Council of Europe 
Background Paper (2007)129 
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India 23 State human rights commissions Minister of State in the 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
(2014)130 
Japan ‘about 
14,000’ 
Local Human Rights Protectors Koike (2014)131 
Korea 15 Provincial and local human 
rights commissions and 
ombudsmen 
Korea Human Rights 
Foundation (2014)132 
Mexico 32 State (and DF) Human Rights 
Commissions 
Rábago (2008)133 
Minnesota At least 44 Local (city and county) human 
rights commissions 
League of Minnesota Human 
Rights Commissions 
(2016)134 
Philippines 14,406 Local (Barangay) Human Rights 
Action Centres 
Commission on Human 
Rights of the Philippines 
(2013)135 
Russia 71 Regional human rights 
ombudsmen 
European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance 
(2013) 136 
Spain 11 Regional Human Rights 
Ombudsmen 
Mora (2003)137 
Turkey ‘around 900’ Local human rights boards Roberts & Adamson (2011)138 
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Abstract In this paper, I argue that independent governmental human rights
bodies at the sub-national level now comprise a meaningful group that can be
understood as a sub-national counterpart to National Human Rights Institutions. In
accordance with the term’s growing usage among human rights practitioners, I
label these bodies as BSub-national Human Rights Institutions^ (BSNHRIs^). So
far, however, SNHRIs (as a general concept) have been the subject of very little
academic attention, although there have been many studies of individual SNHRIs
or particular types of SNHRIs. With the objective of promoting coherent and
generalizable research into this relatively new institutional concept, in this paper I
therefore stipulate and justify a general SNHRI definition and a scientific typology
of SNHRIs based on administrative level, institutional form, and breadth of
mandate.
Keywords Ombudsman .HumanRightsCommission .Federalism .Typology.National
Human Rights Institution
Introduction
In this article, I undertake three tasks. First, I argue that there exists a meaningful
group of governmental human rights bodies characterized principally by their
independence and sub-national mandate. I label these bodies as BSub-National Human
Rights Institutions^ (BSNHRIs^). Second, I stipulate a general definition for SNHRIs,
namely that they are independent non-judicial governmental institutions that possess a
sub-national mandate, and whose mission includes the implementation of human rights
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norms. This definition is then elucidated at a second level of specificity, with definitional
choices justified and hard cases highlighted. Third, I propose a multi-variable typology
of SNHRIs. This typology is crafted so as to be comprehensive and exclusive, and is
based on three variables: administrative level. institutional type, and breadth of mandate.
My intent in this paper is to lay the groundwork for future research and analysis of
SNHRIs. While definition and classification are often neglected undertakings in the
human rights literature, they play fundamental roles in the scientific enterprise (Bailey
1994, p. 1; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996, p. 28; Sartori 2009, p. 170). When
there are multiple definitions (or a lack of definitions) for a concept being studied, then
the extent to which any particular research findings are generally applicable often
remains unclear (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996, p. 27; Gerring and Barresi
2003, p. 202). Knowledge accumulation and productive argumentation remain difficult
(Gerring and Barresi 2009, p. 241) and comparative studies suffer from the lack of a
common framework to conduct research and present findings (Sartori 1970, p. 1039;
Mair 2008, p. 177). As one researcher notes, B[a]rguably, the most fruitful research
programs in social science—those that produce the most knowledge—are those in
which the key concepts are agreed on and defined the same way by all^ (Mueller 2003,
p. 162). Typologies are likewise fundamental to academic research. Descriptive social
science typologies contribute to Bforming and refining concepts, drawing out underly-
ing dimensions, creating categories for classification and measurement, and sorting
cases^ (Collier et al. 2012, p. 217). Typologies also allow researchers to understand
relationships among related phenomena, and can help highlight under-explored areas
(Eppler and Mengis 2011, p. 7).
It is particularly important to establish an accepted general definition and typology
for a concept at an early stage of research into that concept, in order to avoid the
evolution of multiple divergent definitions as a research program develops (Mueller
2003, p. 162; Sartori 2009, p. 172). National Human Rights Institutions (BNHRIs^)
may in this respect provide something of a cautionary tale: over the past two decades, a
large number of (sometime wildly) different NHRI definitions and typologies have
been proposed in different situations, with the result being that it is difficult to
generalize conclusions from studies that utilize a range of definitions and typologies.1
In addition, the first generation of NHRI research largely focused on descriptive
analyses of institutional design and effectiveness, with little of the systematic social
scientific investigation that one might have expected to see, given the large number of
NHRIs and the diversity among them (Cardenas 2012, p. 32). While there are various
possible reasons for this, the lack of an accepted definition and typology that could be
used for structured comparisons or the construction of a large-n dataset has arguably
contributed to this research underdevelopment, and by extension to the widely held
view that NHRIs are still Bundertheorized and not well understood^ (Goodman and
Pegram 2012, p. 3).2
With regards to the SNHRI concept however, academic research is indeed in its
earliest stages. With a few exceptions, academic books and articles have only in passing
1 According to one report, Bthere are as many typologies of NHRIs as papers written about them^
(International Council on Human Rights Policy 2005, p. 6).
2 Since 2012, new research into NHRIs has embraced more sophisticated social science approaches, and at
least one NHRI data collection project is currently underway (Conrad et al. 2012).
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mentioned SNHRIs (Cardenas 2001, p. 8; Reif 2014, p. 223) or related terms such as
Bsub-national human rights bodies^ (Petersen 2011, p. 205), Bhuman rights institutions
at a sub-national level^ (Carver 2011, p. 5), or Bsubnational NHRIs^ (Reif 2012, p. 70).
By setting forth a general SNHRI definition and typology, this article will thus allow for
a more coherent and helpful research agenda to develop moving forward. While the
precise details of a future SNHRI research agenda are impossible to know, some likely
directions can be predicted based on existing strands of NHRI research. For example
one might expect to see research into the reasons for SNHRI proliferation in the past
few decades, just as studies have addressed the analogous question for NHRIs
(Cardenas 2014; Koo and Ramirez 2009; Pegram 2010). An accepted SNHRI defini-
tion and typology would allow researchers to measure the extent of such proliferation
(or compare the degree of proliferation in different jurisdictions) and to explore whether
the reasons for proliferation are the same for different types. One might also expect to
see research on the conditions leading to SNHRI effectiveness, just as researchers have
analyzed the conditions under which NHRIs can be effective (Goodman and Pegram
2012, p. 2; International Council on Human Rights Policy 2005). An accepted SNHRI
typology, however, would help scholars to more clearly delineate the scope of general-
izability of their (and other authors’) conclusions on conditions for SNHRI effectiveness
in a more precise and nuanced manner.
SNHRIs as a Meaningful Concept
Over the past three decades, human rights institutions have proliferated at the sub-
national level, just as they have done at the national level. To illustrate with a few
numbers, there are reported to now be 71 regional human rights ombudsmen in Russia
(ECRI 2013, p. 40),3 32 state human rights commissions in Mexico (Acosta 2012, p.
433), and 23 state human rights commissions in India (Dobhal et al. 2014, p. 11). At the
local level, there are at least 1000 personeros municipales in Colombia (Wolman
2015a, p. 227) and over 40 local human rights ombudsmen in Catalonia (Molin
2010), to pick just two parts of the world.
Like NHRIS, these SNHRIs vary significantly in their power and effective-
ness. In at least some cases, however, they appear to have made a meaningful
impact in local human rights promotion and prevention. The Hong Kong Equal
Opportunities Commission, to give one example, has been called Barguably one of the
more effective human rights bodies in the region^; one of its most significant successes
was its use of strategic litigation to challenge the system for allocating students to
different secondary schools (Petersen 2011, p. 205). At themunicipal level, one example
of a human rights friendly policy informed and inspired by an SNHRI is the York
(UK) Equality Scheme, which was in part based upon a report by the York
Fairness Commission’s (Berends et al. 2013, p. 153).
Until very recently, however, these various bodies were seldom conceptualized as
exemplars of a general institutional type. Rather, such institutions were simply seen by
3 The term Bombudsman^ is gender-neutral in the Swedish language from which it originates, and this
formulation remains in common usage, although some localities have switched to the term Bombudsperson.^
In this article, I use the term Bombudsman^ in a gender-neutral sense.
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observers as examples of city human rights commissions or provincial anti-
discrimination commissions and the like, as usually defined by administrative level,
institutional character, and geography. Research on them has accordingly been gener-
ally confined to case studies of specific institutions or of particular institutional types
within a given country or region (see, e.g., Dünser 2004; Saunders and Bang 2007;
Vitale 2014; Hong 2015). This perspective is now inadequate, however: there is a need
for research into SNHRIs as a general institutional type (in addition, of course, to
research into specific institutions or institutional sub-types). This is the case for three
primary reasons.
First, the human rights community has, over the past two decades, thoroughly
embraced the NHRI concept as a significant institutional category for both research
and practical purposes at the national level. At the global level, the UN increasingly
encourages NHRI participation and establishment, while the Global Alliance of Na-
tional Human Rights Institutions (BGANHRI^) accredits and NHRIs and builds NHRI
capacity.4 Dozens of political science and law scholars now focus on NHRIs as relevant
analytical categories. This focus on NHRIs inevitably brings up questions related to
NHRIs’ subnational counterparts. Just as two decades ago, one might reasonably have
asked whether findings from ombudsman research conducted at the national level also
applies to local ombudsmen, so must scholars ask today whether the voluminous
quantity of NHRI research findings accrued over the past 20 years also applies to
SNHRIs, how SNHRIs relate to NHRIs, the advantages and disadvantages of SNHRIs
compared to NHRIs, and similar questions.
Second, the lines dividing traditional categories of sub-national human rights insti-
tutions are in many cases becoming blurred. As has happened at the national level,
many sub-national classical ombudsman institutions have started to see human rights
implementation as part of their mission, despite human rights not being part of their
mandate. In many Mexican states, human rights commissions have been established
that resemble traditional defensores del pueblo more than classic common law com-
missions (Gaos 2004, p. 147). US commissions that formerly concentrated solely on
racial discrimination are now being given mandates that encompass the entire human
rights corpus (Kaufman 2011, p. 89). In short, while one can still distinguish between
different SNHRI types (which is why a typology is useful), the dividing lines are no
longer as distinct as they once were, and the commonalities are greater. There are
various reasons for these shifts, but one consequence is that for many purposes it makes
sense to study SNHRIs as a general type, because members of different traditional sub-
types increasingly share common traits.
Third, SNHRIs are becoming more active at the international level by, for example,
participating in UN forums, filing reports on local human rights conditions, and
applying for membership at the GANHRI (Wolman 2014). International actors must
therefore develop rules and guidelines for this participation, and decide when and how
to encourage and support the work of SNHRIs. To a certain extent, this is a work in
progress: the UN Human Rights Council is currently engaged in a research project on
local governments and human rights (which includes surveys of SNHRIs and other
actors), while the GANHRI has struggled with the question of SNHRI membership
4 GANHRI was formerly known as the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (BICC^).
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(Wolman 2015b). But from a conceptual standpoint, it is clear that both these organi-
zations are in the process of developing policy with respect to SNHRIs as a group.
Thus, while SNHRIs may still be domestically viewed primarily as local institutional
types, at the international level they are increasingly seen as members of a broader
global group. As evidence of this shift, one can note the growing contemporary usage
of the term Bsub-national human rights institution^ by important international actors
such as the UN Secretary General (2011, para. 95), the High Commissioner of Human
Rights (Pillay 2011; UNHCHR 2011), the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate
Housing (Farha 2014, para. 76(j)), and UNICEF (2013, p. 105). Other prominent
human rights actors have used (presumably) similar phrases such as Bregional and
local human rights institutions^ (Hammarberg 2009, para. 7.2), Blocal human rights
institutions^ (Kang 2012), Bsub-national statutory human rights institutions^ (ICC
2013, p. 25; APF 2015, p. 23), and Bindependent and autonomous ombudsman,
mediator and other national human rights institutions at…the local level^ (UNGA
2013). To put it simply, SNHRIs may not yet be the focus of academic research, but
the SNHRI is already a concept that is used by human rights practitioners.
In addition to justifying a focus on SNHRIs as a meaningful concept, it is worth
briefly justifying the usage of the term BSNHRI^ as a label for this concept. As a
starting point, the term strives for familiarity. As Gerring (1999, pp. 368–369) notes,
finding a term in the existing lexicon that covers a concept is generally a better option
than coining a neologism. As noted, the term BSNHRI^ has been used by important
actors. However, other similar terms have also been used. The term BSNHRI^ has a
particular resonance and clarity that these other potential terms lack, though. It is
resonant because it mirrors the terminology commonly used at the national level
(BNHRI^) and to a lesser extent the international level (Bregional human rights
institution^). It is clear because the term Bsub-national^ can immediately be understood
as covering the entire administrative space below the nation-state (and only that space),
while the term Blocal^ is sometimes used to denote solely municipal (and not higher
level sub-national) space, and the term Bregional^ can be used both for sub-national and
supra-national space.
Definition
Despite the fact that the SNHRI concept is meaningful and it (along with similar terms)
has been used by practitioners in recent years, there is no accepted definition for the
term. This section stipulates a general definition for the term BSNHRI.^ As a Bgeneral^
definition, it should be usable for any research purposes involving SNHRIs. It should
also be usable by practitioners, although influencing the public discourse is not the
primary focus of this article.5 This proposed definition will be Bminimal^ in the sense
that it seeks to Bidentify the bare essentials of a concept, sufficient to differentiate it
extensionally without excluding any of the phenomena generally understood as part of
the extension^ (Gerring 2011, p. 135). In the context of this article, that means that my
5 For example, without a general BSNHRI^ definition, listeners will not know what institutions the UN
Secretary General was referring to, when he stated that B[i]nteraction by subnational human rights institutions
with the international human rights system [are] strongly encouraged.^ (UNSG 2011, para. 95).
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stipulated definition will apply to all SNHRIs and will not apply to any entities that are
not SNHRIs. This is appropriate for facilitating academic research, which is this
article’s objective. It is worth noting, however, that ideal-type definitions may be better
suited for other purposes, such as promoting best practices (one example being the use
of the Paris Principles to define the universe of NHRIs).6
The SNHRI definition is intended to fulfill four objectives. First, it is intended to
approximate a general understanding of the SNHRI concept as constituting the sub-
national equivalent of NHRIs. This understanding, which is stipulated in this article, is
in line with existing usage of the concept (and term), which usually takes place in the
context of discussion or research on NHRIs. This approximation does not lead to a neat
end point, however, as the term BNHRI^ itself has itself been notoriously hard to define
(Reif 2012). Second, it is intended to facilitate further academic research into the
subject. This largely means stipulating a definition that allows researchers to feasibly
identify whether an entity is or is not an SNHRI (i.e., is easily operationalizable) and
promoting group stability, so that entities will only rarely transition from SNHRI status
to non-SNHRI status. Third, it strives for parsimony. As Gerring (2011, p. 34) notes,
Bgood concepts do not have endless definitions.^ Fourth, the definition is intended to
be as precise as possible. This goal is consistent with the objective of facilitating
academic research; as Rowe and Frewer (2005, p. 252) state, B[t]he more precise our
definitions, the better (more reliably, validly) we can conduct research, the easier it is to
interpret findings, and the greater the confidence we can have in our conclusions.^ A
precise definition does not end debate as to whether a particular entity possesses all the
criteria of an SNHRI; however, it can at least reduce or eliminate uncertainty as to what
those criteria actually mean.
Pursuant to the first of these objectives, it makes sense to use common NHRI
definitions as a starting point for an SNHRI definition. Many have been proposed.
NHRIs have been defined, inter alia, as: Bindependent bod[ies] established by a
national government for the specific purpose of advancing and defending human rights
at the domestic level^ (Pohjolainen 2006, p. 1), Bindependent bodies that promote and
monitor states’ implementation of and compliance with their obligations to protect
human rights^ (Dam 2007, p. 1), B[s]tate bodies with a constitutional and/or legislative
mandate to protect and promote human rights… [that] are not under the direct authority
of the executive, legislature or judiciary^ (UNHCHR 2010, p. 13), and Bofficial
independent legal institutions established by the State by law for the promotion and
protection of human rights^ (APF 2015, p. 15). Oftentimes, NHRIs are simply defined
as those entities that comply with the Paris Principles, as fleshed out by the General
Recommendations of the GANHRI (Reif 2012, p. 53). However, while this may be
satisfactory for defining the universe of NHRIs in some instances, it is unworkable for
SNHRIs. The Paris Principles by their terms only apply to national-level institutions,
and the GANHRI (with an exception for the Scottish and Northern Ireland Human
Rights Commissions) has not accepted sub-national bodies for full membership.7
6 The Paris Principles are a set of guidelines for national institutions promulgated by the UN in 1993, which
have been used to assess the mandate, autonomy, independence, pluralism, resources, and investigative
powers of NHRIs (UNGA 1993).
7 The Paris Principle uses terms such as Bnational institution^ and Bnational legislation^ and states that NHRIs
should pay attention to human rights violations in Bany part of the country^ (UNGA 1993).
92 A. Wolman
At their core, however, most NHRI definitions seem to contain three elements:
independence; a link to the state (governmentality); and a focus on implementation
of human rights norms. These three concepts—along with the sub-national level of
operation—thus also form the core of my proposed definition, which is that an
SNHRI is an independent non-judicial governmental institution that possess a
sub-national mandate, and whose mission includes the implementation of human
rights norms. While this definition should be adequate for a shorthand under-
standing of the SNHRI concept, it is intentionally parsimonious, and in the
remainder of this section, I will elucidate the different elements of this definition.
Specifically, I will focus on four tasks. First, I will justify the use of each term that
is contained in my definition. Second, I will draw out the relevant terms at a
second level of specificity, by proposing and justifying criteria that can be used to
empirically establish whether the given term does or does not apply to a particular
entity. Third, I will discuss the real-world definitional implications of certain terms
with respect to particular entities’ inclusion or exclusion from the SNHRI defini-
tion. And fourth, I will where relevant acknowledge hard cases or limitations of
the term’s usage.
Independent
Perhaps the most important distinguishing characteristic of NHRIs is their indepen-
dence (Reif 2012, p. 52). Independence represents one of the fundamental aspirational
values of the Paris Principles and has been made explicit in multiple NHRI definitions
(Pohjolainen 2006, p. 1; Dam 2007, p. 1; APF 2015, p. 15). The precise meaning of
independence is not clear, however. At a minimum, it means that an SNHRI should not
operate under the direct authority of other governmental entities. In the case of NHRIs,
however, some would go further to require a de facto absence of governmental
influence into an institution’s actions. For SNHRIs, however, a definition that relies
on de facto independence would not benefit group research. For one thing, there is no
outside body such as the GANHRI to judge whether SNHRIs are de facto independent
or not. Thus, a researcher would be forced to individually evaluate each entities de facto
independence, a herculean task given the thousands of SNHRIs in the world and
difficulty in evaluating the level of governmental influence in their actions. In addition,
the reliance on de jure rather than de facto independence leads to a more stable group.
This is generally a benefit to research analysis; without such stability, one would have
to recalibrate group membership constantly.
Among the implications of the independence requirement is that a state or local
governmental agency should not be considered an SNHRI (as, indeed, a national
governmental agency would not be considered an NHRI). Several US States possess
human rights Bdivisions^ or Bagencies^ that for this reason would for this reason not be
considered SNHRIs. Another implication is that the local branch offices of NHRIs
would not be considered SNHRIs, because they are not independent institutional
entities. SNHRIs that are appointed by the executive but operate autonomously present
a tricky classification, with actual independence depending on local administrative
culture, length of term, and ease of dismissal, among other factors. However, these
factors are hard to measure, and in line with the emphasis on de jure rather than de facto
independence, I would argue that it makes sense to consider executive-appointed
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autonomous bodies to be independent as they are not normally intended to take
instructions from government officials.
Non-judicial
It is undisputed that courts are not NHRIs, although the two types of institutions share
some similarities, such as independence, and courts often address human rights issues.
This distinction is omitted in some NHRI definitions, perhaps because it would be
considered an obvious point. Other scholars make this provision explicit, however
(Reif 2004, p. 7), or specify that NHRIs are Badministrative^ bodies, which can be
taken to mean non-judicial (Cardenas 2014, p. 2). This same distinction should also
apply at the sub-national level. This means that sub-national human rights courts, as
exist in India, Ontario, and elsewhere, would not be considered SNHRIs. On the other
hand, where sub-national institutions issue non-binding rulings on human rights com-
plaints outside of the judicial context, then they would be considered SNHRIs.
Operationally, the distinction between courts and SNHRIs will usually be quite easy
for the researcher to make based on institutional title: entities called courts and tribunals
will generally be judicial in nature. Similarly, judicial officers will generally be called
judges, tribunal officers, or the like, while these terms will not normally be used for
SNHRI workers.
Governmental Institutions
NHRIs are widely accepted to be Bgovernmental,^ in the sense that they are established
by government (whether through statute, constitution, or executive decree), funded
through the governmental budget, and staffed wholly or partially by civil servants
(UNHCHR 2010, p. 13). SNHRIs, thus, should also share this Bgovernmental^ status.
This means that local NGOs or community organizations, even those that attempt to be
representative in nature, would not be considered SNHRIs (just as their national
counterparts would not be considered NHRIs). In the sub-national context, measuring
governmentality may be more complex than at the national level, however, because one
would be more likely to find government-formed or sponsored institutions that are
operated solely by non-civil servants, examples being Japan’s Human Rights Protectors
and many US municipal human rights commissions. It may also be possible to find
human rights institutions that are entirely lacking in government funding, especially at
the very local level. Given these peculiarities and this definition’s emphasis on parsi-
mony, it makes sense to distinguish governmentality in the SNHRI context based solely
on whether or not a human rights institution is governmentally established (whether by
constitution, statute or decree). From an operational perspective, these criteria facilitate
research because information on whether an institution is governmentally established or
not can usually be located relatively easily by looking for the existence of an organic
law, which is often posted on the institution’s website.
That Possess a Sub-national Mandate
The term Bsub-national^ is understood here to encompass Bentities that are smaller than
the nation (and not under or below it), such as regions, provinces, municipalities,
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member states of a federation, or cantons^ (Homem de Siqueira 2010, p. 4, italics in
original). Thus, although SNHRIs may sometimes be established by national-level
legislation or decree, they in all cases focus their domestic human rights work in a
jurisdictional sphere that is narrower geographically than the entire nation. SNHRIs
may occasionally participate in international mechanisms or issue statements on over-
seas human rights abuses, just as some NHRIs do, but their domestic mandate must be
restricted to a sub-national administrative space; this is evidently the most significant
distinction between SNHRIs and NHRIs.
While in most cases, it will be relatively simple to distinguish whether a human
rights institution should be considered Bnational^ or Bsub-national,^ there will occa-
sionally be difficult cases. For example, in some cases there will be human rights
institutions in entities that are not universally recognized as nations, such as the Kosovo
Ombudsman or Palestine’s Independent Commission for Human Rights. There may
also be institutions operating on entities that are universally unrecognized as states, but
arguably possess the necessary attributes of statehood; examples include the Taiwanese
Control Yuan and Somaliland Human Rights Commission. Finally, there are institu-
tions located in entities that are sometimes called Bnations,^ even though they are
clearly not nation-states under international law (such as Quebec, Scotland, or Native
American nations). From an operational perspective, the easiest and most acceptable
way of distinguishing nation-state status (and by extension sub-nationality) would be
through an examination of UN membership status. If an entity is a member state or
non-member observer state of the UN, then it should be considered a nation, and its
human rights institution (if it has one) should be considered an NHRI. If, on the other
hand, an entity is not a UN member or non-member observer state, and is not supra-
national in scope (i.e., composed of more than one nation), then its human rights
institution should be considered a SNHRI.
Another difficult question of classification arises with centralized human rights
institutions that cover most of a nation’s territory, but not all of it. One example of this
is the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which operates in England, Wales, and
(for some issues) Scotland, but not in Northern Ireland (or, for that matter, in the UK’s
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies). In practice, it seems appropriate to
classify such institutions as NHRIs rather than SNHRIs, as long as they have been
established by the national-level government (as with the Equality and Human Rights
Commission, established by the UK Parliament’s Equality Act 2006) and have a
mandate that covers the majority of a nation’s population. This choice is justified by
the prerogative of avoiding overlap between the class of institutions normally recog-
nized as NHRIs (such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission) and the class
recognized as SNHRIs.
Mission Includes
By stating that human rights implementation must be Bincluded^ in the institution’s
mission, this formulation implies that an SNHRI may have other missions besides
human rights implementation. Thus, under this definition, those ombudsman offices
that have a mission that includes human rights implementation (as well as addressing
maladministration, corruption, etc.) would be considered SNHRIs. This is consistent
with certain statements of the UN General Assembly, Committee on Economic and
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Social Cultural Rights, Committee on the Rights of the Child and many European
actors that classical ombudsman institutions at the national and sub-national level can
be considered NHRIs, despite the fact that their work is not confined to solely human
rights issues (Reif 2012, pp. 55, 71–72). It does, however, run counter to the
GANHRI’s practice of refusing to fully accredit classical ombudsman institutions or
refer to them as NHRIs (Reif 2012, p. 71). A separate question is whether the human
rights missions must be explicit in the institution’s mandate. I would argue that an
explicit human rights mission should be considered unnecessary. From a functional
perspective, it seems illogical for an SNHRI definition to exclude those institutions that
have evolved a practice of human rights implementation, simply because their organic
legislation does not explicitly refer to human rights. The downside of this choice,
however, is that it complicates classification, as it is more difficult to examine an
institution’s practice than simply review its organic statute or decree, and it forces a
somewhat arbitrary decision of how much human rights implementation is required to
turn a classical ombudsman institution into an SNHRI. In practice, however, the large
majority of classical ombudsman institutions are likely to be involved in human rights
protection (broadly understood), even if this is often confined to implementation of
administrative procedure rights (Remac 2013, p. 66).
Implementation
The term Bimplementation^ has been used to cover broadly the different ways in which
sub-national institutions use human rights in their work, including protective tasks,
such as complaint-handling, promotional tasks such as education, advocacy, and
awareness-raising, along with human rights monitoring and advising. This is
consistent with the Sepulveda et al. (2004, p. 67) definition of Bimplementation^ as
Ball initiatives taken…to enhance respect for human rights and prevent violations,^ as
well as the broad scope given to the phrase Bhuman rights implementation^ by some
scholars writing about NHRIs (De Beco 2010, Baik 2012).8 I consciously avoid the
phrase Bpromotion and protection,^ which has occasionally been used in NHRI
definitions ( APF 2015, p. 15). First, the term Bpromotion and protection^ has always
been a rather confusing formulation that leaves uncertainties as to what activities
actually fall under each rubric. Second, the conjunctive term Bpromotion and
protection^ is often used to encompass both awareness-raising activities and
complaint-handling activities. In practice, however, SNHRIs tend to be smaller than
NHRIs in budgetary and staffing terms, and therefore it is more common for SNHRIs to
focus solely on one or the other types of tasks (while still being widely seen as human
rights institutions).
Human Rights Norms
The proposed definition concludes by noting that implementation can involve Bhuman
rights norms.^ By not specifying that Ball^ human rights norms must be implemented,
8 Other scholars, however, use the term Bimplementation^ more narrowly, to refer to legislative actions or
programmatic initiatives to facilitate the enjoyment of human rights in a community, which are undertaken
alongside human rights Bprotection^ (complaint handling) or Bpromotion^ (training or awareness-raising).
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this clause thus implicitly includes within the SNHRI definition those bodies that focus
on a subset of the human rights corpus, such as anti-discrimination, women’s rights,
administrative rights, or children’s rights. One difficult issue is whether bodies that
implement Bcivil right^ or Bconstitutional right^ norms should be considered human
rights institutions. In practice, it will likely be very rare for such organizations to
entirely ignore human rights language in today’s world, but from a functional perspec-
tive, the language used seems of little importance; the important thing is that human
rights norms are being implemented, regardless of their specific legal source or the
name used.
On the other hand, it does seem logical (and consistent with NHRI definitions and
general usage) to require that entities explicitly implement human rights of some sort
(whether from international, national, or local sources) in order to qualify as an SNHRI.
Thus, while an electoral commission clearly furthers the implementation of political
rights, it normally would not explicitly rely on human rights norms or rights discourse
in its day to day work. It would therefore not be an SNHRI. Similarly, an anti-
corruption commission that relies on administrative law, but not Bhuman rights^ as
such, would not be considered an SNHRI, even though anti-corruption work can
reasonably be formulated as the promotion of a right to good governance.
Typology
While SNHRIs present a useful concept for study, they also vary in significant ways.
Academic research should take into account these different types where relevant. This
section therefore proposes a general typology of SNHRIs with the objective of facil-
itating research into SNHRIs.9 As with the proposed definition, this proposed typology
will comply with the basic rules for social science classifications. Thus, this typology is
constructed so as to be comprehensive and non-exclusive, meaning that all possible
SNHRIs can be categorized in one (and only one) of the possible types and the
typology will aim for the minimization of within-group variance and maximization
of between-group variance (Kluge 2000, para. 2).
Within those parameters, this typology is also constructed so as to be relevant,
parsimonious, and feasible. Relevance means that the divisions resulting from this
typology should correspond to divisions that are most likely to be studied by re-
searchers. Parsimony means that the divisions created by this typology are kept at a
minimum, so as to avoid overwhelming the researcher with relatively insignificant
distinctions. Feasibility means that researchers should be able to categorize SNHRIs
within one of the possible types using readily accessible information.
Pursuant to these objectives, this article proposes a SNHRI typology based on three
dimensions, namely administrative level, institutional form, and breadth of mandate.
These dimensions were chosen for four reasons. First, they correspond to common
ways of classifying NHRIs and other human rights institutions (thus facilitating
comparative research). Second, they correspond to common categories of existing
9 As with my proposed definition, a secondary objective of this typology is to promote greater clarity in the
public discourse surrounding SNHRIs. Typologies can assist communication by allowing for greater linguistic
precision when referring to specific subsets of the broader concept.
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sub-national research, allowing for a better understanding of the applicability of
existing research to particular types of SNHRIs. Third, these dimensions to a certain
extent describe distinct institutional histories, functions, and mandates, thus promoting
the goal of minimizing within-group variance. And fourth, these dimensions can be
relatively easily measured by researchers, unlike, for example, capacity, effectiveness,
or de facto independence, all of which are important attributes but very difficult to
measure. The typology presented will be a nominal taxonomy, with three administrative
level categories, two institutional form categories (which are sub-divided into a total of
five sub-categories), and three breadth of mandate categories. This allows for 18
possible first-level institutional types or 45 possible types when the second-level
institutional form categories are used.
Each of these proposed categories will be delineated with precision below, while
providing illustrative examples. I will then note if there are any commonalities or typical
characteristics of each type. This is important as a means of justifying the choice of
categories: good typological categories will highlight similarities among types in a
category that go beyond those distinctions stipulated in the typology itself (Kaplan
1964, p. 51). The proposed typology differs from common NHRI typologies in two
important ways. First, it is a multi-variable typology. This contrasts with NHRI typologies,
which generally classify NHRIs based on one variable, often labeled as institutional type
(see, e.g., Kjearum 2003, pp. 8–9; Pohjolainen 2006, p. 16). Second, it is logically
exclusive. Typical NHRI typologies denote a selection of established institutional types
(such as Bhuman rights ombudsman^ or Bhuman rights commission^), while neglecting to
categorize logically conceivable institutions that fall outside these categories.
Administrative Level
SNHRIs have been established at many different sub-national levels, including villages,
towns, counties, states, oblasts, provinces, cantons, and regions. As will be discussed
below, SNHRIs tend to have somewhat different histories, functions, and characteristics,
depending on the administrative level at which they operate, so administrative level
presents an obvious dimension to distinguish SNHRI types. It is difficult to neatly
delineate categories, however, because the names, powers, sizes, and governmental
structures of sub-national administrative levels vary quite widely by country (and in some
cases, even within a country). For the purposes of SNHRI classification, this typology
proposes three relevant administrative levels, labeled as provincial, local, and autonomous
regional levels. Each of these are defined and described below.
Provincial SNHRI
The first category encompasses SNHRIs established at the highest standard sub-
national governmental level, labeled here as Bprovincial SNHRIs.^ Of course, different
countries have very different terminology for administrative divisions, and US States,
French départements, German Länder, etc. are all considered Bprovinces^ for the
purpose of this typology.10 Examples of provincial SNHRIs include the Karnataka
10 Conversely, the Provincias in Spain or Provinces in Belgium would not be considered Bprovinces^ for the
purpose of this typology, because in each case there exist a higher sub-national administrative level.
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State Human Rights Commission (India), the Victoria Ombudsman (Australia), and the
Sindic de Greuges de Catalunya (Spain).
While provincial SNHRIs exist in a variety of locations, they are particularly
common in two types of countries. First, provincial SNHRIs are often found in
countries where the highest sub-national administrative subdivisions possess significant
policy-making powers and administrative autonomy, as is the case with federal or
devolved systems of government. This is unsurprising, as division of powers reasons
would suggest that such communities would be likely to favor autonomy in human
rights implementation. Thus, for example, all or most provinces (or their equivalent) in
Mexico, Russia, Argentina, the USA, Australia, and Spain possess SNHRIs.
Provincial SNHRIs also tend to show certain common characteristics. In most
nations with provincial SNHRIs, the SNHRIs are of the same institutional form at
the provincial level as the NHRI at the national level (i.e., commissions or ombudsmen)
and interact with the NHRI in a variety of ways (Wolman 2013). In some cases (most
notably Russia, India, and Mexico), the NHRI establishing legislation also authorizes
the establishment of SNHRIs at the provincial level. SNHRIs at the provincial level
tend to be larger than local SNHRIs, and, relative to local SNHRIs, it is more common
for provincial SNHRIs to actively engage in international human rights mechanisms
(Wolman 2014).
Local SNHRIs
The label Blocal SNHRIs^ refers to SNHRIs established at a standard sub-provincial
administrative subdivision (i.e., at the second or lower level of sub-national adminis-
tration). This can include SNHRIs in counties, cities, towns, villages, and other similar
administrative designations. Examples include the Boston Commission for Persons
with Disabilities (USA), the Personería Municipal de Santiago de Cali (Colombia),
and the Barcelona Human Rights Observatory (Spain). Local SNHRIs are quite
common in cities big and small in the USA, Colombia, Argentina, and Italy. Elsewhere,
local SNHRIs have tended to be established in larger cities (such as Montreal or Seoul),
and in certain municipalities that want to promote their connection to human rights in a
visible way, such as Gwangju (Korea) or Graz (Austria). Local SNHRIs can also be
established at the village or neighborhood level; this is quite common in Japan and the
Philippines.
In the USA, municipal race relations commissions (many of which eventually
evolved into human rights commissions) existed prior to World War II (Saunders
and Bang 2007), but in other countries, local SNHRIs tend to be more recently
established. The first local classical ombudsman was established in 1967 in
Jerusalem, and it is only in the post-Cold War era that local ombudsmen with
an explicit human rights mandate have become common (Danet 1989, p. 16).
Local SNHRIs are frequently of a different institutional type than the home
country’s NHRI; for example, Gwangju and Yogyakarta have ombudsmen, while
Korea and Indonesia have human rights commissions. While there are certain
exceptions (such as Colombia, where each municipality is required to have a
Personero Local (Program Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH 2009, p.
20)), in general, local SNHRIs are unlikely to be required by legislation at higher
administrative levels and are more likely to emerge from local initiatives.
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Autonomous Region SNHRIs
Finally, there are a number of SNHRIs established in sub-national regions that can
be qualified as non-standard because they possess a significantly higher degree of
autonomy than similarly situated administrative units in a particular country.
These are here termed Bautonomous region SNHRIs.^ One sees a relatively high
frequency of SNHRIs in autonomous regions. Examples include the Hong Kong
Equal Opportunities Commission (China), the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission (UK), and the land Discrimination Ombudsman (Finland). This
frequency is unsurprising; in these places, the NHRI (if there is one) might be
distant, mistrusted, or lacking in authority to influence regional actors.
SNHRIs in autonomous regions tend to be similar to NHRIs in their function
and mandate, as one would expect given the greater regulatory powers of auton-
omous entities. Autonomous region SNHRIs are not generally relegated to a level
hierarchically below the NHRI, as is sometimes the case with other NHRIs at the
provincial level (Wolman 2013). They also tend to be relatively active interna-
tionally, and, in a few instances, have applied for accreditation by the GANHRI
(Wolman 2015b, pp. 124–125).
Institutional Form
Institutional form is the variable that is most commonly used to typologize NHRIs,
although the number of institutional forms that are specified varies widely. Some
scholars note two types: national commissions and national ombudsmen (Steinerte
and Murray 2009, pp. 54–56; Cardenas 2014, p. 9). Others have broken down NHRIs
into three categories (Centre for Human Rights 1995, pp. 7–8), four categories
(Pohjolainen 2006, p. 16), or even five or six (International Council on Human Rights
Policy 2000, p. 4; Kjearum 2003, pp. 8–9), by including other institutional forms such
as advisory committees on human rights, human rights ombudsmen, and specialized
institutions. These typologies are generally non-comprehensive, however, because it is
logically possible for an NHRI to exist that does not fall into any of these types as
normally defined.
For the sake of feasibility and comprehensiveness, this typology opts for a somewhat
different strategy, by dividing SNHRIs into monocratic institutions and multi-person
institutions. For many research purposes, this distinction will be sufficient. One might,
for example, be interested in comparing whether multi-person institutions are more
effective than monocratic institutions or receive greater support from the local popula-
tion.11 In some instances, however, more precision will be helpful when dealing with
institutional forms. For example, one might want to explore whether certain research
findings related to national classical ombudsmen are also true for sub-national classical
ombudsmen. Therefore, these two higher level categories are divided into five sub-
categories, namely classical ombudsmen, human rights ombudsmen, and idiosyncratic
institutions (which are all monocratic), and human rights commissions and human
rights councils (which are multi-person). These are detailed below.
11 At the national level, this monocratic/multi-person typology is utilized by Conrad et al. (2012, p. 10) in their
NHRI dataset (although labeled as ombudsman/human rights commissions).
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Monocratic Institutions
For the purposes of this typology, monocratic SNHRIs (defined as single-person
SNHRIs or SNHRI offices managed by a single person) are categorized as one
institutional form. There is a high degree of within-group similarity among monocratic
SNHRIs. While there is some variation in their functions, powers, mandates, and
appointment procedures, the vast majority of these institutions would self-identify as
ombudsman institutions, or some variants thereof (although they go by many different
names, such as Defensores del Pueblo, Provedores de Justiça, Difensori Civici, and
Médiateurs). Conversely, virtually all self-identified ombudsman institutions would be
contained within this category, as ombudsman institutions are almost always mono-
cratic (Cardenas 2014, p. 9) and are occasionally defined as such (Colín and Colín
2007, p. 190). The individual ombudsman may head an institutional entity or be given
resources to appoint a staff, but this is not always the case, especially at the local level.
As (in large part) ombudsman variants, most monocratic SNHRIs share a common
heritage. Ombudsman institutions originated in Sweden in 1809 and spread throughout
Scandinavia over the next 150 years before spreading to other regions of the world in
the 1960s (Reif 2004, p. 1). At the sub-national level, municipal ombudsman first
emerged in Europe in the 1970s,12 and while sub-national ombudsmen may not have
engaged with human rights to a significant extent at that time, over the last two decades
many have begun to explicitly implement human rights norms, not only in Europe
(Pihlajassari and Skard 2011, pp. 9–10), but also in Latin America (Van Leeuwen and
Merino 2008, pp. 11, 15) and, increasingly, Asia.13 At their most basic level, ombuds-
men are independent governmentally appointed actors tasked with supervising the
executive’s administrative activities, through receiving and investigating complaints
from the public and making non-binding recommendations on the resolution of those
complaints (Reif 2004, pp. 1–2).
Beyond that very basic level, ombudsman institutions have evolved considerably
from their Swedish roots, such that the broad institutional form now encompasses many
different variants. While traditionally ombudsmen were selected by the legislature,
contemporary ombudsmen are sometimes appointed by the executive or (rarely) directly
elected (Reif 2004, pp. 30–31). In addition to sub-national and national ombudsmen,
there are now ombudsmen at the supra-national level (UN and EU), as well as in private
sector organizations and individual departments or ministries of larger organizations
(Reif 2004, pp. 26–28). There are ombudsmen with general competencies, as well as
those that focus on specific subject areas. Most importantly for present purposes, there
are ombudsmen who are mandated to protect human rights and those that are not. This is
highlighted below as a distinguishing factor for second-level categories.
Classical Ombudsman Institutions
Classical ombudsman institutions can be defined as monocratic SNHRIs that are
ombudsman institutions, and whose mandate does not explicitly mention human rights.
12 Europe’s first local ombudsman institution was established in Zürich in 1971 (Dünser 2004).
13 For example, Korea now has 13 local human rights ombudsmen (Korea Human Rights Foundation 2014,
pp. 208–211).
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The existence or non-existence of an explicit human rights mandate mirrors definitions
sometimes given to classic ombudsman institutions at the national level, which is
important in order to promote comparative research that deals with both national and
sub-national entities (Saari 2010, p. 33). These criteria have also been previously used
to distinguish between classical and human rights ombudsmen at the sub-national level
(Stuhmcke 2011, p. 43).
Consistent with their institutional heritage, classical ombudsmen are focused on
resolving complaints of administrative wrongs, most notably governmental acts of
administrative unfairness, noncompliance with the law, and maladministration (Tai
2010, p. 2). Of course, in doing so, classical ombudsmen may simultaneously be
addressing human rights violations (Reif 2004, p. 2). Despite this fact, some classical
ombudsmen avoid using human rights in their work altogether, especially in the Asia-
Pacific region and areas with common law legal systems (Burdekin 2007, p. 86). Many
other classical ombudsmen do implement human rights norms in their work, despite the
lack of an explicit mandate, especially in continental Europe (Dünser 2004). Some
examples of classical ombudsman SNHRIs include the Hong Kong Ombdusman, the
Saskatchewan Ombudsman, and the Québec Protecteur du Citoyen (Reif 2004, p. 393).
Human Right Ombudsman Institutions
Human rights ombudsman institutions have been defined as ombudsman institutions
that have an explicit human rights implementation mandate (Byrnes and Renshaw
2014, p. 472). In addition to the resolution of human rights violation complaints,
human rights ombudsmen may also engage in human rights documentation, policy
research, government advising, and educational activities. This human rights mandate
usually is present in addition to (and not instead of) the administrative fairness and
legality mandate common in classical ombudsmen (Pegram 2010, p. 736). In terms of
composition, appointment procedures, and basic functions, there is little to separate
human rights ombudsmen and classical ombudsmen (Pegram 2010, p. 736).
At the national level, human rights ombudsmen date back to the 1970s democrati-
zation movements of Southern Europe and the establishment of the Portuguese
Provedor de Justiça and the Spanish Defensor del Pueblo (Reif 2004, p. 8). Since that
time, human rights ombudsmen have been established with particular frequency
throughout Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, both at the national and
sub-national levels (Reif 2004, p. 9). To a lesser extent, there has been some movement
of sub-national institutions from the classical ombudsman institution category to the
human rights ombudsman category due to legislative revision of their mandates (Reif
2011, pp. 271–272). With a few exceptions, human rights ombudsmen are found today
in civil law jurisdictions (Reif 2011, p. 272). Examples include the Ombudsman for
Children of the Republic of Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Defensor del Pueblo
de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (Argentina), and the Puerto Rican Oficina del
Procurador del Ciudadano (USA).
Idiosyncratic Types
While it is true that the vast majority of self-identified ombudsman institutions are
monocratic, it is not necessarily the case that all monocratic SNHRIs are ombudsmen.
102 A. Wolman
Thus, in order to maintain its logical comprehensiveness, this typology must allow for
the possibility of non-ombudsman monocratic SNHRIs through the creation of a catch-
all category, labeled here as idiosyncratic types. In practice, however, non-ombudsman
monocratic SNHRIs are rare or non-existent in most parts of the world. Two exceptions
are Japan and the Philippines, where Local Human Rights Protectors (in Japan) and
Barangay Human Rights Action Officers (in the Philippines) are widespread. In each
country, there are in fact several thousand such institutions at the neighborhood level,
with office-holders explicitly mandated to engage in human rights promotion and
education as well as handling complaints from the public (Koike 2014, p. 80;
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines 2009, p. 60).
Multi-person SNHRIs
Multi-person SNHRIs are the logical counterpart to monocratic institutions. Given the
wide diversity in multi-person SNHRIs, they can perhaps most easily be characterized
in reference to their contrasts with monocratic ombudsmen. For one thing, they do not
all handle complaints from the public (although some do). In addition, they are more
likely to focus on other civil society actors as well as governmental human rights abuse
(Centre for Human Rights 1995, p. 9; Tai 2010, p. 7) and they are more likely to
address economic and social rights issues than are ombudsmen. Multi-person SNHRIs
are also by their nature more able to be pluralistic in their make-up, including in many
cases through the appointment of non-governmental members. While this broad cate-
gory will suffice for most research purposes, multi-person SNHRIs can also be divided
into two sub-types, based on function, here labeled as human rights commissions and
human rights councils.
Human Rights Commissions
Multi-person SNHRIs that are primarily concerned with human rights protection
(complaint handling) or promotion (including awareness-raising and the provision of
education or training) can be classified as Bhuman rights commissions.^ Examples
would include the Eugene (Oregon) Human Rights Commission (USA), the Kerala
State Commission for Protection of Child Rights (India), and the Cayman Islands
Human Rights Commission (UK). Human rights commissions are most common at
the national level in countries with a common law tradition, and the same is true at the
sub-national level. At the state or provincial level, human rights commissions have
existed for at least 20 years in the USA, Canada, India, and Australia. Outside of the
USA, commission forms tend to be less common at the local level.
Human Rights Councils
On the other hand, multi-person SNHRIs that are primarily concerned with human
rights monitoring or advising the government on human rights issues (which are often
two sides of the same coin) can be classified as Bhuman rights councils.^ Examples
include the Advisory Council on Human Rights of the City of Graz (Austria), the
Observatorio de Equidad de Género de Buenos Aires (Argentina), and the Conselho
Permanente dos Direitos Humanos do Estado do Paraná (Brazil). Human rights
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councils are usually relatively new creations, and some have emerged as a result
of transnational initiatives such as the Human Rights Cities movement (Oomen
and Baumgärtel 2014). In Argentina and Brazil, issue-specific sub-national human
rights monitors have also been formed to monitor the treatment of prisoners in
detention facilities. These institutions were established in order to comply with the
Optional Protocol for the Convention Against Torture, which requires that state
parties designate or establish one or several independent national preventive
mechanisms.
Breadth of Mandate
The third dimension that is measured in this SNHRI typology is the breadth of the
institution’s human rights mandate. This is broken down into three categories,
namely broad-based SNHRIs, anti-discrimination SNHRIs, and single-issue
SNHRIs. Breadth of mandate is an important dimension for functional reasons,
as it relates to the types of issues an SNHRI addresses, the sources of law that it
uses, and in some cases even the peers that an SNHRI networks with, as there
exist separate trans-governmental networks for children’s ombudsmen or anti-
discrimination commissions.
Broad-Based SNHRIs
Broad-based SNHRIs can be defined as SNHRIs that implement a broad range of
different types of human rights. In most cases, their mandate will include both civil and
political rights and economic and social rights. Sometimes the scope of the mandate is
explicitly calibrated to international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and/or human rights treaties ratified at the national level (Wolman
2015a, pp. 229–231). In many other circumstances, however, the sources of human
rights are not specified, but rather the commission is left to self-define the exact types of
rights included in its mandate (Wolman 2015a, pp. 233–234). Broad-based SNHRIs
tend to be relatively recently established and are particularly common in Europe and
Latin America. In some cases, they exist alongside more specialized SNHRIs (often
dealing with women’s or children’s rights) or may have sub-offices that specialize in
particular types of rights. Examples of broad-based SNHRIs include the Seattle Human
Rights Commission (USA), the Independent Commission for Human Rights in the
Kurdistan Region (Iraq), and the Conseil Lyonnais pour le Respect des Droits (France).
Equality SNHRIs
The second category proposed is equality SNHRIs, defined here as SNHRIs that imple-
ment general equality or non-discrimination rights, but not other types of human rights.
Examples include the Anti-Discrimination Commission of Queensland (Australia), the
Humboldt County (CA) Human Rights Commission (USA), and the Espoo Equality
Committee (Finland). In most cases, equality SNHRIs are commission-form institutions,
although there are some ombudsman examples. Equality SNHRIs are most prevalent in
common law countries, where they tend to have a relatively long history (Dam 2007, p. 2).
However, there is a trend in common law countries towards the broadening of mandates,
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and some former equality commissions in the USA and Canada now deal with the full
range of human rights norms (Wolman 2015a, p. 230).
Issue-Specific SNHRIs
There are other SNHRIs that have mandates that are confined to one particular
substantive issue or protected group, labeled here as issue-specific SNHRIs. Examples
include the Alexandria (VA) Commission on Persons with Disabilities (USA), the
Shizuoka City Gender Equality Advisory Committee (Japan), and the Madrid Defensor
del Menor (Spain). The most common issue that SNHRIs focus on is children’s rights.
Sub-national commissions and ombudsmen specializing in children’s rights have
become increasing common all around the world in recent years, following their earlier
establishment at the national level (Ruggiera 2013, p. 71). Many of these Commissions
are guided by international norms, especially the CRC (Wolman 2015a, pp. 230–231).
As is the case on the national level, there are many cases of single issue SNHRIs
existing alongside broad-based or equality SNHRIs.
Conclusion
Whenever a new concept emerges, defining and typologizing the concept are
important steps towards understanding and researching it. This article has contrib-
uted to that objective by defining and classifying SNHRIs. It is worth noting that
the choices made in conceptualizing and typologizing SNHRIs (or indeed any
concept) have real consequences (Coppedge 2012, p. 33). They influence research
agendas, datasets, and comparisons, and impact the generalizability of case stud-
ies. To the extent that these choices are accepted in the broader community, they
also influence how institutions are thought about and think about themselves
(Eppler and Mengis 2011, p. 7). For example, once human rights actors started
to think of national ombudsmen and human rights commissions as BNHRIs,^ one
saw a gradual isomorphism (or trend towards similarity), as pressure mounted to
adapt to the NHRI ideal espoused in the Paris Principles (Cardenas 2014, p. 352).
Similar processes could occur if institutions view themselves as SNHRIs rather
than municipal human rights commissions or other traditional types.
Developing a new concept also inevitably has an effect on our understanding of
neighboring concepts (Gerring 2011, p. 128). In this case, a definition and typology of
SNHRIs could have an effect on our understanding of NHRIs as well. To give one
example, the Scottish Human Rights Commission is often referred to as an NHRI (and
often refers to itself as such). It has also been fully accredited as a national institution by
the GANHRI. If, however, the SNHRI definition proposed here is accepted, then the
Scottish Human Rights Commission would clearly be considered an SNHRI. To the
extent that SNHRIs are viewed as a non-overlapping counterpart set to NHRIs, this
could lead other actors to rethink whether the Scottish Human Rights Commission
should really be treated as an NHRI.
The fact that defining and typologizing SNHRIs leads to real-world effects does
not, of course, mean that they are unwarranted tasks. On the contrary, they are
necessary for the promotion of high quality research. The importance of definition
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and classification means that they should be undertaken explicitly and scientifi-
cally, with choices justified and reasoning made clear. That is what I have
attempted to accomplish in this article.
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institutions in federal states
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Seoul, Korea
The rapid spread of national human rights institutions represents one of the most
important developments in the human rights movement in recent years. Many federal
states have joined this global trend by creating national human rights institutions,
state human rights institutions, or both. This article presents an empirical comparison
of how such states have addressed the federal division of power and responsibility
concerns that have arisen in such an enterprise. So far, no single strategy has emerged
to address federalism concerns. Some countries have established unitary but
deconcentrated national human rights institutions, while others have multiple sub-
national human rights institutions but no internationally recognised national human
rights institution. The most common response has been the establishment of both a
national human rights institution and a network of sub-national human rights
institutions. Strict forms of dual federalism are rarely embraced however, and the
relationship between national and sub-national institutions, where both exist, has been
characterised by both episodic cooperation and signiﬁcant tensions.
Keywords: national human rights institutions; ombudsmen; national human rights
commissions; federalism; decentralisation
Introduction
During the past two decades, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) have emerged in
every region of the world, and among countries with widely varying political systems. Accord-
ing to the United Nations Ofﬁce of the High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR),
NHRIs are now crucial partners that ‘have a central place in the national human rights protec-
tion system’.1 Although NHRIs differ from one another in many ways, they are all fundamen-
tally focused on the protection and promotion of human rights2; promotional tasks generally
focus on human rights education and training, while common protective tasks include inves-
tigating human rights complaints, consulting with governmental and non-governmental actors,
and cooperating with international actors.3 While located ﬁrmly within the state apparatus,
NHRIs are integral in implementing international human rights norms.4
Federal countries have not been immune to this widespread trend. As of May 2012, 19
out of 27 federal countries have established either NHRIs or their sub-national counterpart,
which this article shall term a Sub-National Human Rights Institution (SHRI), or both.
To date, however, there has been little comprehensive analysis of how these countries
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have approached the complex questions of institutional competency inherent to systems
that divide powers and responsibilities between different levels of government. To the
extent that these issues have been highlighted by commentators, the dominant theme has
been to caution federal countries to ensure full coverage so that individuals are not
denied a remedy. Thus Brian Burdekin has emphasised that in countries with both an
NHRI and SHRIs there should be ‘clarity and coordination to ensure that individuals are
not deprived of a remedy by jurisdictional conﬂicts’.5 Likewise, a recent report on
NHRIs by the UN Secretary General stated that ‘[i]t is recommended that subnational
human rights institutions work together with the federal national human rights institution
to ensure that all human rights are equally protected across the country’.6 In terms of
case studies, the Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute has discussed the impli-
cations of federalism to the establishment of NHRIs and SHRIs, but its analysis was con-
ﬁned to Canada and Australia,7 while there have been a number of analyses of the federal
relationships of NHRIs and SHRIs in Spain and Mexico (including one which took a com-
parative approach).8 There have not been any larger scale empirical studies, however.
This article will attempt to ﬁll this gap by examining the strategies used by the different
federal countries to establish a system of NHRIs and/or SHRIs. It will illustrate the fact that
there is no standard institutional manner in which federal countries have chosen to divvy up
responsibilities for human rights issues at the federal and sub-national levels. On the con-
trary, there are a wide variety of strategies, ranging from unitary federal NHRIs to multiple
SHRIs (but no NHRI) to the establishment of both NHRIs and SHRIs. Interestingly, the
commonality among these systems is a rejection of mutually exclusive dual federalism,
that is to say a system where a particular type of issue or claim can be dealt with by the
SHRI or the NHRI, but not both. Rather, among the states that have both an NHRI and
SHRIs, different forms of shared authority appear to be the norm.
Countries and institutions examined
There has long been conceptual debate as to which states should be classiﬁed as ‘federal’.
Perhaps the most well-known early deﬁnition is Riker’s statement that a constitution is
federal if ‘(1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at
least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even
though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its
own sphere’.9 Hueglin and Fenna provide more simply that a federal system is one where
‘sovereignty is shared and powers divided between two or more levels of government, each
of which enjoys a direct relationship with the people’.10 This article embraces the latter deﬁ-
nition, or, to put it more precisely, will accept as federal the list of nations that are considered
federal by Hueglin and Fenna, with a few updates to reﬂect developments since 2005.11 The
updates include the removal of Serbia andMontenegro from the list of federal countries due to
Montenegro’s independence, and the inclusion of Iraq, Sudan and Nepal due to recent consti-
tutional developments in those countries.12 Thus, the list of federal countries examined here
are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, the
Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nepal, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Russia, St Kitts and Nevis, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, the United
Arab Emirates, the United States and Venezuela. It is worth noting that the core 24 countries
taken fromHueglin and Fenna are all likewise classiﬁed as ‘federal’ by Ann Lynn Grifﬁths and
Karl Nerenberg, in theirHandbook of Federal Countries.13 Of course, federalism is in practice
a relative concept, and some of these states – Argentina, Austria, Nigeria and Malaysia, for
example – are clearly more centralised than others.14
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This article’s analysis of the relationship between NHRIs and SHRIs also requires a
decision as to which institutions qualify as NHRIs and SHRIs. Unfortunately there is no
single generally accepted deﬁnition of NHRI. Human rights commissions are always recog-
nised as NHRIs, while human rights ombudsmen (sometimes called defensores del pueblo
in Spanish-speaking countries) generally are; however there is less agreement as to whether
specialised institutions (for example, those that focus on discrimination rather than all
human rights) or classical ombudsman institutions that lack an express mandate to
protect or promote human rights should also be considered NHRIs.15 Rather than adopting
one of the many NHRI deﬁnitions and independently evaluating which institutions in
federal countries comply with its terms, this article will instead consider as NHRIs the
set of institutions that are members of the International Coordinating Committee of National
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC), which is the most
prominent body that accredits NHRIs at the global level. The ICC itself has never provided
a deﬁnition of what an NHRI is; instead it accredits institutions based on the degree to
which such institutions comply with the 1993 Paris Principles Relating to the Status of
National Institutions (Paris Principles), a non-binding guidance document adopted by the
UN General Assembly that sets forth standards for the competencies and responsibilities
of NHRIs, their composition and their methods of operation.16 Speciﬁcally, the ICC
gives institutes that are compliant an ‘A’ level (voting) membership; those that are not
fully in compliance receive a ‘B’ level (non-voting) membership, and non-compliant insti-
tutions receive a ‘C’, and are not considered members.17 As of May 2012, the ICC includes
91 member institutions (including both voting and non-voting members).18 The vast
majority of these are human rights commissions (either general or speciﬁc to discrimi-
nation) or human rights ombudsmen, although the ICC has a few members that could
better be classiﬁed as human rights institutes or classical ombudsmen.19
While there is at least a widely accepted way of classifying a body as an NHRI, no such
ready classiﬁcation system exists for SHRIs, in part because there is no global international
association of SHRIs that would be required to deﬁne the concept in order to establish its
membership criteria. In this article, independent human rights commission or human rights
ombudsman-type institutions that are active at the highest sub-national level (i.e., state, pro-
vince, La¨nder, etc.) will be classiﬁed as SHRIs. This operational deﬁnition will thus exclude
local (city or county) human rights institutions although clearly they are ‘sub-national’ in
the literal sense. Classic ombudsman institutions at the sub-national level are quite
common, but will generally not be reviewed in this article except where – as is the case
in Austria – the country possesses a classic ombudsman institution at the national level
that also has ICC membership.
Federal countries without an ICC-member NHRI or SHRI
Among the 27 federal nations that are considered in this article, there are eight countries that
do not currently possess either an ICC-member NHRI or any SHRIs at the sub-federal level.
Three of these are small island nations: the Comoros; St Kitts and Nevis, and Micronesia.20
The other ﬁve are countries that are widely considered to have relatively poor human rights
records, namely Ethiopia, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates.21 Legis-
lators in the United Arab Emirates have been working with UNHCHR on establishing an
NHRI,22 however; while the Pakistani National Assembly has passed a National Human
Rights Commission Act, which as of the drafting of this article has not yet received the
necessary presidential assent.23 Meanwhile Sudan and Iraq are in the very early stages of
establishing functioning NHRIs, but neither country has submitted their commission for
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accreditation with the ICC.24 Pursuant to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the Suda-
nese Commission must in turn establish ‘decentralised, independent, autonomous and
resourced Human Rights Sub-Committees for Darfur’.25
Finally, it is worth noting that Ethiopia has in fact possessed a functioning human rights
commission since 2000. Although not accredited at the global level, the Ethiopian Human
Rights Commission is a member of the Network of African Human Rights Institutions.26 It
is still in the process of establishing a regional presence, and has currently opened up six
branch ofﬁces in Ethiopia’s nine regions.27 Each regional ofﬁce is headed up by a Regional
Commissioner who reports to the Chief Commissioner in Addis Adaba.28 Ethiopia also has
an ombudsman ofﬁce, which has been characterised as a ‘human rights ombudsman’, but
this ofﬁce has not been accredited by the ICC, either.29
Federal countries with SHRIs but no ICC-member NHRI
There are three federal countries that do not possess ICC-member NHRIs, but do have
SHRIs in at least some states: Brazil, the United States and Switzerland. In Brazil, there
are human rights ombudsman institutions in all 26 states and the Federal District of Brasi-
lia.30 These institutions have a mandate to provide legal assistance to individuals interacting
with state administrative authorities (or the authorities of the federal district).31 The state of
Sa˜o Paulo has a general human rights commission in addition to an ombudsman. The com-
mission, called the Conselho Estadual de Defesa dos Direitos da Pessoa Humana, can hear
complaints of violations of rights contained in either the federal or Sa˜o Paulo state consti-
tutions.32 Many states also have human rights commissions with more narrow competen-
cies, most commonly focusing on the rights of the child, but also including a State
Council on the Rights of Black People (Rio de Janeiro), State Council on the Rights of
the Elderly (Ceara´), and a State Council on the Defense of Diffuse Rights (Minas
Gerais). At the federal level, Brazil has an ombudsman institution that is ‘responsible for
receiving, examining and forwarding complaints, praise and suggestions referring to pro-
cedures and actions of Federal Executive agents, units and entities’,33 along with an
Ombudsman-General of Citizenship (sometimes called a human rights ombudsman) that
‘receives opinions, claims, denouncements and suggestions in respect to facts and
actions that violate the rights of children, teenagers, the disabled, the elderly, and other
more vulnerable social groups’.34 Neither of these is accredited by the ICC.
In the United States, many (but not all) states have their own state human rights or
human relations commissions.35 The mandates of these commissions generally focus on
anti-discrimination issues, often relating particularly to employment, housing, credit and
ﬁnancial practices, public accommodation, education and community relations.36 In all
cases, these state commissions are products of state law and mandated to enforce state
anti-discrimination ordinances (which may at times substantively overlap with federal
law). At the federal level, the United States has no NHRI, but since 1957 the US Commis-
sion on Civil Rights has acted as an independent body whose mission is ‘to inform the
development of national civil rights policy and enhance enforcement of federal civil
rights laws’.37 The United States also has an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which (among other tasks) investigates charges of employment discrimination in
violation of federal law.38 In some cases a complaint to the EEOC may also be covered by a
state law implemented by a SHRI, and vice versa. Where the complaint is ﬁled ﬁrst with the
EEOC, then the EEOC will dual ﬁle with the SHRI to preserve rights there and generally
retain the case for handling, while if the complaint is ﬁled ﬁrst with the SHRI, then the
SHRI will handle the case, but dual ﬁle with the EEOC.39
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In Switzerland, human rights ombudsman institutions have been established by the
cantons of Baselland, Basel-Stadt, Vaud, Zug and Zurich.40 At the federal level, the
Federal Commission against Racism and the Federal Commission on Women’s Issues
were each given ‘C’ accreditation (non-member status) by the ICC.41 The Federal Commis-
sion on Women’s Issues provides recommendations to lawmakers and writes reports, but
does not receive individual complaints.42 The Federal Commission against Racism, on
the other hand, has a complaint handling function, receiving one or two complaints from
the public per day.43 These complaints can allege racial discrimination perpetuated by
private individuals or public ofﬁcials, whether at the cantonal or federal level. However,
while the Federal Commission against Racism mediates some complaints itself, it often
directs complainants to a more appropriate actor, whether inside of outside of government,
that can address the complainants concerns.44 While both commissions focus most of their
attention on federal governmental policies and federal laws, the Federal Commission
against Racism also speciﬁes that it ‘stands at the disposal of cantonal and municipal auth-
orities for support and advice’45 and has held meetings on an annual basis with cantonal
representatives.46
Federal countries with NHRIs
There are 16 federal countries with NHRIS that are member institutions of the ICC. These
are: Argentina (Defensorı´a del Pueblo de la Nacio´n Argentina); Austria (Austrian Ombuds-
man Board); Australia (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission); Belgium
(Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism); Bosnia and Herzegovina
(The Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina); Canada (Canadian
Human Rights Commission); Germany (The German Institute for Human Rights); India
(National Human Rights Commission); Malaysia (Human Rights Commission of Malaysia
(SUHAKAM)); Mexico (National Human Rights Commission); Nepal (National Human
Rights Commission of Nepal); Nigeria (Nigerian Human Rights Commission); Russia
(Commissioner on Human Rights in the Russian Federation); South Africa (South
African Human Rights Commission); Spain (Ofﬁce of the Ombudsman), and Venezuela
(Ombudsman Institution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).47
The NHRIs from federal countries show signiﬁcant diversity, including ombudsman,
commission, human rights institute and human rights ombudsman (defensor del pueblo)
models. Some of their mandates encompass all types of human rights, while others have
a more narrow focus. This wide range of NHRI varieties in federal states is perhaps unsur-
prising, as the countries with federal governmental systems are themselves quite diverse,
representing every continent and many different legal traditions. Fourteen of the 16
NHRIs in federal countries have received ‘A’ accreditation from the ICC, indicating their
compliance with the Paris Principles. However, the Austrian Ombudsman Board and
Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism have received ‘B’
accreditation, signifying incomplete adherence to the Paris Principles.48
Countries with an NHRI but no SHRI
Seven of these 16 countries – Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,49 Malaysia, Nepal,
Nigeria, South Africa and Venezuela – lack separate SHRIs. Rather, the NHRIs in all of
these countries have chosen to engage in deconcentration, or the geographic dispersion
of agents of central government control. In South Africa, the South African Human
Rights Commission has precisely aligned its branch ofﬁces with the existing federal
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structure, so each South African province possesses one ofﬁce in the provincial capital.50
Similarly, the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal has established regional
branches in each of that nation’s ﬁve development regions, along with three sub-regional
ofﬁces.51 Venezuela’s Defensorı´a del Pueblo has opened 33 branch ofﬁces, including at
least one ofﬁce in all 23 states and the capital district.52 On the other hand, the Human
Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) has branches in Sabah and Sarawak but
none in Malaysia’s 11 peninsular states, while the National Human Rights Commission
of Nigeria has ofﬁces in six of that country’s 36 states and the Abuja Federal Territory,
although it is planning to open ofﬁces in all remaining state capitals.53 In Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, the Human Rights Ombudsmen’s ofﬁce is headquartered in Banja Luka, in
Republika Srpska, and has two regional ofﬁces and a ﬁeld ofﬁce in the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one regional ofﬁce in the Brcˇko District.54
While deconcentration does not address federalism division of power concerns it can
still accomplish other important goals, such as increasing access to human rights services
outside of the capital and providing better monitoring of conditions in local regions. For
these reasons, deconcentration is advocated in the Paris Principles, which state that an
NHRI shall ‘set up local or regional sections to assist it in discharging its functions’.55
This advice is also echoed in Amnesty International’s recommendations for NHRIs,
which state that ‘local and regional ofﬁces are vitally important to the effective functioning
of NHRIs in a large country, or a country with isolated and inaccessible centres of popu-
lation, or where transportation is difﬁcult’.56 Interestingly, the Commonwealth Best Prac-
tice Guidelines for NHRIs do not explicitly recommend the establishment of local ofﬁces
(although they note the importance of geographic accessibility), but they do caution that
‘NHRIs should carefully monitor and supervise local ofﬁces or “out-post” representatives
to ensure that high-quality services are provided’.57
Deconcentration is sometimes at the discretion of the NHRI itself.58 However, it can
also be mandated by the NHRI’s organic legislation, as is the case in Nigeria59 and
Bosnia and Herzegovina.60 While deconcentration may not be a politically feasible (or
desirable) alternative to decentralisation in strongly federal systems, it can have certain
advantages over the establishment of separate SHRIs. For example, NHRIs tend to have
a greater prominence and visibility than SHRIs, economies of scale could favour the estab-
lishment of one rather than multiple bodies and it may be easier for a single body to estab-
lish a uniform jurisprudence.61 In practice, SHRIs may also be more susceptible to outside
pressure or simply lack the institutional expertise and competency of longer-established
NHRIs. There is some general theoretical and empirical evidence that decentralised politi-
cal systems are more corruptible than centralised systems (although this conclusion is not
clear-cut), but to the best of this author’s knowledge there have been no such studies that
have focused speciﬁcally on SHRIs and NHRIs.62
One important question in those countries that have NHRIs but no SHRIs is whether the
NHRI is mandated to hear complaints relating to human rights violations perpetrated at the
state level and provide recommendations to state governments. When Amnesty Inter-
national issued recommendations for NHRIs in 2001, it noted that some NHRIs in
federal countries have difﬁculties in addressing violations by state governments.63 In
fact, the NHRIs do have the explicit or implicit authorisation to hear complaints relating
to human rights violations perpetrated by government at the state level in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina,64 Malaysia,65 Nepal,66 Nigeria,67 South Africa68 and Venezuela.69
In Belgium, the scope of NHRI jurisdiction is in a state of ﬂux. Currently, the Centre for
Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism is only legally mandated to investigate
complaints based on federal anti-discrimination legislation, which is quite expansive,
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prohibiting a wide range of discrimination with the notable exceptions of gender and
language-based discrimination.70 However, it can also investigate complaints based on
anti-discrimination decrees from the Walloon Region and the French-speaking community
pursuant to protocols between those two entities and the federal centre.71 Advanced discus-
sions are currently underway to change the centre into an inter-federal institution, however,
which would allow the centre to address complaints based on either federal or sub-federal
legislation.72 These reforms are in part due to pressure to improve the chances of the centre
receiving an ‘A’ accreditation from the ICC rather than the ‘B’ that it most recently
received.73
Countries with both an NHRI and SHRIs
The nine other federal states reviewed in this article have established both an NHRI and
multiple SHRIs. In four of those countries (Argentina,74 Australia,75 Canada76 and
Mexico77), SHRIs have been established in all states in the federal system. In the other
ﬁve countries, SHRIs have been established in some but not all of the sub-national entities.
There are two state ombudsman institutions in Austria, in Tyrol and Vorarlberg.78 Germany
has ombudsman institutions that handle complaints in Rhineland Palatinate, Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein.79 As of April 2012, there were State Human
Rights Commissions in 20 out of 28 Indian states, although the Indian Law Ministry and
National Human Rights Commission recently requested those states lacking commissions
to establish them.80 Meanwhile, by April 2011 there were 60 human rights ombudsman
ofﬁces at the sub-federal level in Russia, with laws approved (but no commissioners yet
assigned) for SHRIs in eight other regional subjects.81 Thirteen out of 17 Spanish Auton-
omous Communities have established their own defensor del pueblo or equivalent insti-
tution.82 In some cases – Russia and Argentina, most notably – deconcentration of the
federal NHRI has occurred alongside the establishment of SHRIs, while in most other
countries SHRIs are seen as more of an alternative, with the NHRI located solely in the
capital city.
Complaints jurisdiction
The ability to handle individual complaints is discussed but not explicitly required by the
Paris Principles, and the ICC therefore does not require such capabilities as part of its
accreditation process.83 Among the 10 federal countries that have both accredited NHRIs
and SHRIs, only in Germany does the NHRI lack a complaint handling mandate. Rather,
the German Institute for Human Rights is an institute-type NHRI, which focuses on
‘research, human rights education, and documentation, and also provision of advice to
the government’.84 In all other examples, both NHRI and SHRI can hear and rule on com-
plaints, although it should be stressed that these rulings are generally not binding.
Ombudsman-type NHRIs. NHRIs from the ombudsman (or human rights ombudsman) tra-
dition have tended to focus their attention on human rights and maladministration perpe-
trated by government agencies, rather than rights violations in the private sector. The
Spanish, Argentine, Austrian, Russian and Mexican NHRIs reﬂect this tradition, and
their complaint handling mandate therefore tends to focus on complaints against govern-
ment ofﬁcials or government bodies.85
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While one might expect that ombudsman-type NHRIs would only have jurisdiction
over federal government actions, and ombudsman-type SHRIs would only have jurisdiction
over state government actions, in fact only the latter is generally true. In all ﬁve of these
countries (as well as Germany), the state-level human rights ombudsman is not authorised
to resolve complaints involving federal government ofﬁcials, although there may be some
room for informal mediation or emergency investigation86 and, at least in Spain, auton-
omous community ombudsmen have on occasion attempted to investigate federal
actions, leading to backlash from federal authorities.87 On the other hand, in all ﬁve
countries the federal ombudsman is nevertheless empowered in various ways to hear com-
plaints relating to state government actions, as discussed below.
Of these countries, Austria maintains the closest afﬁnity to exclusive federal divisions
of power. According to the federal ombudsman law, the federal ombudsman only has auth-
ority to investigate complaints against a La¨nder government where the La¨nder has desig-
nated it with that authority.88 Currently, seven La¨nder have made such a designation,
while Tyrol and Vorarlberg – the two La¨nder farthest geographically from Vienna –
have chosen instead to establish their own ombudsmen.89 La¨nder also have the option of
choosing neither to establish an ombudsman nor grant oversight authority to the federal
ombudsman, but none have chosen this course.
Among the other countries, Spain and Argentina have similar federal defensor del
pueblo ofﬁces, supplemented by state human rights ombudsman institutions.90 In Spain,
these state institutions are in some cases based on traditional regional bodies.91 The
Spanish human rights ombudsman may assert its jurisdiction over complaints of rights vio-
lations perpetrated by the government of the autonomous region, whether or not a state-
level ombudsman has been established.92 This overlap has been tempered to some
degree by an informal agreement by the federal human rights ombudsman to allow auto-
nomic ombudsmen exclusive jurisdiction to hear complaints dealing with local adminis-
tration.93 The overlap has also led to tension between the two tiers of government and
was challenged legislatively in Catalonia when the Catalan Parliament passed a revised
Statute of Autonomy which stated in article 78.1 that the Sindic de Greuges (state
human rights ombudsman) exclusively oversees the administration of the Generalitat.
Upon legal challenge in 2010, this clause was deemed unconstitutional and was voided
by the Spanish Constitutional Court.94 The episode demonstrates that human rights insti-
tutions are not immune from the political power struggles that sometimes occur in
federal nations, especially in places like Catalonia where regional autonomy can be a pro-
minent political force.
In Argentina, the constitutional authorisation and organic legislation for the national
defensor del pueblo are less explicit as to jurisdictional scope, which has led to disputes
over whether acts of provincial administrations can be investigated. According to
Ma´ximo Borzi de Lucia, the national defensor del pueblo lacks power to investigate provin-
cial government actions because the article authorising the national defensor del pueblo is
located in the part of the constitution dealing with national authorities and there is a general
assumption that the provinces reserve all powers not explicitly delegated to national auth-
orities.95 This argument has been countered by Jorge Luis Maiorano, a former national
defensor del pueblo, who asserts that the constitution gives the national defensor del
pueblo competency over public administrative functions without any exclusion of provin-
cial or municipal administrative functions, thus implying that those functions are also part
of the mandate.96 In practice, Maiorano’s position of expansive national authority has been
accepted by the courts, and the national defensor del pueblo regularly asserts jurisdiction
over acts of provincial governments.97
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In Russia, the federal ombudsman also has authority to investigate sub-national govern-
ment actions, as explicitly granted in Article 16 of the law establishing the position of
Human Rights Commissioner.98 Here, the law clariﬁes that the federal human rights
ombudsman shall still accept a complaint even if it has been submitted previously to a
regional ombudsman, thus creating the possibility of a de facto review process at the
federal level.99 This possibility is important in the Russian context because of the percep-
tion that some of the sub-federal ombudsmen ofﬁces do not function effectively or lack
independence.100 The federal human rights commissioner has attempted to encourage uni-
formity across the ofﬁces, but lacks any formal regulatory or oversight role over the differ-
ent SHRIs.101
Mexico differs from the other ombudsman institutions discussed above by generally
restricting the National Human Rights Commission’s competency to national government
actions.102 There are, however, some important exceptions to this rule. First, according to
Article 60 of the National Human Rights Commission Act, the federal commission can hear
cases where the state commission is inactive regarding a complaint or the issue is important
and the state commission is delaying signiﬁcantly in reaching a recommendation.103 This
provision ensures recourse in cases where the state commission may be unwilling to con-
front powerful local interests, and also builds in an incentive for a state commission to act
promptly if it wants to maintain its institutional relevance. Also, when a complaint involves
both federal and state government personnel, or personnel from multiple state governments,
then the National Human Rights Commission can hear the case.104
Finally, the National Human Rights Commission can act as a kind of court of second
instance regarding state-level complaints. Thus, although the National Human Rights Com-
mission cannot hear a case that is pending at a State Human Rights Commission after a
decision has been entered either party may ﬁle an appeal from the State Human Rights
Commission to the National Human Rights Commission, which will then issue its own
decision.105 This creates a more hierarchical type of relationship between the NHRI and
SHRIs. This appellate-type system may help ensure justice where the NHRI is well-
respected and independent but the SHRIs have a reputation as being less competent or
more susceptible to outside pressure. It may also assist in the development of a nationally
uniform human rights jurisprudence, at least on important issues that are likely to lead to
appeals. On the other hand, states’ rights advocates bristle at the preservation of ﬁnal auth-
ority at the national level, and this provision has perhaps unsurprisingly been criticised by a
number of Mexican commentators. According to Gaos, the system is undesirable because
the Mexican National Human Rights Commission does not have as much knowledge as the
state commissions of local conditions; because the existence of an appellate policy weakens
the autonomy and moral force of state commission recommendations, and because the
human rights petition procedure is fundamentally non-judicial and should therefore not
copy the structure of an appellate court system.106
Commission-type NHRIs. Australia, Canada and India, on the other hand, have NHRIs that
are in the form of multi-person commissions. In India, the National Human Rights Commis-
sion deals with all types of human rights abuses, while the NHRIs in Australia and Canada
have a complaints mandate limited to acts of discrimination. These NHRIs accept com-
plaints involving both public and private sector actors; the major federalism-related juris-
dictional question is thus not whether the NHRI can investigate state government action,
but rather whether there is substantive overlap between the mandates of NHRI and
SHRI, and if so how this is dealt with.
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In India, the National Human Rights Commission Act provides that state human rights
commissions generally have the power to address complaints involving entities enumerated
in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution, unless the matter is
already pending before the National Human Rights Commission or another duly constituted
commission.107 In the broader Indian division of federal powers, List II enumerates matters
under the exclusive authority of state governments (such as public order, the police and ofﬁcers
and servants of theHighCourt) while List III enumeratesmatters under the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of both state and federal governments (such as criminal law, preventive detention andmar-
riage).108 The National Human Rights Commission of India, on the other hand, can respond to
complaints involving any human rights violation, unless the matter is pending before a state
human rights commission or other duly constituted national commission.109 Thus, the peti-
tioner will in many instances have a choice of state or federal forum to launch his or her com-
plaint. Oftentimes, the National Human Rights Commission will have the advantage of greater
independence andcompetency, but theremaybe countervailing considerationsof convenience,
given India’s enormous size, or a greater familiarity with local issues at the state level.
As is the case in some of the countries described above, this system of overlapping jur-
isdiction has not been without its tensions. Many observers – including the National
Human Rights Commission itself – have denigrated the effectiveness of the state commis-
sions, and there have in fact been claims of complaints related to state government actions
purposefully being ﬁled before an ineffective state commission in order to preempt the jur-
isdiction of the national commission.110
On the other hand, in Australia the federal human rights commission is solely mandated
to enforce federal anti-discrimination law, and state commissions are solely mandated to
enforce state human rights law (which is usually but not always related to discrimination).
This divide does not necessarily mean that a particular case can only be ﬁled in one com-
mission, however, because in practice there is quite considerable (but not total) substantive
overlap between state and federal anti-discrimination laws in Australia. For example, com-
plaints of discrimination can in most instances be ﬁled to either the South Australian Equal
Opportunity Commission or the federal Australian Human Rights Commission; however,
complaints alleging discrimination based on social origin or political opinion can only be
made at the federal level, because these types of discrimination are not prohibited under
the state laws of South Australia.111 As is the case in India, complaints cannot be
handled by both the state and federal level at the same time.112
In Canada, the Canadian Human Rights Commission enforces the Canadian Human
Rights Act, which regulates discrimination perpetrated by federal government entities as
well as private organisations and businesses under the authority of the federal government
such as banks and airlines. Meanwhile each provincial human rights commission may pur-
suant to provincial laws hear complaints of discrimination (and other human rights abuses,
in certain provinces) by entities regulated at the provincial level.113 Thus, unlike the case in
Australia or India, a complaint can generally only be ﬁled at the state level or federal level,
but not both, as there is no concurrent list of entities regulated by both federal and state law.
When there is uncertainty among the public as to which commission is the appropriate place
to direct a complaint, the national and provincial commissions provide advice to petitioners
regarding where to ﬁle.114
Cooperation between NHRIs and SHRIs
While jurisdictional disputes have sometimes arisen in the complaint handling functions of
NHRIs and SHRIS, there is often greater room for cooperation in the promotional,
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educational and monitoring functions of NHRIS and their state counterparts, and in fact
different forms of collaboration have been prioritised in many of the countries discussed
here. For example, in Australia the Australian Human Rights Commission has arranged
to display its publications in several state human rights commission ofﬁces.115 In
Canada, one of the focal points for collaboration has been issues related to indigenous
peoples, which has included cooperation between provincial and national bodies to
improve awareness of human and treaty rights.116 In India, the National Human Rights
Commission held consultations with the state commissions during the preparation of its
Universal Periodic Review submission (although the National Human Rights Commission
complained that the state commissions ‘contributed almost nothing’ to the process).117 One
interesting aspect of the cooperative relationship in some cases is the provision of training
or capacity building assistance by the NHRI to SHRIs. For example, the Australian Human
Rights Commission has provided professional development and conciliation training to the
state commissions,118 while in India, the National Human Rights Commission has assisted
state human rights commissions in strengthening their complaint handling systems, as well
as other capacity building.119
A number of formal mechanisms for encouraging cooperation have been developed. In
several countries an association of ombudsman or human rights commissioner that includes
national, state and local ofﬁcers functions as a mechanism to bring together different actors
and foster either horizontal (i.e., state–state) or vertical (i.e., national–state or state–local)
cooperation. Examples include the Australian Council of Human Rights Agencies, the
Canadian Association of Statutory Human Rights Agencies and the Asociacio´n Defensores
del Pueblo de la Repu´blica Argentina. In some countries the NHRI has also tried to enou-
rage cooperation by holding regular meetings or conferences with the SHRIs. Spain, for
example, has tried to encourage cooperation through annual conferences focusing on coor-
dinating promotional activities.120 The Mexican National Human Rights Commission has
also held a number of semi-annual meetings with SHRIs,121 as has the Indian National
Human Rights Commission.122 In Russia such meetings take place under the aegis of the
Coordination Council of the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation.
Some NHRIs have signed formal agreements or memorandums of understanding to
promote cooperation with their state counterparts and delineate speciﬁc areas of responsi-
bility. In Argentina there are now collaboration agreements between the Defensor del
Pueblo de la Nacio´n and all provincial and municipal defensores del pueblo.123 In
Mexico there are agreements between the national ombudsman and the local ombudsmen
of Tabasco, Yucata´n, Zacatecas and Nayarit.124 In Spain there are agreements between the
ofﬁce of the federal Defensor del Pueblo and its counterparts in Catalonia, Andalucia, the
Islas Canarias, Castilla y Leo´n and Galicia, although these agreements have reportedly not
been effective in actually controlling jurisdictional disputes.125
Concluding observations
Certain concluding observations can be drawn from this comparison of how federal systems
accommodate the increasing pressures to establish human rights institutions. Perhaps the
clearest of these conclusions is that there is so far no dominant solution to the question
of how to arrange the competencies of state and national human rights institutions in
federal nations: countries have rather adopted a wide range of responses, ranging from
the establishment of a deconcentrated NHRI and no SHRIs, to the establishment of
SHRIs at the sub-federal level without an NHRI, to the establishment of both an NHRI
and SHRIs. This diversity of approaches is unsurprising. If there is one axiomatic principle
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of comparative federalism it is that federal countries vary widely in how they address div-
ision of competency issues.126 The diversity of approaches could also in part be a product of
the relatively low level of international guidance regarding the appropriate way for a
country to assure the independent promotion and protection of human rights in a federal
state. The UNHCHR has recently commissioned a study on NHRIs in federal states, but
international organisations and non-governmental organisations have overall provided
very little guidance on strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights in
federal states. In fact, the ICC itself seems uncertain about how to treat SHRIs; the
Bermuda Ombudsman, Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission, Northern Ireland
Human Rights Commission, Scottish Human Rights Commission and Puerto Rican
Oﬁcina del Procurador Del Ciudadano have been accredited, but other SHRIs are excluded
(and are therefore also excluded from those regional NHRI groupings that base admission
on ICC accreditation and function similarly as forums for the exchange of information and
best practices).127
A second observation is that strict adherence to principles of dual federalism appear
to be very much the exception rather than the rule. Dual federalism refers to systems
characterised by exclusive competencies at the federal and sub-federal level, whereby
each governmental level has a monopoly of authority on matters falling under their com-
petency and an inability to intervene in matters not falling within their competency.128 In
the federal systems studied above, it is really only in Canada and the Austrian states of
Tyrol and Vorarlberg that this characterisation would be accurate. Instead, federal
countries have mostly instituted either unitary regimes, where the NHRI exists without
a correspondent SHRI and is competent to deal with human rights violations even at
the sub-national level, or differing forms of shared federalism, where both NHRI and
SHRI at times have the authority to deal with the same subject matter. This ﬁnding is con-
sistent with trends in other areas of public administration, where recent studies have shown
that cooperative federal systems where powers are shared between different levels of gov-
ernment are becoming increasingly prevalent.129 In theory, there may be considerable
advantages to such a system, such as the provision of opportunities for a more diverse
set of players to inﬂuence the policy-making process and reducing the likelihood of regu-
latory capture by interest groups.130 One of the characteristics of shared sovereignty,
however, is that the question of hierarchical subordination will tend to arise.131 This
study shows that countries have come up with a range of different answers to the difﬁcult
question of how to deal with situations where identical complaints are made to both SHRIs
and NHRIs.
The relative absence of dual federalism systems is perhaps surprising when it comes to
institutions from the human rights ombudsman tradition, as national classic ombudsman
institutions in federal countries which are not ICC-member NHRIs tend to have a compe-
tency restricted to federal government actions. In Belgium, Australia and Pakistan, for
example, the federal (classical) ombudsman institutions are restricted to reviewing the
actions of the federal government, and various state and regional ombudsman, where
they exist, have exclusive jurisdiction at their tiers.132 In fact, commentators have
assumed that this is the natural state of affairs.133 It is plausible that there are certain press-
ures stemming from membership in the ICC that make dual federalism relatively unattrac-
tive, such as the Paris Principles requirement that an NHRI shall issue ‘opinions,
recommendations, proposals and reports on anymatters concerning the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights’.134 This appears to be the case in Belgium,135 and would be con-
sistent with recent research showing the standardising inﬂuence of the Paris Principles on
the development of NHRI types.136
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A ﬁnal observation is that federalism issues related to human rights institutions are still
quite vigorously debated and controversial in many parts of the world, and it is therefore
difﬁcult to make strong recommendations regarding best practices. As mentioned above,
these debates have been particularly pronounced in Spain, as is perhaps unsurprising
given the particularly strong emotions regarding autonomy in that country. However, ten-
sions have arisen elsewhere, too. In Mexico, for example, the President of the Federal Dis-
trict (Mexico City) Human Rights Commission notes that ‘We have some projects in
common [with the National Human Rights Commission], but to be honest, we don’t
have a very similar conception.’137 The relationship between the NHRI and SHRIs have
also been criticised as dysfunctional in India, where a prominent non-governmental organ-
isation has complained that ‘[n]either of the commissions utilise the other’s potential or
expertise, thus losing the opportunity for a mutually beneﬁcial relationship’.138 In the
United States, some human rights advocates have argued for the establishment of a
NHRI,139 while the Russia and India NHRIs have pressured states to establish SHRIs.140
There are thus very few systems that one could consider both stable and widely accepted.
It must of course be stressed that the development of NHRIs and SHRIs in federal
countries is, at least in some cases, a relatively recent development. Therefore, only time
will tell if best practices can develop, and if the inﬂuence of the ICC and Paris Principles
can lead to any kind of convergence in the ways in which responsibilities and competencies
are divided between NHRIs and SHRIs. For now, however, it seems clear that a wide range
of practices exist, and it would behoove non-governmental organisations and the inter-
national community to work with federal countries to ensure that their chosen systems func-
tion effectively.
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Subnational human rights institutions are often thought of as distinctly local
bodies, addressing human rights concerns within their jurisdictions with lit-
tle attention to the processes and mechanisms of the wider international
human rights regime. This article shows that this description is no longer
necessarily accurate. Rather, subnational human rights institutions can and
do participate in the UN human rights regime in a number of important
ways. Such participation is potentially beneficial to the UN human rights
processes, and subnational human rights institutions have in fact been wel-
comed by institutional actors at the UN. Nevertheless, the UN, national
human rights institutions, and subnational human rights institutions them-
selves can all do more to ensure that subnational human rights institutions
are able to participate fully in the UN human rights system. KEYWORDS: sub-
national human rights institutions, United Nations, Human Rights Council,
Universal Periodic Review, national human rights institutions.
WHILE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (NHRIS) ARE NOW WIDELY
recognized as playing an accepted and prominent role in the UN human
rights system, less attention has been paid to the international engagement of
their subnational counterparts: those state, provincial, and regional human
rights commissions and ombudsman institutions known broadly as subna-
tional human rights institution (SNHRIs). On the contrary, SNHRIs are often
thought of as distinctly local bodies that address human rights concerns
within their jurisdictions with little attention to the processes and mechanisms
of the wider international human rights regime. This perception is no longer
entirely accurate. As I show in this article, SNHRIs are becoming increas-
ingly active participants in the UN human rights system where they are intro-
ducing their distinct viewpoints to a landscape previously dominated by
national-level actors.
It should be noted that, when compared with NHRI participation, SNHRI
engagement with the UN remains at a relatively low level. However, the
potential significance of this new actor at the international stage is greater than
the current rate of engagement might indicate. NHRI engagement at the UN
also started out at low levels, and it is only in the past few years that NHRI
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participation has become more common and has spread beyond the main
human rights mechanisms to other UN bodies such as the Commission on the
Status of Women and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. A similar
trend is certainly possible with SNHRIs, especially given that the Secretary-
General is now strongly encouraging further SNHRI participation.1
More importantly, SNHRI participation in a UN system that until recently
was considered a bastion of the nation-state represents a significant innovation
in human rights governance that so far has gone largely unremarked by schol-
ars.2 Global governance research has exhaustively addressed the process of
international human rights norm transmission to the local level, employing
concepts such as norm diffusion and internalization,3 localization,4 and ver-
nacularization.5 However, these theoretical approaches have had little to say
about the implications of the active participation of subnational state entities in
international mechanisms, tending instead to see them more as passive recep-
tors of global norms, which they then transmit (or “translate” in Sally Merry’s
terminology)6 to their communities. The innovation of active and multifaceted
SNHRI participation at the UN shows that a greater give and take is possible
between the local and the global (to use the common, but heavily criticized
terms) with results that warrant further empirical and theoretical study.
In this article, I thus take a first step toward addressing the issue by
examining the principal ways in which SNHRIs are participating at the UN:
through filing or contributing to reports to treaty bodies and at the Universal
Periodic Review (UPR); acting as or engaging with independent national
mechanisms pursuant to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities (CPD) and Optional Protocol of the Convention Against Torture
(OPCAT); and engaging with the special procedures. I argue that the impli-
cations of this engagement are largely positive, and conclude by suggesting
possible ways of facilitating further SNHRI participation.
An Introduction to SNHRIs 
As with NHRIs, SNHRIs are independent governmental bodies that protect
and promote human rights; however, SNHRIs differ in that their operations
are limited to subnational jurisdictions, whether municipalities, provinces,
autonomous regions, or other subdivisions. At the broadest level, SNHRIs
can be divided into two types: human rights commissions and ombudsman,
a classification scheme that the UN has also used for NHRIs.7 These two
types have developed in different regions along a somewhat different time
line, and tend to display distinct functional characteristics (although a certain
amount of hybridization has occurred in some countries). 
The ombudsman institution originated at the national level in 1809 in
Sweden as a legislatively appointed individual mandated to monitor the legal-
ity and fairness of public administration, largely through the issuance of non-
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binding recommendations in response to individual complaints.8 By the
1960s ombudsman institutions were spreading throughout the world, and also
were being established at the subnational level in federal nations such as
Canada and Australia. While the traditional ombudsman institution did not
implement human rights norms, this began to change with the establishment
of new “human rights ombudsmen” institutions in postdemocratization Spain
and Portugal. These institutions had a specific mandate to protect human
rights, and often engaged in significant human rights promotional activities.
The human rights ombudsman model was later adopted at the subnational
level in Spain (both at the level of autonomous communities and municipal
government) and proliferated at both the national and subnational levels in
much of Latin America and Eastern Europe when these regions experienced
their waves of democratization. Today, there are seventy-six regional human
rights ombudsmen in Russia alone, and thirty-two in Mexico.9 Simultaneous
to these developments, ombudsman institutions that lack a specific human
rights mandate (often called “classical ombudsmen”) have begun to show an
increasing willingness to make use of human rights norms in their work, even
without an explicit mandate to do so.10 Thus, even many of the classical sub-
national ombudsmen in Europe and the common-law world would be consid-
ered SNHRIs, although their promotional work may be minimal and human
rights activities typically comprise a small percentage of their workload.11
Examples of classical subnational ombudsmen that are recognized as using
human rights norms include the British Columbia ombudsman and the
Bermuda ombudsman.12
Meanwhile, state and municipal human rights commissions emerged first
in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s as a way to address racial
tensions and promote equal opportunity, eventually becoming more common
during the civil rights era.13 Although these commissions varied in form and
function, they mainly focused on reducing racial discrimination through the
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, including federal employment and
housing discrimination laws, as well as local ordinances. This antidiscrimi-
nation commission model was later adopted at the state or provincial level in
other common-law countries with federal or devolved structures such as
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. More recently, commission-
form SNHRIs have also been established by all twenty-three Indian states,
although these differ in that their mandates cover the full corpus of human
rights rather than just equality rights.14 Commission-form SNHRIs today are
generally multiperson independent bodies, appointed by either the subna-
tional legislature or executive, that are mandated to promote and monitor
human rights and to advise subnational governments on human rights issues.
Most (but not all) human rights commissions also have the power to investi-
gate complaints based on violation of antidiscrimination laws or human rights
charters and to make nonbinding recommendations to the parties.15
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The Existing Framework: 
International Engagement of NHRIs
In order to understand the place of SNHRIs in the international system, it is
first necessary to examine the existing framework for NHRI engagement,
which provides the context for current SNHRI engagement. NHRI partici-
pation at the UN is usually dated back to the General Assembly’s 1993 adop-
tion of the Paris Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions
(Paris Principles).16 The Paris Principles elaborated a set of benchmarks for
NHRIs that, among many other provisions, stated that NHRIs should “coop-
erate with the United Nations and any other organization in the United
Nations system”17 For many years, there was a relatively low rate of NHRI
engagement with UN mechanisms, and participation in the Human Rights
Commission was restricted to agenda items specifically related to NHRIs.18
Since the formation of the Human Rights Council, however, NHRIs have
significantly increased their presence in Geneva and they are now given
access to participate at the UN in their own right, apart from their national
delegations. Among other privileges, NHRIs are permitted to submit docu-
ments for the consideration of the Human Rights Council, make written
statements and oral interventions on any item on the council’s agenda, and
sponsor parallel events.19
As UN bodies have been granted special access for NHRIs, there has
arisen the need to define which bodies qualify as NHRIs. To date, the UN has
resolved this dilemma by limiting privileged NHRI participation to those
NHRIs that have received A status accreditation from the International Coor-
dinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights (ICC). The ICC is a global NHRI forum, which accredits
member institutions according to their compliance with the Paris Principles:
A status signifies full compliance with the Paris Principles; B status signifies
partial compliance or insufficient documentation to make a determination;
and C status signifies a lack of compliance. As discussed further below, the
appropriate extent of ICC accreditation of SNHRIs is one of the key unre-
solved issues relating to SNHRI participation at the UN.
NHRI participation at the international level has been the subject of
considerable academic research over the past decade, and this research also
provides a contextual backdrop to many of the conceptual issues surround-
ing SNHRI participation at the international level.20 One issue that has been
repeatedly raised is how to fit NHRIs into the established categories for par-
ticipants at the international level. For example, Rachel Murray examined
whether NHRIs should be considered subjects of international law, conclud-
ing that the practical relevance of such a designation was minimal.21 Murray
and Frans Viljoen wrestle with the question of whether NHRIs should be
considered “state” or “nonstate” actors.22 Viljoen concludes that NHRIs are
“state” but not “governmental” actors; effectively comprising a third cate-
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gory.23 As a practical matter this conclusion seems to best reflect the actual
role of NHRIs, which by and large have acted independently of their
national delegations in international proceedings. The proper place for
SNHRIs among types of international actors is a similarly relevant issue,
although with a twist: the scholarly and practical acceptance of NHRIs as a
separate category means that for SNHRIs the most important question is not
whether they are a state or nonstate actor, but rather whether they should or
should not be considered a form of NHRI (a “subnational NHRI” as Linda
Reif labels them).24
Another strand of research has attempted to ascertain how NHRI partic-
ipation at the international level can add value, both to the NHRI’s own work
and the work of the international human rights regime itself. Chris Sidoti
argues that NHRI participation in UN mechanisms can increase an NHRI’s
effectiveness at home, strengthen its base in law and practice, consolidate its
position, and help it build support and widen partnerships.25 He envisions an
even more beneficial impact at the international level, due to NHRIs’ contri-
butions of information and expertise to international human rights mecha-
nisms.26 Murray focuses more narrowly on the value of NHRIs to the inter-
national system, and suggests four primary justifications for international
participation: to ensure government accountability by providing an alterna-
tive voice, to bring NHRI expertise to the international system, to speak with
a collective NHRI voice, and to protect human rights defenders.27 Viljoen,
however, doubts whether NHRIs have anything to add to the work that non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are already undertaking with regard to
the first two of these rationales, and questions the substantive impact of a col-
lective NHRI voice.28 According to Viljoen, NHRIs provide added value at
the international level primarily through their ability to protect human rights
defenders and their ability to intervene with their government to exert pres-
sure on another government.29 Although this discussion of the value of inter-
national engagement is important for SNHRIs as well, the situation is not
exactly the same. As I discuss in this article, there are other potentially ben-
eficial aspects of SNHRI engagement that do not apply to NHRIs while there
may also be SNHRI-specific factors that decrease their utility at the interna-
tional level. 
SNHRI Engagement at the United Nations
While the role of NHRIs at the international level is now widely acknowl-
edged, there has been less consideration of the international activities of
SNHRIs, which are often thought of as solely concerned with activities in
their own localities, with the only potential connection to the international
level being their implementation of international norms. In this section, I
demonstrate that SNHRIs can have an international presence, and examine
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three principal ways in which SNHRIs currently participate in the UN human
rights system: through the UPR and treaty body reporting processes, through
acting as or engaging with independent mechanisms under the CPD and
OPCAT, and through engaging with the special procedures of the UN Human
Rights Council. I also highlight where relevant the differences and similari-
ties between NHRI and SNHRI forms of participation. Though SNHRIs have
also been established at lower administrative levels, I focus on SNHRIs from
states, provinces, and autonomous regions since those are the ones that are
most likely to engage with the UN system. 
It should be stressed, however, that my intention is not to present a com-
prehensive list of avenues for SNHRI involvement at the UN. Clearly there
are many other ways that SNHRIs can and do participate in UN mechanisms,
including participating in expert meetings organized by the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),30 attending conferences of
human rights treaty parties,31 providing information for OHCHR studies,32
and even filing complaints before international bodies.33 The Yucatan Human
Rights Commission, for example, is explicitly mandated to submit complaints
to international human rights organs in cases of grave violations of human
rights or where the commission’s recommendations are ignored.34 In addi-
tion, there have been examples of SNHRI attendance at ordinary Human
Rights Council sessions; however, such participation has been relatively
exceptional since SNHRIs lack the general right to submit documents or take
the floor for any item under discussion unless they have received A status
accreditation by the ICC.35
Human Rights Reporting Processes
Human rights reporting comprises one of the most important implementation
mechanisms of the international human rights regime. The most significant
human rights reporting at the UN takes place through the UPR process and
treaty body reporting. During the UPR, which was a product of the 2005–
2006 reform in the UN’s human rights apparatus, each member state is sub-
jected to a review of its human rights record in the Human Rights Council.
The UPR, which takes place for each state once every four years, is based on
a report submitted by the national government as well as a ten-page compi-
lation of stakeholder reports and a ten-page compilation of UN information.
These reports are then the subject of interactive discussions between the
reporting state and other member states at a meeting of the UPR Working
Group. 
Meanwhile, parties to the ten core UN human rights treaties are obliged
to submit separate periodic reports to each treaty’s committee regarding their
compliance with the terms of that particular treaty. Unlike the UPR, which is
an intergovernmental process, the treaty bodies are composed of independ-
ent experts. As is the case in the UPR, other stakeholders have the opportu-
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nity to submit parallel reports (often called “shadow reports”) to the treaty
bodies regarding the relevant state’s record. These reports are normally
reviewed in the presence of state representatives, and are generally followed
by the treaty body’s issuance of concluding observations.
There are four basic mechanisms by which SNHRIs can participate in
the reporting process. The first way is through integrating SNHRI informa-
tion regarding local conditions into the report submitted by the national gov-
ernment. This type of consultation is currently encouraged by US national
authorities, as evidenced by a 2010 letter from the Department of State to
state and local human rights commissions asking them to submit information
on their actions for inclusion in reports pursuant to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Interna-
tional Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT).36 Similarly, the Flemish children’s rights
commissioner is mandated to report to the Belgian national government so
that his or her findings can be integrated into Belgium’s periodic report to the
Committee on the Rights of the Child.37 It is worth noting that both Belgium
and the United States lack an A status NHRI that might otherwise be a more
logical SNHRI consultation partner. SNHRIs can also contribute to responses
given by nation-states to questions posed by a treaty body during the course
of a review, an example being the responses drafted by Quebec’s Commis-
sion des Droits de la Personne et des Droits de la Jeunesse in response to
questions posed to the Canadian government during the examination of its
report to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) Committee.38
A second possible mode of indirect SNHRI participation in UPR and
treaty body reporting is through the provision of information to the home
state’s national-level NHRI for inclusion in the NHRI report. A status NHRIs
can attend working group meetings during their home country’s UPR, albeit
without the right to speak; can make oral statements at the UPR plenary ses-
sions; and can take the floor after their home country’s delegation.39 Summa-
rized information from A status NHRIs is also compiled in a separate section
of the ten-page report on stakeholder contributions that is submitted to the
Human Rights Council.40 While treaty body procedures vary, there is also a
clear trend toward providing greater opportunities for participation to A sta-
tus NHRIs in the treaty reporting process.41
One instance of NHRI coordination with SNHRIs in the reporting
process was the 2010 submission by the Australian Human Rights Commis-
sion for Australia’s UPR. After consultation, seven human rights and antidis-
crimination commissions at the Australian state or territorial levels endorsed
the Australian Human Rights Commission’s submission.42 In the past, similar
attempts have been made in Canada to encourage formal coordination
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between the Canadian Human Rights Commission and provincial human
rights commissions during the treaty reporting process through the establish-
ment of a Continuing Committee of Officials on Human Rights, but more
recently provincial commissions have reportedly stopped serving as part of
this committee.43 Of course, consultation between NHRIs and SNHRIs does
not necessarily improve the quality of NHRI reporting. During preparation of
the Indian National Human Rights Commission’s submission to the Human
Rights Council during its second UPR, five regional consultations were held
with state human rights commissions along with other stakeholders. How-
ever, according to the national human rights commission, the state human
rights commissions “contributed almost nothing, confirming that most are
still inchoate, and must be strengthened.”44
Third, while the Paris Principles require NHRIs to have “as broad a man-
date as possible” and address human rights violations “in any part of the
country,” at least in occasional cases it is possible for SNHRIs to be accred-
ited as A status (i.e., Paris Principles compliant) NHRIs by the ICC, thus giv-
ing them the ability to act directly at the international level as NHRIs.45
According to the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation, multiple national
institutions may “in very exceptional circumstances” be accredited as long as
the national government provides its written consent and the concerned insti-
tutions provide a written agreement regarding rights and duties as an ICC
member, including arrangements for participation in the international human
right system.46 As of February 2013, the only SNHRIs with A status accredi-
tation were the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission; the Scottish
Human Rights Commission, and the Equality and Human Rights Commis-
sion (which may just as easily be classified as an NHRI that lacks authority
over the entire country since it exercises its mandate in England, Wales, and
Scotland, for those human rights issues not devolved to the Scottish parlia-
ment). The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has taken advantage
of its A status to participate in the United Kingdom’s UPR in 2012 and file a
parallel report before the Committee Against Torture in 2013.47 The Scottish
Human Rights Commission has also filed numerous reports to the UN,
including a recent report to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee).48 It is worth noting
that the Puerto Rico Oficina del Procurador del Ciudadano and Hong Kong
Equal Opportunities Commission have also applied for ICC accreditation, but
they each received C status, which signifies noncompliance with the Paris
Principles and does not lead to greater access to the UN system.49
The fourth way for SNHRIs to participate in the reporting process is by
contributing shadow reports as a general stakeholder, without any claim of
NHRI status. Stakeholder reports are accepted by both treaty bodies and by
the Human Rights Council during UPR sessions. One SNHRI that has been
particularly active in submitting stakeholder reports is the Hong Kong Equal
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Opportunities Commission, which has regularly submitted alternate reports
alongside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s reports to the ICE-
SCR, ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT, CPD, and CERD Committees.50 While stake-
holder reports are often drafted by a single entity, they can also result from
the collaborative work of multiple interested parties. Thus, an SNHRI could
in principle collaborate with other SNHRIs or interested civil society organi-
zations in a joint report (although the latter may or may not be considered
appropriate, depending on the nature of the ties between SNHRIs and NGOs
in a particular jurisdiction). A recent example of this type of cooperation is
the joint submission by a group of seven Mexican state human rights com-
missions before the Committee Against Torture.51
Independent National Mechanisms
Another way of entry into the UN system for SNHRIs has been involvement
in the independent national mechanisms that are mandated by both the CPD
and OPCAT. According to the CPD, state parties “shall, in accordance with
their legal and administrative systems, maintain, strengthen, designate or
establish within the State Party, a framework, including one or more inde-
pendent mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor imple-
mentation of the present Convention.”52 States are instructed to take into
account the Paris Principles when designating independent mechanisms.53
Meanwhile, states parties to the OPCAT shall “set up, designate or maintain
at the domestic level one or several visiting bodies for the prevention of tor-
ture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” which
are referred to as National Preventive Mechanism (NPMs).54
To date, the majority of independent mechanisms designated under the
CPD and NPMs under the OPCAT have been NHRIs.55 However, with regard
to both treaties, federalism concerns have arisen in some states regarding the
appropriateness of a single national-level body acting in issue areas that have
traditionally been addressed at the state level. This has resulted in a number
of innovative responses; for example, Germany has designated a Joint Com-
mission of the Länder as the NPM along with the Federal Agency for the Pre-
vention of Torture while Argentina has designated a National System to Pre-
vent Torture that is comprised of a National Committee for the Prevention of
Torture, a Federal Council of Local Preventive Mechanisms, and local pre-
ventive mechanisms to be designated in each province.56
Federalism concerns also have led to SNHRIs being designated as inde-
pendent mechanisms under both treaties. Unlike the treaty body or UPR
reporting process, there is no need for independent mechanisms to be accred-
ited by the ICC, and the possibility of multiple bodies is explicitly anticipated
by the treaty texts. Thus, the United Kingdom has designated the Equality
and Human Rights Commission, the Scottish Human Rights Commission, the
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, and the Equality Commission
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of Northern Ireland to jointly serve as independent mechanisms pursuant to
Article 33(2) of the CPD.57 With regard to the OPCAT, Denmark has desig-
nated Greenland’s ombudsperson as Denmark’s NPM (along with Denmark’s
national ombudsman) while the Scottish Human Rights Commission and
Office of the Children’s Commissioner for England have each been desig-
nated as one of eighteen NPMs in the United Kingdom.58
In this context, it is also worth noting the interesting reaction of the Cata-
lan parliament to Spain’s OPCAT ratification. The Catalan government had
called for its human rights ombudsman (called the sindic de greuges) to be
designated as one of Spain’s NPMs. When the Spanish national government
chose to instead appoint the national defensor del pueblo as a unitary national
NPM, the Catalan parliament nevertheless passed a law designating the sindic
de greuges as the “Catalan Authority for the Prevention of Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment in virtue of the OPCAT,” and
granted it new competencies to visit sites of detention and prevent torture.59
Essentially, it is now acting as an unofficial (at least at the national and inter-
national levels) preventive mechanism. Similarly, the state of Rio de Janeiro
has established a local preventive mechanism and has issued a report on tor-
ture prevention in the absence of the establishment of any NPM by Brazil at
the federal level.60
In addition, just as SNHRIs can play an indirect role in the reporting
process for treaty bodies and the UPR, the possibility also exists for them to
participate indirectly in the work of national expert bodies even when the
SNHRIs are not themselves designated. Perhaps the most formalized example
of such cooperation has taken place in Mexico where the National Commis-
sion of Human Rights, in its role as Mexico’s NPM pursuant to the OPCAT,
has signed collaboration agreements with thirty of Mexico’s state human
rights commissions.61 A typical agreement with the Sinaloa State Human
Rights Commission provides that the national human rights commission will
conduct inspection visits while the state commission commits to providing
human and material resources to the extent possible, participate in developing
observations addressed to the competent authorities, and monitor and estab-
lish communications with civil society organizations.62
Special Procedures
The special procedures refers to those independent human rights experts
mandated by the Human Rights Council to report and advise on particular
human rights themes or the state of human rights in particular countries. As
of October 2013, there were thirty-six special procedures currently operating
with thematic mandates, and thirteen with mandates to report on particular
countries where the international community has human rights concerns.63
Most of these special procedures consist of a single expert called a special
rapporteur, but five of the thematic mandates are made up of five-person
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working groups. Although the range of actions undertaken by the special pro-
cedures varies, their main activities include fact-finding through country vis-
its, developing jurisprudence, and communicating human rights complaints to
government representatives. The only area of the special procedures where
A status ICC accreditation is necessary to fully participate is the plenary
Human Rights Council meeting when a special rapporteur reports on a coun-
try visit; at these meetings, only A status NHRIs are allowed to address the
plenary after the concerned state.64
There are relatively few strict rules regarding the organizations with
which the special procedures should engage during their country visits,
although their guidance manual states broadly that country visits allow for
contact with NHRIs and “facilitate an intensive dialogue with all relevant
state authorities, including those in the executive, legislative and judicial
branches.”65 Thus practices vary but, in some circumstances, special proce-
dures have found it useful to meet with SNHRIs during country visits as a
way of ascertaining objective information from independent observers work-
ing in local areas. For example, in Mexico in 2010 the special rapporteur on
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion met with the Comisión de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos del Estado
de Guerrero66 while the special rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers met with the Comisión Estatal de Derechos Humanos de Nuevo
León.67 Elsewhere, the special rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers met with the commissioner for human rights of the Sverdlovsk
region during a country visit to Russia,68 the special rapporteur on torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment met with the
defensor del pueblo de la provincia de Buenos Aires,69 and the special rap-
porteur on the right to food met with the Ontario Human Rights Commission
during a recent country visit to Canada.70
In the United States, the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission
recently went a step further in engaging with the special procedures by sub-
mitting a formal complaint to the special rapporteur on the rights of indige-
nous peoples, alleging that the United States and state of Arizona were vio-
lating the rights of the Dine and other indigenous peoples to access the San
Francisco Peaks as a sacred site through the proposed use of wastewater for
artificial snowmaking in a commercial ski operation.71 The complaint called
for the special rapporteur to formulate recommendations and proposals to
prevent, remedy, and redress these violations, which he in fact did by pre-
senting a set of observations to the US government in July 2011.72 This illus-
trates an interesting dynamic whereby an SNHRI has purposefully initiated
engagement with the UN in order to increase pressure on the national gov-
ernment to respect rights in the subnational entity, a dynamic similar to that
anticipated by Murray with respect to NHRIs holding their governments
accountable.73
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Potential Benefits of 
SNHRI Participation in UN Mechanisms 
There are a number of potential advantages to SNHRI involvement in UN
processes that have yet to be fully explored. Perhaps the most evident advan-
tage from the UN’s perspective would be the increased access to objective
local information that SNHRIs could make available at the international
level. Especially in federal polities, the national-level actors—whether NHRI
or governmental—may lack detailed knowledge of the types of human rights
abuses occurring in the provinces and the reasons for such abuses. In addi-
tion, there is no strong tradition of participation by other subnational actors
(e.g., mayors, governors, and local NGOs) in UN human rights processes.
SNHRIs can therefore fill an important need for accurate and neutral testi-
mony on local conditions while minimizing the risk of duplicating existing
voices due to the relative lack of other internationally engaged subnational
actors.
Second, besides their role in conveying local information, SNHRIs can
potentially convey new perspectives on human rights in their interactions
with UN processes, by including voices that are rarely heard at the national
level. For example, indigenous peoples’ perspectives are probably more
prominent at the subnational than national level in many countries, which is
one of the reasons why indigenous rights have received relatively short shrift
in UN human rights treaties. Providing more access to organizations like the
Greenland ombudsman, Northwest Territories Human Rights Commission, or
Chiapas State Human Rights Commission could provide at least one outlet
for official human rights organizations that more prominently represent the
concerns of indigenous peoples. Similarly, discussion of the right to self-
determination, which is often overlooked by the UN human rights system
despite its prominent inclusion in Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR, could
benefit from the contributions of SNHRIs such as the Catalan sindic de
greuges and Quebec’s Commission des Droits de la Personne et des Droits de
la Jeunesse, which would presumably provide different perspectives than
most national governments.
Third, greater participation in UN processes would likely improve
SNHRI familiarity with UN-established human rights norms and improve
SNHRI capacity to integrate those international norms into their everyday
internally focused work of, inter alia, human rights promotion, complaint res-
olution, human rights training, policy, and legislative reviews. The impor-
tance of this channeling function has been highlighted by Murray with
respect to the international engagement of NHRIs, and much the same argu-
ment applies to SNHRIs.74 While some SNHRIs still exclusively rely on
domestic (local or national) rights norms, an increasing number are also
directly applying international norms, generally from the major human rights
treaties and Universal Declaration of Human Rights.75 By further integrating
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SNHRIs into UN processes, the UN would naturally encourage SNHRIs to in
turn integrate international norms into their work. 
Fourth, SNHRI participation in UN processes would facilitate the inclu-
sion of truly independent state voices from countries that possess SNHRIs,
but either lack an NHRI accredited with A status by the ICC (as is the case
with Belgium, Switzerland, and the United States), lack an NHRI with full
substantive authority throughout the country due to strong federalism or
regionalism traditions (as is the case in Canada, Australia, and elsewhere), or
possess an accredited NHRI that in fact does not act with robust independ-
ence (as some would argue is the case in Mexico).76 NHRIs are often lauded
as vital participants in UN processes that “bring a measure of honesty to
international forums where it is lacking.”77 Where no NHRI exists, SNHRIs
can bring that same honesty and objective perspective. Of course, while pro-
viding greater voice to SNHRIs in these situations may provide short-term
benefits, one could argue that it incrementally decreases the pressure to estab-
lish a full-fledged and fully authoritative NHRI in countries that currently
lack them, which some might consider a preferable long-term alternative. 
These benefits may be offset by potential drawbacks to UN participation.
There is the danger that increased participation at the international level
would draw money and personnel away from SNHRIs’ primary task of
improving human rights conditions within their own jurisdictions. This has
proven a serious issue even for generally better-funded NHRIs when they
have been given more international responsibilities such as NPM status.78
There may also be logistical difficulties inherent in some aspects of UN man-
agement of SNHRIs as a coherent new category as well as the potential risk
of SNHRI participation in UN processes eating into the time and attention
granted to NGOs, an outcome that some observers have criticized with
respect to NHRI participation.79
Overall, however, in recent years the UN has accepted the advantages of
SNHRI involvement. In 2011, High Commissioner for Human Rights
Navanetham Pillay publicly encouraged subnational human rights institutions
to “enhance [their] engagement with the United Nations treaty bodies and the
special procedures mechanisms of the Human Rights Council.”80 This state-
ment was reiterated the same year in a report from the Secretary-General stat-
ing that “[i]nteraction by subnational human rights institutions with the inter-
national human rights system, including the universal periodic review, the
treaty bodies and the special procedures, is strongly encouraged.”81 This wel-
coming attitude is consistent with the advice of the 2004 Panel of Eminent
Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, which argued that a more
systematic engagement of local authorities with the UN system would
“strengthen global governance, control democratic deficits in intergovern-
mental affairs, buttress representational democracy and connect the United
Nations better with global opinion.”82
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Conclusion
Considering the potential benefits of greater SNHRI engagement in UN
processes, it is notable that SNHRI participation remains at a relatively low
level, at least when compared with NHRI engagement. For some SNHRIs,
this surely is due to a lack of capacity; many SNHRIs lack the funding and
staffing resources to devote to international engagement (as, for that matter,
do some NHRIs). In the United States, for example, the president of the
SNHRI association has welcomed calls from the national government to par-
ticipate in the reporting process, but has also clarified that federal assistance
“in the form of dedicated staff, education and training, and funding, is essen-
tial to enable commission staff to engage in reporting efforts.”83 Other
SNHRIs may view engagement with international organizations as outside of
their mandate, or at least of relatively low priority. However, there neverthe-
less are actions that can be taken by the UN, NHRIs, and the SNHRIs them-
selves that would facilitate future engagement with UN processes for those
SNHRIs that see such engagement as beneficial. 
One way that UN bodies could encourage greater SNHRI participation
would be to provide more explicit guidance on how to include SNHRIs in
particular situations. For example, guidance documents for the special pro-
cedures could instruct them to consult with SNHRIs when relevant (in addi-
tion to NHRIs and civil society groups), and the Human Rights Council could
create a separate accreditation status for SNHRIs that would allow them to
participate in Human Rights Council sessions even without applying for
exceptional ICC accreditation. In addition, the UN could increase its level of
capacity-building assistance to SNHRIs in developing countries. Not only
would this assist with improving SNHRI professionalism and spread best
practices in their day-to-day work, but it would also necessarily familiarize
SNHRIs with UN norms and mechanisms, increasing the likelihood that
SNHRIs will choose to engage more fully with the international system.
As for NHRIs, there are two principal actions that could be taken to
increase the level and quality of SNHRI participation in UN processes. First,
those NHRIs that actively participate at the UN could ensure that they consult
with interested SNHRIs prior to engaging at the international level. This
would allow SNHRIs to indirectly have a voice at the UN even where limited
finances or restrictive mandates may make direct participation difficult. Sec-
ond, NHRIs could also play more of a proactive role in providing training to
SNHRIs in their home country on how best to interact with the international
human rights system. At this point, many NHRIs have well over a decade of
experience with intensive participation in UN processes and would be in a
good position to pass on that expertise to their subnational counterparts. In
nations such as India and Australia, there already have been encouraging
examples of NHRIs offering training to SNHRI officers.84
The most important step that SNHRIs could take to facilitate their par-
ticipation at the UN would be to develop an effective global forum for
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transnational cooperation. Although there are many existing regional
ombudsman forums and the International Ombudsman Association operates
globally, these forums are not especially human rights focused, are gener-
ally open to both national and subnational ombudsmen, and do not have a
significant membership of nonombudsman SNHRIs. The experience of the
ICC with NHRIs shows that the establishment of a credible global forum
for SNHRI cooperation would create a conduit for information on UN
processes to be passed down to SNHRIs, could offer a means of accrediting
SNHRIs for greater access, and would provide a more prominent collective
voice to promote greater interactions between SNHRIs and the UN system.
The establishment of such an institution is an area where UN assistance
could also be helpful; the ICC, for instance, is heavily supported by
OHCHR in terms of both staffing and finances.
An alternative option would be for the ICC to allow A status accredita-
tion to more SNHRIs, as has been suggested by commentators in certain cir-
cumstances.85 However, this seems unlikely to occur at a large scale. As with
any group, current ICC members would fear that expansion would water
down the influence of existing members. In addition, allocating ICC voting
rights to SNHRIs while respecting the principle of sovereign equality would
be challenging, as some countries have dozens of SNHRIs while others have
none. Currently, this issue is dealt with somewhat unsatisfactorily in the case
of the United Kingdom by allotting only one collective vote to all ICC-
accredited UK bodies. Finally, establishing appropriate criteria for SNHRI
eligibility would be a major challenge, given that emphasis on a broad man-
date by the Paris Principles presents difficulties for SNHRIs. 
Even at the current levels of participation, however, it is becoming evi-
dent that there is a new actor in the UN human rights system that bears fur-
ther research and consideration. Where we once could refer to a three-level
international human rights regime with global, regional, and national ele-
ments, it is clear that today the international human rights regime is also mak-
ing room for SNHRIs to participate, both directly and indirectly through
coordination with national governments or NHRIs in their home countries.
While the implications of this development seem largely positive—and have
been recognized as such at the UN—it continues to be a development that
warrants greater recognition from a human rights community that has tradi-
tionally been reluctant to acknowledge the role of subnational actors.  
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Abstract: Transgovernmental networks have played a prominent role in the evolution and
development of national human rights institutions (‘NHRIs’) by promoting cooperation,
best practices, and engagement at the international level, and providing NHRIs with
legitimacy through the accreditation process. The role that transgovernmental networks
play in the development of sub-national human rights institutions (‘SNHRIs’), however,
has yet to be examined. This article attempts to fill this gap by comparing networking
patterns of national and sub-national human rights institutions. This article concludes that
while SNHRIs are able to derive certain benefits from their membership in ombudsman
associations, they are currently missing out on many of the other benefits that NHRIs
derive from their membership in the International Coordinating Committee for National
Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (‘ICC’) and its affiliated
networks. This article therefore proposes that the ICC establish a separate membership
category for SNHRIs, with membership conditioned on compliance with a set of principles
based on the Paris Principles, but revised so as to be applicable to sub-national bodies.
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I. Introduction
Transgovernmental networks such as the International Coordinating Committee for
National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (‘ICC’) and its
affiliated regional networks have played a prominent role in the growth and development of
national human rights institutions (‘NHRIs’). These networks have incentivised NHRI
conformity with best practices,1 facilitated NHRI exchange of information and coordination
on particular human rights issues,2 encouraged and assisted in the development of new
NHRIs,3 provided legitimacy and credibility through accreditation,4 and effectively
*Email: amw247@yahoo.com
1A Byrnes, A Durbach and C Renshaw, ‘Joining the Club: The Asia Pacific Forum of National Human
Rights Institutions, the Paris Principles and the Advancement of Human Rights Protection in the
Region’ (2008) 14 Australian J Human Rts 63.
2C Renshaw, ‘The Role of Networks in the Implementation of Rights in the Asia Pacific Region’, in
H Nasu and B Saul (eds), Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region (Routledge 2011), 202–7.
3C Renshaw and K Fitzpatrick, ‘National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific Region:
Change Agents under Conditions of Uncertainty’, in R Goodman and T Pegram (eds), Human Rights,
State Compliance, and Social Change (Cambridge University Press 2012), 166–180.
4Ibid 165; S Sarugaser-Hug, ‘How a Peer-Review Mechanism can Influence the Implementation of
International Human Rights Standards: Why the Work of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation of the
International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights Matters’, (2012) 18 Australian J Human Rts 45, 62.
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developed outlets for participating in United Nations activities.5 The UN General Assembly,
Human Rights Council and treaty bodies have all, at various times, encouraged NHRIs to
join the ICC.6 Over the past decade, NHRI networking has been the subject of a growing
number of academic studies, which have generally lauded the networks’ beneficial effects on
the evolution of NHRIs.7
While the importance of networking for NHRIs is by now clear, there is far less
understanding of the potential and actual use of networking by the sub-national
counterparts of NHRIs, which are here termed sub-national human rights institutions
(‘SNHRIs’), and defined as independent non-judicial governmental institutions that
possess a sub-national mandate, and whose mission includes the implementation of
human rights norms. As with NHRIs, SNHRIs stand to reap significant gains from
transgovernmental networking. They also have often shown a willingness to engage in
networking with their peers at the global, regional, and in some cases domestic levels. To
date, however, there has been very little academic examination of the phenomenon of
SNHRI networking. This is in part a symptom of a broader tendency among both
scholars and practitioners to overlook sub-national human rights actors in favour of
national or supra-national institutions.8
In this article, I attempt to fill this lacuna by examining the role that
transgovernmental networks play in the work of SNHRIs, in comparison with the role
that they play for NHRIs. I show that while SNHRIs currently enjoy some of the
benefits of transgovernmental networking, they generally lack access to the most
influential and effective networking opportunities available to NHRIs, with negative
implications for SNHRI effectiveness and engagement in the international human rights
system. I conclude with prescriptive recommendations for optimising the potential for
transgovernmental networks to improve the quality of human rights work undertaken by
SNHRIs.
5S Cardenas, ‘Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions’
(2003) Global Governance 23, 33–34; K Roberts, ‘National Human Rights Institutions as Diplomacy
Actors’, in Michael O’Flaherty et al (eds), Human Rights Diplomacy: Contemporary Perspectives (Leiden,
Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), 230–34.
6Sarugaser-Hug (n 4) 47.
7See, e.g., M Brodie, ‘Progressing Norm Socialisation: Why Membership Matters – The Impact of the
Accreditation Process of the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights’ (2011) 80 Nordic J Intl L 143; N Shawki, ‘A New Actor
in Human Rights Politics? Transgovernmental Networks of National Human Rights Institutions’, in
N Shawki and M Cox (eds), Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: Actors and Issues in
Contemporary Human Rights Politics (Ashgate 2009), 41–57; T Pegram, ‘Global Human Rights
Governance and Orchestration: National Human Rights Institutions as Intermediaries’, Eur J Intl Rel 1,
14 (Advance Access Published 6 October 2014, DOI: 10.1177/1354066114548079); Byrnes et al,
‘Joining the Club’ (n 1); and Renshaw, ‘The Role of Networks’ (n 2).
8N Shawki, ‘Global Norms, Local Implementation – How are Global Norms Translated into Local
Practice?’ (2011) Globality Stud J https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/article/global-norms-local-implementation-
how-are-global-norms-translated-into-local-practice/ accessed 15 November 2014; International Council
on Human Rights Policy, ‘Local Rule: Decentralization and Human Rights’ (2002) 42.
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II. Sub-National Human Rights Institutions: An Overview
While the term ‘sub-national human rights institution’ has been employed on occasion in
recent years by the UN and other actors,9 it has not yet entered wide circulation. Thus, before
going further, a brief introduction to the concept is warranted. In broad terms, SNHRIs can be
considered as the sub-national counterparts of NHRIs, and the two institutional types share
many of the same characteristics. As is the case with NHRIs, the most important
distinguishing factor of SNHRIs is their independence; they are governmental bodies but
operate outside the general government agency hierarchy and (in principle, if not always in
practice) do not operate under the instructions of any other bodies. The range of functions
performed by SNHRIs varies widely according to local circumstances but can include
gathering information, publishing reports, monitoring human rights violations, conducting
inquiries, proposing legislative or policy reforms, conducting awareness-raising campaigns, and,
in many cases, receiving complaints from the general public and working toward the
satisfactory resolution of those complaints. Within the broad SNHRI category is included a
diverse range of institutions such as human rights commissions, ombudsmen, personeros,
defensores del pueblo, difensores civicos, etc, as well as institutions that specialise in particular
rights such as the rights of children or the rights of the disabled. SNHRIs exist at virtually all
administrative levels, from cities and counties to provinces and vast autonomous regions.
SNHRIs may be far less well known than NHRIs in the human rights community, but
they have become similarly abundant on the world stage. Anti-discrimination or human
rights commissions in many common law countries have the longest history, dating back to
the 1930s in the United States10 and the 1960s in Canada.11 Currently there are human
rights commissions in all Australian states (and some territories), as well as in most US states,
Indian states, and Canadian provinces.12 In Europe, there are several hundred regional
ombudsmen and almost 1,000 local ombudsmen in the 47 Council of Europe member
states,13 all of which have been established since the 1970s.14 While some of these are classic
9See e.g., Address by Navanetham Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights, to the Annual
Meeting of the Coordinating Council of Sub-national Ombudspersons of the Russian Federation,
‘National Human Rights Protection Systems: The First Ports of Call’ (18 February 2011) http://
www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10798&LangID=E accessed 15
November 2014; Report by the Secretary General: National Institutions for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights, A/66/274 (8 August 2011) para 95; and Commonwealth Human Rights
Initiative, ‘The Parliamentary Committee as Promoter of Human Rights: The UK’s Joint Committee
on Human Rights’ (2007) 17.
10KL Saunders and HE Bang, ‘A Historical Perspective on US Human Rights Commissions’, in
Executive Sessions Papers: Human Rights Commissions and Criminal Justice (June 2007) 7.
11RB Howe and D Johnson, Restraining Equality: Human Rights Commissions in Canada (University of
Toronto Press 2000) 9–12.
12A Wolman, ‘The Relationship between National and Sub-National Human Rights Institutions in
Federal States’ (2013) 17 Intl J Hum Rts 445, 448–51.
13‘Effective Protection of Human Rights in Europe: Enhanced Co-operation between Ombudsmen,
National Human Rights Institutions, and the Council for Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’,
Background Paper for 10th Round Table of European Ombudsmen and the Council for Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights, CommDH/Omb-NHRI (2007) 1 Rev 3 (April 2007) para 16.
14D Ansari and HM Tschudi, ‘Regional Ombudspersons: An Institution in the Service of Citizens’
Rights’, Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities Explanatory Memorandum
CPR (11) 7 Part II https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=906233&Site=COE accessed 15 November
2014 (noting first local ombudsman was established in Zurich in 1971).
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ombudsmen that address good governance issues with little attention to human rights, more
and more European ombudsmen engage closely with human rights norms,15 and in central
and eastern Europe most ombudsmen are explicitly required to do so (these are generally
called human rights ombudsmen).16 In the last decades, sub-national human rights
ombudsmen have also become widespread in Latin America. Currently there are at least
36 provincial and municipal defensores del pueblo in Argentina17 and 1,100 personeros
municipales in Colombia.18 While SNHRIs are less common in Africa and Asia, their
number has been growing recently; to give one example, South Korea now has 16 SNHRIs,
all established since 2011.19
III. Transgovernmental Networks: The Conceptual Framework
Government officials have long had formal and informal relationships with their peers in
foreign countries. In the post-Cold War period, however, transgovernmental networks,
defined as ‘pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units
working across the borders that divide countries from one another’, have become more
common.20 These networks have involved a range of different types of officials, from judges
to regulators to policy implementers, acting in many different issue areas, from human rights
to financial regulation to antitrust enforcement. While attention has often focused on
networks involving national government units, the increase in transgovernmental networks is
also evident at the sub-national level, especially in areas of local interest such as
environmental regulation.21 At the sub-national level, governmental units have also formed
networks with their peers within a single country, which are sometimes called ‘translocal’
networks.22 While translocal networks would not be considered ‘transgovernmental’ under
the definition given above, they may in some cases be functionally similar.
15H Pihlajasaari and H Skard, ‘The Office of Ombudsman and Local and Regional Authorities’, Report
for Council of Europe Congress for Local and Regional Authorities (2011) para 9.
16L Reif, ‘Transplantation and Adaptation: The Evolution of the Human Rights Ombudsman’ (2011)
31 Boston Coll Third World LJ 269, 309.
17There are currently 36 provincial and municipal defensor del pueblo members of the Asociación
Defensores del Pueblo de la República Argentina. ADPRA, ‘Defensorias Integrante de ADPRA’ http://
www.adpra.org.ar/integrantes-adpra accessed 15 November 2014.
18The Federación Nacional de Personeros de Colombia includes 1,102 personeros municipales and
personeros distritales. Federación Nacional de Personeros de Colombia, ‘Quienes Somos’ http://www.
fenalper.org/web/index.php/institucional/quienes-somos accessed 15 November 2014.
19These include 13 human rights commissions, two human rights ombudsmen, and one human rights
center. Korea Human Rights Foundation, ‘Report on Local Government and Human Rights’ (August
2014), 208–11.
20A-M Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2004), 14.
21See, e.g., K Kern and H Bulkeley, ‘Cities, Europeanization and Multilevel Governance: Governing
Climate Change Through Transnational Municipal Networks’ (2009) 47(2) J Common Market Stud
309. These networks have provided members with ‘a sense of collective purpose, political support,
access to knowledge, and the sharing of best practices’. H Bulkeley, ‘Transgovernmental Networks’, in
J-F Morin and A Orsini (eds), Essential Concepts of Global Environmental Governance (Routledge 2015),
220–221.
22See J Resnik, ‘Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs
Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism’ (2007) 57 Emory LJ 31.
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NHRI and SNHRI networks can be included among this broader category of
transgovernmental networks (or translocal networks if they involve entities within a single
country).23 While NHRIs and SNHRIs act independently, they nevertheless are state
sponsored and funded, and are established by national or sub-national constitutions,
legislation or decrees.24 Although NHRIs and SNHRIs are sometimes deemed ‘quasi-
governmental’ because of their functional independence,25 such independence is relatively
common for governmental participants in transgovernmental networks, and, in fact, earlier
studies defined transgovernmental relations to require member sub-units to act
autonomously from their governments.26
Transgovernmental networks can be classified according to both the relationships that the
networks establish and the functions that the networks perform. According to the typology
developed by Anne-Marie Slaughter and Thomas Hale, the relationships that they establish
can be horizontal, vertical, or both.27 Horizontal networks involve actors at the same
administrative level, whether sub-national, national, or supra-national. These are most
common and most commonly studied. Vertical networks include actors from different
governmental levels. While SNHRI and NHRI networks are mainly horizontal in nature,
some also include vertical elements by including both SNHRIs and NHRIs in the same
network (or even by including the European Ombudsman, which operates at a supra-
national level).
Functionally, transgovernmental networks have been divided into three types:
information networks, enforcement networks, and harmonisation networks (although it
should be noted that many networks exercise more than one function).28 Information
networks focus on exchanging information and collecting or distilling best practices through,
for example, the use of conferences, training sessions, and the publication of reports. Recent
research has stressed the importance of networks to governmental learning and innovation
because of evidence that officials tend to evaluate new information or policies based more on
the subjective opinion of their peers rather than formal sources.29 Enforcement networks
involve cooperation with the goal of enforcing laws that cannot be easily enforced by a single
country’s enforcement apparatus. Harmonisation networks are aimed at promoting
conformity with a single standard or set of rules. SNHRI and NHRI networks function in
23For the use of transgovernmental networks as a conceptual framework for analysing NHRI networks,
see Shawki, ‘A New Actor in Human Rights Politics?’ (n 7).
24A Smith, ‘The Unique Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?’ (2006)
28 Hum Rts Q 909.
25R Kumar, ‘National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance Perspectives on
Institutionalization of Human Rights’ (2003) 19 Amer U Intl L Rev 281. In a similar vein, Rachel
Murray has called NHRIs ‘semi-official’ bodies. R Murray, The Role of National Human Rights
Institutions at the International and Regional Levels: The Experience of Africa (Hart 2007), 68.
26R Keohane and J Nye, ‘Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations’ (1974) 27
World Pol 43 (stating that transgovernmental relations involve ‘sub-units of different governments that
are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of cabinets or chief executives of those
governments’).
27A-M Slaughter and T Hale, ‘Transgovernmental Networks and Multi-Level Governance’, in H
Enderlein, S Wälti and M Zürn (eds) Handbook on Multi-Level Governance (Edward Elgar 2010) 360.
28Ibid.
29E Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (Free Press 2003), 341; H Wolman and E Page, ‘Policy Transfer
among Local Governments: An Information Theory Approach’ (2002) 15(4) Governance an Intl J of
Policy and Admin 497.
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large part as information networks, however the ICC in particular also has a strong
harmonisation function with respect to the Paris Principles.
Looking beyond a purely functional analysis, a large body of research has highlighted the
fact that transgovernmental networking can have other important implications for their
members. Three of these are of particular potential importance for SNHRIs. First,
membership in transgovernmental networks can have a positive effect on the legitimacy of
their member bodies. According to an empirical study of transgovernmental securities
networks by David Bach and Abraham Newman, ‘[b]oth the statistical analysis and
preliminary anecdotal evidence suggest that newly created regulators use membership in
transgovernmental networks to bolster their legitimacy’.30 In particular, new or insecure
bodies see network membership as a pathway to improving their image through association
with more established or respected bodies in the transgovernmental network setting. A
similar legitimising motive has been noted in studies of NHRI membership in the ICC, as
will be discussed in the following section.
Secondly, transgovernmental networks can promote their members’ independence. In
some cases this is accomplished through the promulgation of non-binding guidelines that
encourage independence, such as the Basel Core Principles on Banking Supervision or the
International Organisation of Securities Commissions principles.31 Elsewhere, as is the case
with NHRIs in the ICC, membership may be conditioned on structural independence,
thereby providing an incentive for states to establish independent NHRIs. Even without
explicit support for member independence, transgovernmental networks can provide fora for
lower level officials to develop their professional agendas separately from and outside of the
supervision of their national (or sub-national) governments. According to Robert Keohane
and Joseph Nye, transgovernmental relations can even lead to the emergence of ‘coalitions
with like-minded agencies from other governments against elements of their own
administrative structures’.32
Thirdly, transgovernmental networks can also have a socialising effect on their
members.33 In the human right field, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have applied their
work on state socialisation to human rights networks. According to Goodman and Jinks,
there are three distinct mechanisms of social influence driving state behaviour: material
inducement, persuasion, and acculturation.34 Of these mechanisms, acculturation (meaning
the ‘general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioural patterns of the
surrounding culture’) is of particular importance in explaining the impact of
transgovernmental human rights networks.35 Acculturation is based on the social desire to
conform, a result of the socio-psychological costs of nonconformity (including dissonance
30D Bach and A Newman, ‘It’s Time to Join: The Politics of Transgovernmental Network
Participation’, APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper (2009) 4.
31L Casini, ‘Domestic Public Authorities within Global Networks: Institutional and Procedural Design,
Accountability, and Review’, in J Pauwelyn, R Wessel and J Wouters, Informal International
Lawmaking (OUP 2012), 392.
32Keohane and Nye (n 26) 44.
33Slaughter, ‘New World Order’ (n 20) 198.
34R Goodman and D Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law
(OUP 2013), 22.
35R Goodman and D Jinks, ‘Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law’ 19
EJIL 726. See, generally, T Pegram, ‘Diffusion Across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National
Human Rights Institutions’ (2010) 32 Hum Rts Q 729.
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from conduct inconsistent with an actor’s social role) and the socio-psychological benefits of
conformity, based on ‘cognitive comfort’ from achieving high social status or membership in a
perceived ‘in-group’.36 According to Goodman and Jinks, acculturation can lead to
isomorphism, meaning structural similarities in organisations, even when underlying
conditions differ widely across states.37 While Goodman and Jinks accept the thesis that
membership in transgovernmental networks increases the likelihood of accepting international
norms, they also see membership as increasing the likelihood of states being influenced by
practices of other network members (whether or not those practices reflect international
norms).38 Goodman and Jinks also pay particular attention to the implications of network
membership rules. In brief, they find that restrictive memberships can allow membership to be
used to confer legitimacy or ostracism (when it is denied); can strengthen affinity among
insiders; and, where the membership is small, can enhance social conformity.39
The dominant strand of recent research on transgovernmental networks, most associated
with the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter, has taken a positive view of the potential for these
networks to contribute to contemporary global governance. In particular, they are seen as
having advantages over traditional international organisations in their flexibility, speed,
inclusiveness, and ability to devote sustained attention to complex regulatory issues.40
According to Slaughter, transgovernmental networks are ‘the optimal form of organization
for the Information Age’41 and ‘the blueprint for the international architecture of the 21st
century.’42 Kal Raustiala similarly argues that the establishment of transgovernmental
networks is likely to have synergistic effects with the functioning of classic international treaty
regimes.43 Much of the research on NHRI networks has been similarly positive.44
There have, however, been notes of caution regarding the spread of transgovernmental
networks.45 Slaughter and Hale note that networks’ flexibility may render them toothless
when strong enforcement powers are needed to sustain member cooperation.46 This is less
relevant for NHRI and SNHRI networks, however, as they are not primarily intended to
sustain international cooperation. Slaughter and Hale also highlight that transgovernmental
networks can face legitimacy problems to the extent that they ‘empower domestic officials to
act without approval from their domestic superiors’.47 This is sometimes characterised as a
36Goodman and Jinks, ‘Socializing States’ (n 34) 27.
37Ibid 42–46.
38Ibid 48.
39Ibid 109.
40Slaughter, ‘New World Order’ (n 20) 167.
41A-M Slaughter, ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’, in M Byers (ed)
The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (OUP
2000), 204.
42A-M Slaughter, ‘The Real New World Order’, (Sept–Oct 1997) Foreign Affairs 197.
43K Raustiala, ‘The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the
Future of International Law’ (2002) 43 Virginia J Intl L 1–93.
44See e.g., G de Beco, ‘Networks of European National Human Rights Institutions’ (2008) 14 Eur LJ
876–77.
45For more critical perspectives, see P Verdier, ‘Transnational Regulatory Networks and their Limits’
(2009) 34 Yale J Intl L 113; M Mansour Kadah, ‘Trans-Governmental Networks: A Less than
Convincing Vision of New World Order’ (2011) IPRIS Occasional Paper No 3.
46Slaughter and Hale (n 27) 364.
47Ibid.
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deficit of democratic accountability.48 This would not normally be considered a drawback for
NHRI and SNHRI networks, however, as both are by definition supposed to act
independently of their home governments, and in fact derive much of their credibility
from that very independence.49
IV. NHRI Networking
Transgovernmental networks have played an undeniably prominent role in the establishment
and development of NHRIs over the past two decades. NHRIs have joined two parallel sets
of networks. First, there is a system of global and regional NHRI-specific networks with
strong connections to the United Nations and other international actors. Secondly, there is a
separate system of global and regional ombudsman networks which have weaker connections
to other international actors and lack the legitimating qualities of a robust accreditation
system. This section will give an overview of each of these networking systems and their
implications.
IV.1 NHRI networks
The ICC was the first transgovernmental NHRI network to be established, in 1993.50 The
ICC accredits members through an interactive and rigorous peer-review process based on an
evaluation of compliance with the Paris Principles, a set of standards adopted by the UN
General Assembly that provides guidelines on the competence and responsibilities of NHRIs,
NHRI independence and pluralism, and NHRI methods of operation.51 Although the
application process is fundamentally based on submitted documentation, the UN, civil
society groups, and other stakeholders also can provide input to the ICC.52 Currently, the
ICC has 70 NHRI members with A status, signifying compliance with the Paris Principles.53
It also has accredited 25 NHRIs with B status, signifying partial compliance with the Paris
Principles, and 10 NHRIs with C status, signifying non-compliance.54 Re-accreditation is
required every five years.55 While B and C status NHRIs can participate in some ICC
48F Bignami, ‘Transgovernmental Networks vs Democracy: The Case of the European Information
Privacy Network’ (2005) 26 Mich J Intl L 807–868.
49International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Performance and Legitimacy: National Human
Rights Institutions’ (2004) 58.
50S Cardenas, Chains of Justice: The Global Rise of State Institutions for Human Rights (U Penn Press
2014) 47.
51Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, adopted 20 December 1993, GA Res 48/134, UN GAO R, 48th Sess,
UN Doc A/RES/48/141 (1993) (‘Paris Principles’).
52S Pesic, ‘National Human Rights Institutions and the Accreditation Process’ (2012) 16 Eurodialog
153, 158.
53ICC, ‘Chart of the Status of National Institutions’ (2014) http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Countries/NHRI/Chart_Status_NIs.pdf accessed 15 November 2014. The pluralism requirement has
been interpreted to refer to commissioners for commission-form NHRIs, and staff members for
ombudsman-form NHRIs. L Reif, ‘Enhancing the Role of Ombudsman Institutions in the Protection
and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, paper presented at International
Ombudsman Institute Conference (Wellington, 2012) 15.
54ICC (n 53).
55Pesic (n 52) 157.
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activities, they are not voting members and do not receive privileged treatment at the UN.56
In addition to allowing for full participation within the ICC and providing an entryway for
participating in the UN, A status is widely recognised as a sign of institutional legitimacy and
credibility.57
Structurally, ICC decision-making is managed by a bureau consisting of 16 voting
members, four of each from the Americas, Africa, Europe and the Asia-Pacific.58 It also has
working groups on governance and sustainable funding and a Sub-Committee on
Accreditation (‘SCA’) made up of one voting member from each of the four regions which
reviews applications and makes recommendations on Paris Principles compliance to the
managing Bureau.59 The ICC maintains an extremely close relationship with the UN Office
of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (‘OHCHR’), which has been a strong advocate
for the establishment and strengthening of NHRIs and coordination between NHRIs via the
ICC.60 Currently, the OHCHR in Geneva serves as the ICC secretariat and is a permanent
observer to the SCA.61
Functionally, the ICC has five principal roles. First, as is common with
transgovernmental networks, the ICC encourages cooperation and information sharing
among its members, through the organisation of conferences and the promotion of regional
fora.62 Secondly, the ICC assists in the establishment of new NHRIs and capacity building
for existing NHRIs.63 Thirdly, the ICC promotes best practices, primarily by conditioning
new membership on compliance with the Paris Principles (and suspending existing members
that fall out of compliance).64 Fourthly, the ICC, along with its regional affiliates, acts as a
collective mouthpiece for NHRIs at international fora.65 In recent years, the ICC has helped
NHRIs participate collectively in the negotiation of treaties and declarations through the UN
system.66 Fifthly, by accrediting Paris Principles-compliant NHRIs, the ICC facilitates
individual NHRI engagement in the international human rights system. This is
accomplished because A status accreditation has been viewed by the UN Human Rights
Council as a sufficient signal of legitimacy to entitle an NHRI to privileged participation.67
Specifically, A accredited NHRIs (along with the ICC itself and its affiliated regional
networks) are now permitted to make an oral statement for all Human Rights Council
56Ibid 156–57.
57Ibid 156.
58Ibid 155.
59Ibid 156.
60C Sidoti, ‘National Human Rights Institutions and the International Human Rights System’ in
R Goodman and T Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change (CUP 2012), 109.
61Pegram, ‘Global Human Rights Governance and Orchestration’ (n 7) 30.
62Pesic (n 52) 155.
63Ibid; Cardeas, ‘Chains of Justice’ (n 50) 46–48.
64When a member NHRI falls out of compliance with the Paris Principles, it may face temporary or
permanent suspension, as has occurred with human rights commissions from Fiji, or demotion to
‘B status’, as occurred with commissions from Sri Lanka, Algeria, Cameroon, Madagascar, and Nigeria.
Mertus, State Compliance at 78; a Suraina Pasha, ‘NHRIs and the Struggle against Torture in the Asia-
Pacific Region’ (2010) 6 Essex Hum Rts Rev 84, 88. Sidoti (n 60) 98.
65Sidoti (n 60) 108.
66Roberts (n 5) 230.
67Sidoti (n 60) 104–20.
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agenda items, submit documents to the Human Rights Council, and take separate seating in
all Human Rights Council sessions.68
The ICC is supplemented at the regional level by four formally affiliated regional NHRI
networks: the European Group of National Human Rights Institutions; the Asia Pacific
Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (‘APF’); the Network of National Institutions
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Americas; and the Network of
African National Human Rights Institutions (‘NANHRI’).69 These four networks are
comprehensive and exclusive in the sense that they cover all areas of the globe without
overlap. With the exception of the NANHRI, the regional networks do not conduct their
own accreditation; rather, they accept as voting members any NHRI in their geographical
area that has received A status accreditation by the ICC SCA.70 While the Asian, African,
and European networks possess permanent secretariats, the American group does not, despite
efforts to establish one by the ICC and OHCHR.71 The basic functions of the regional
networks are quite similar to those of the ICC, for example the APF ‘facilitates the exchange
of information between its members, forges links between staff in different institutions, and
disseminates technological expertise’.72 The ICC has strongly supported the establishment
and growth of these regional networks.73
Along with the ICC and its four affiliated regional networks, many NHRIs belong to one
or more other transgovernmental NHRI networks, based on either cultural or geographic
affinity. While not formally affiliated with the ICC, the Association of National Human
Rights Institutions of EAC Partner States, the Arab Network for NHRIs, the Network of
National Human Rights Institutions in West Africa, and the Southeast Asian National
Human Rights Institutions Forum have acted as standing regional (or sub-regional) fora with
regular meetings, exchanges, and other forms of coordination. The Southeast Asian National
Human Rights Institutions Forum, which groups together six NHRIs from the ASEAN
region, has been particularly active in pressuring ASEAN states to develop a robust regional
human rights mechanism within the ASEAN system.74 Meanwhile, NHRI networks from
countries with historical or linguistic commonalities have been established through the
British Commonwealth (the Commonwealth Forum of National Human Rights Institutions)
and the Organisation de la Francophonie (the Francophone Association of National Human
Rights Institutions). Finally, a range of less formalised transgovernmental networks has been
68Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, ‘VII. Rules of Procedure’, Rule 7(b).
69Established in 1994, the European Group of NHRIs is the oldest of the regional affiliates, while the
Network of African NHRIs (created in 2007) is the youngest. Cardenas, ‘Chains of Justice’ (n 50) 47.
70Of the NANHRI’s 43 members (as of September 2014), 18 also have A status at the ICC, while 7
have B status, 2 have C status, and 16 are unaccredited by the ICC. See NANHRI, ‘List of Members’
(2014) http://www.nanhri.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=107&Itemid=828&
lang=en accessed 15 November 2014.
71Pegram, ‘Global Human Rights Governance and Orchestration’ (n 6) 33.
72Renshaw, ‘The Role of Networks’ (n 2) 185.
73The NANHRI objectives, for example, are to ‘[e]ncourage the establishment of NHRIs, in
conformity with the Paris Principles; [f]acilitate the coordination, strengthening and effectiveness of
NHRIs in Africa [and e]ncourage cooperation among NHRIs and with intergovernmental
organisations.’ NANHRI, ‘Mandate, Vision and Mission’ http://www.nanhri.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=96&Itemid=542&lang=en accessed 15 November 2014.
74Renshaw and Fitzpatrick 168. The network has also been lauded for its efforts to fight human
trafficking. Ibid 169.
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forged between NHRIs from different countries. Multilateral examples include the Arab-
Ibero American dialogue of National Human Rights Institutions and the Arab-European
Human Rights Dialogue. These forms of inter-regional cooperation have been encouraged by
the ICC.75
In recent years, a number of researchers have highlighted the importance of the ICC for
the development and operation of NHRIs. In part, this is because the ICC opens up the path
for individual and collective participation at the international level.76 Gauthier de Beco
points out that the participation of NHRIs in international fora benefits NHRIs by
increasing their visibility, thereby enhancing their status, and helps them to stay up to date
on international developments.77 In part, it is also due to the ICC’s prominent role in
promoting adherence to the Paris Principles. In particular, Meg Brodie claims that at the
global level, the ICC has played a critical role in the international socialisation of Paris
Principle norms through its accreditation process.78 Brodie argues that by conditioning
membership on compliance with the Paris Principles, the ICC has defined the boundaries of
a collective identity and helped mobilise pressure for compliance from both above and
below.79 Brodie claims that ICC membership can in turn provide legitimacy by the ‘symbolic
validation’ of NHRIs.80 Sonia Cardenas also notes that by publicly acknowledging Paris
Principles compliance through awarding membership, the ICC helps legitimise NHRIs, both
in the eyes of their domestic constituents and in the eyes of the international community.81
Other scholars have focused their research on the impact of regional NHRI networks.
For example, Gauthier de Beco analysed European NHRI networks, finding that regional
cooperation allows for greater information exchange on issues of common concern and helps
strengthen NHRI relationships with regional bodies such as the Commissioner for Human
Rights of the Council of Europe.82 Cardenas and others have shown that the regional
networks have in some cases gone beyond the ICC in generating new standards, by issuing
resolutions, commission reports, and developing region-specific jurisprudence.83 At the
regional level, the APF has been the subject of particularly thorough study. Andrea Durbach,
Andrew Byrnes, and Catherine Renshaw showed that in many cases the APF has facilitated
the establishment and development of NHRIs.84 This was supplemented by further analysis
by the same authors, demonstrating that the APF membership application and review
procedures ‘have been reasonably effective in moving NHRIs towards greater compliance
75ICC, ‘ICC Strategic Plan 2010–2013’ (2009) sec 5.5.
76According to Kirsten Roberts, the ICC provides an ‘important forum for NHRIs to have a collective
voice at the regional and international level.’ Roberts (n 5) 230. She highlights as examples the
European Group of NHRIs’ submission of an amicus curiae brief before the European Court of Human
Rights and the role of the APF and ICC in lobbying the Commission on the Status of Women to
permit NHRIs to participate independently in the Commission’s work. Ibid 242–43.
77de Beco ‘Networks of European NHRIs’ (n 44) 867.
78Brodie ‘Progressing Norm Socialisation’ (n 6).
79Ibid 192.
80Ibid 190–91.
81Cardenas ‘Chains of Justice’ (n 50) 49.
82de Beco ‘Networks of European NHRIs’ (n 44) 870–71.
83Cardenas ‘Chains of Justice’ (n 50) 48
84A Durbach, C Renshaw, and A Byrnes, ‘A Tongue but No Teeth: The Emergence of a Regional
Human Rights Mechanism in the Asia Pacific Region’ (2009) 31 Sydney L Rev 211.
120 Andrew Wolman
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [H
an
ku
k U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Fo
rei
gn
 St
ud
ies
] a
t 1
8:2
8 1
4 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
5 
with the Paris Principles norms– at least as a formal matter – and in reinforcing the role of
existing members in enforcing those shared standards’.85 Vitit Muntarbhorn has
highlighted the norm-creation role of the APF through the Advisory Council of Jurists,
as well as its role as a cooperative forum in the absence of other options for human rights
regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific.86 In issue-specific case studies, Suraina Pasha found the
APF’s provision of education and training to Asian NHRIs to be significant,87 and
Renshaw found that the APF had advanced the acceptance by NHRIs of standards relating
to human rights and sexual orientation, creating the expectation that NHRIs would then
engage in a discourse with state actors on related issues.88 According to Renshaw, networks
like the APF ‘represent a significant, and already present, force for the implementation of
human rights’.89
Among NHRI researchers, there have also been notes of caution regarding the value of
networks. Cardenas, for example, states that while NHRI networks seem to be relatively
efficient and legitimate modes of human rights governance, their formation ‘signals a pooling
of resources and power [and] potentially an entrenchment of state control over the human
rights agenda’.90 Peter Rosenblum has argued that there are profound limitations in the
ability of the ICC to ensure that its NHRI members comply with a set of high standards.91
Despite these caveats, however, it is fair to conclude that the general tenor of research on
NHRI networking has been quite positive regarding their contribution to NHRI
development and Paris Principles compliance.
IV.II Ombudsman networks
In addition to NHRI-specific networks, most ombudsman-type NHRIs have also joined a
separate set of ombudsman networks.92 These networks also exist at the global, regional, and
sub-regional levels. At the global level, the International Ombudsman Institute (‘IOI’) has
been the most prominent organisation bringing together independent ombudsman
institutions since its founding in 1978.93 The IOI focuses its work on training, research,
and regional subsidies for projects, in addition to organising periodic conferences.94 Since
2009, the Austrian Ombudsman Board has hosted the IOI Secretariat (which had previously
85Byrnes et al (n 1) 91 (The APF has since relinquished an independent role in member accreditation,
instead relying on ICC status for its own membership decisions.)
86V Muntarbhorn, ‘In Search of the Rights Track: Evolving a Regional Framework for the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region’ (2007) 10 Thailand LJ 1.
87S Pasha, ‘The Evolution of the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institution’s Regional
Training Program’, in H Osaka (ed), Human Rights Education in Asia-Pacific, Vol. II (Asia-Pacific
Human Rights Information Center 2011), 73–82.
88Renshaw, ‘The Role of Networks’ (n 2) 205.
89Ibid 185.
90Cardenas, ‘Chains of Justice’ (n 50) 49.
91P Rosenblum, ‘Tainted Origins and Uncertain Outcomes: Evaluating NHRIs’, in R Goodman and T
Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change (CUP 2012), 314–20.
92Currently, 27 out of 70 A status NHRIs are ombudsman (or human rights ombudsman) institutions.
93IOI, ‘Information Folder: About the IOI’ http://www.theioi.org/the-i-o-i/about-the-ioi accessed 15
November 2014.
94Ibid.
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been located at the University of Alberta).95 The Austrian Ombudsman Board also provides
the majority of the IOI’s funding.96
As is the case with NHRI networks, there is also a relatively comprehensive set of regional
ombudsman associations, comprised of the European Network of Ombudsmen, African
Ombudsman and Mediators Association, Asian Ombudsman Association, Ibero-American
Federation of Ombudsmen (which also has members from Spain and Portugal), and Pacific
Ombudsman Alliance. As with NHRI associations, these ombudsman networks are
supplemented by additional associations based on cultural or sub-regional (and occasionally
bilateral) groupings, including the Arab Ombudsman Association, the Association of
Mediterranean Ombudsmen, the Association des Ombudsmans et des Médiateurs de la
Francophonie, the Australia and New Zealand Ombudsman Association, and the
Ombudsman Association (formerly the British and Irish Ombudsman Association). Of
these regional and sub-regional groups, the Ibero-American Federation of Ombudsman has
been particularly active and, according to some accounts, has a history of tensions with the
‘competing’ Latin American NHRI network.97
Ombudsman networks differ from NHRI networks in several ways. First, as the name
suggests, ombudsman networks are focused on ombudsman-type institutions with few, if
any, commission-type members.98 In contrast, NHRI networks include both ombudsman
and commissions. Secondly, ombudsman networks are not solely focused on human rights
issues, as ombudsman institutions have traditionally been more concerned with issues of
maladministration and corruption (as many ombudsmen still are). In fact, with the exception
of the Ibero-American Federation of Ombudsmen, ombudsman associations tend to be
dominated by classical ombudsmen with little tradition of human rights implementation.99
Thirdly, the membership of ombudsman networks is not based on ICC accreditation or any
other peer-review process based on a set of best practices. While membership practices at the
regional networks vary, IOI membership decisions are made by the IOI Executive
Committee based on the recommendation of the Secretary General; voting membership is
contingent on an ombudsman’s investigation of complaints, functional independence, and
compliance with a set of IOI principles.100 In practice, IOI membership is not seen as a
signal of quality or independence that can lend ombudsman offices any meaningful
legitimacy. Fourthly, as will be discussed in further depth below, ombudsman associations
commonly group together both NHRIs and SNHRIs (and in a few cases include a supra-
national ombudsman – the European Ombudsman – for good measure). NHRI associations,
95The Austrian Ombudsman Board, ‘International Ombudsman Institute’ http://volksanwaltschaft.gv.
at/en/international-activities/international-ombudsman-institute accessed 15 November 2014.
96In 2012–2013, the Austrian Ombudsman Board provided 365,000 Euros for ongoing operations,
technical servicing, three employees, and a trainee. The other pillar of IOI financing is membership fees,
which amounted to 95,800 Euros in 2012–2013. IOI, ‘Annual Report 2012/2013’ (2013) 50–51.
97Cardenas, ‘Chains of Justice’ (n 50) 48.
98While classic human rights commissions are largely absent from ombudsman associations, there are
some cases of hybrid commission and ombudsman institutions (such as the Ghana Commission on
Human Rights and Administrative Justice or the Korean Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights
Commission) with membership in ombudsman associations. IOI, ‘IOI Directory 2014’ http://www.
theioi.org/pdf/2 accessed 15 November 2014.
99In Spain and Latin America, ombudsmen tend to have an explicit human rights implementation
mandate.
100IOI Bylaws, art 6 (2012).
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on the other hand, generally exclude SNHRIs. Fifthly, ombudsman networks tend to have
far less interaction with international and regional organisations such as the UN,101 although
the IOI Secretary General has in recent years worked to increase their international
engagement.102 For example, the IOI applied to the UN Economic and Social Council in
May 2013 for consultative status as an NGO.103 However this would not lead to the
privileged access granted by the UN human rights system to the ICC (and regional NHRI
associations such as the APF). Connected to this point, it is worth noting that, in contrast
with membership in the ICC, membership in ombudsman networks does not convey any
privileged status at the UN.
There has so far been little research directed at the implications of ombudsman
associations on NHRI growth and development (or even, for that matter, on ombudsman
growth and development), although their role in standard-setting and information sharing
has been highlighted, at least in the European context.104 In part, this relative lack of interest
is no doubt due to the generally more limited ambitions of ombudsman networks; as
discussed, they have not attempted to spread a particular code of best practices (like the Paris
Principles) or promote member interests before international bodies. The paucity of research
could also reflect academic research priorities that tend to favour explicitly ‘human rights’
focused institutions and underemphasise the role of administrative law bodies (such as
classical ombudsmen) in implementing human rights, whether at the domestic or
international levels.105
V. SNHRIs and Transgovernmental Networks
Transgovernmental networks present tempting prospects to SNHRIs, for much the same
reason that they have been embraced by NHRIs. These networks can promote best practices,
provide capacity-building assistance, and facilitate inter-body cooperation, and access to the
international system. These various benefits would be particularly important for SNHRIs
given their typically small size and low budgets, which in many cases would make it difficult
for SNHRIs to access training or develop norms independently, or to engage with
international mechanisms. In theory, transgovernmental networks would also be able to
help legitimise fragile institutions and socialise SNHRI into desired institutional norms, as
has taken place with NHRIs in their networks. To date, however, SNHRIs have, with a few
exceptions, not been made welcome at NHRI-specific networks. They have been accepted to
a greater degree at ombudsman networks, however, and in many countries have initiated
their own translocal networks that bring together multiple SNHRIs from a single country.
101Members of the IOI have described its lack of regional and international visibility as a weakness. IOI
‘Annual Report 2012/13’ (n 96) 25.
102IOI representatives have met with UN and European Commission staff and attended international
conferences in recent years. Ibid 45–48.
103Ibid 45.
104See C Harlow and R Rawlings, ‘Promoting Accountability in Multi-Level Governance: A Network
Approach’ European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No C-06-02 (2006) 25–27.
105See A Stuhmcke, ‘Australian Ombudsmen and Human Rights’ (2009) 20–22.
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V.I SNHRIs in NHRI-specific networks
Since its inception, the ICC and affiliated NHRI networks have struggled with the question
of whether to accredit and allow membership to SNHRIs.106 On the one hand, sub-national
bodies are – perhaps by definition – not NHRIs. The Paris Principles repeatedly use terms
such as ‘national institution’ and ‘national legislation’ and states that NHRIs should pay
attention to human rights violations in ‘any part of the country.’107 Bearing in mind the
strong influence of the OHCHR in setting up and operating the ICC, there may also have
been reluctance to deal with sub-national entities, which have traditionally been absent from
the halls of New York and Geneva.108 On the other hand, decentralisation and self-
government considerations have in many countries led to the establishment of strong and
internationally active SNHRIs in systems where it is politically difficult or impossible for an
NHRI to oversee government actions throughout the country.
In recent years, the ICC has dealt with applications from SNHRIs in a haphazard and
inconsistent manner, leaving a lack of clarity as to underlying policy. The ICC’s first reaction
to SNHRI membership applications was to grant them non-voting status. Thus, in 2000 the
Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission was given C status accreditation, despite
being fairly well respected by observers.109 A year later, the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission was granted B status, while in 2007 the Oficina del Procurador del Ciudadano
del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico was given C status. These outcomes have been
criticised by some; from the outside, C status suggests a lack of independence or effectiveness
(as with, for example, the Iran Human Rights Commission), but in fact these SNHRIs were
basically being denied voting membership solely due to their sub-national mandates.110
While the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission and Oficina del Procurador del
Ciudadano del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico have maintained their C status, the
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission was upgraded to A status upon re-
accreditation in 2006. A few years later, the British Equality and Human Rights
Commission (which is mandated to address English issues and limited Scottish matters,
but does not cover Northern Ireland) was given A status, and finally the Scottish Human
Rights Commission was given A status in 2010, although all three bodies were asked to share
a single vote.111 In 2008 this result was justified in section 6.6 of the ICC’s General
Observations, which stated that ‘[i]n very exceptional circumstances’ multiple national
institutions could seek ICC accreditation, provided that they had the written consent of the
state government and a written agreement regarding rights and duties as an ICC member,
106The ICC has faced similar questions with regard to the accreditation of issue-specific national
institutions. In the past, multiple specialised Swedish ombudsmen shared accreditation but currently
there are no specialised institutions with A status accreditation. R Carver, ‘One NHRI or Many? How
Many Institutions does it Take to Protect Human Rights? – Lessons from the European Experience’
(2011) 3 J Hum Rts Prac 1, 4.
107Paris Principles (n 51).
108CM Bosire, ‘Local Government and Human Rights: Building Institutional Links for the Effective
Protection and Realisation of Human Rights in Africa’ (2011) 11 Afr Hum Rts LJ 147, 159–60.
109See C Petersen, ‘Bridging the Gap? The Role of Regional and National Human Rights Institutions
in the Asia Pacific’ (2011) 13 Asian-Pacific L Pol J 174, 204–5.
110Ibid. In fact, many doubt the usefulness of C status accreditation in general, and the SCA has not
granted C status to any applicants since 2007.
111ICC, ‘Chart of the Status of National Institutions’ (2010) http://www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/NHRI/
Chart_Status_NIs.doc accessed 15 November 2014.
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which included arrangements for participation in the international human rights system.112
In addition, the state must be a UN member.113 In these circumstances the institution would
have only one speaking right, one voting right, and one ICC Bureau member, if elected.114
The issue of SNHRI accreditation was once again brought to the fore in 2011–2012 with
the application by the Office of the Bermuda Ombudsman, which was eventually declined by
the SCA. The SCA at this time took a strict attitude against SNHRIs, stating that ‘Article 10
of the ICC statute clearly refers to applications for accreditation from “national” human rights
institutions . . . a “national” institution is an institution established by a nation state of the
United Nations’.115 While this denial was perhaps not surprising, the justification used only
complicated the issue: rather than analysing compliance with the section 6.6 conditions
elaborated earlier, the SCA seemed to be introducing a separate threshold test of whether an
institution was established by a UN member nation-state or not (bringing into question the
UK exception). More recently, both the Mexico City Human Rights Commission and the
City of Buenos Aires Human Rights Commission have inquired about ICC membership
eligibility but were informed that they would not be allowed to seek accreditation.116
Finally, although it would not normally be considered sub-national, it is worth noting
that the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights received A status
accreditation (with reservations) in 2005 and A status (without reservation) in 2009
despite Palestine not being a UN member state at either time.117 This may be a sui generis
situation, but it nevertheless seems to bring into question the emphasis on UN membership
in both the SCA’s Bermuda decision and section 6.6 of the ICC’s General
Recommendations. The issue of UN membership may arise again in the near future, as
some officials in both Kosovo and Taiwan are reportedly eager to establish ICC-accredited
NHRIs.118
Similar SNHRI membership issues were (inconsistently) addressed in the past by the
regional networks, but this is no longer a significant issue since the regional NHRI networks
now simply accept as voting members those NHRIs that have been given A status by the
ICC (with the exception of the NANHRI).119 The Francophone Association of National
Human Rights Institutions is the one other NHRI network to currently struggle with
SNHRI membership; while its general policy is to only admit NHRIs with A accreditation
from the ICC as voting members, the Association made an exception for Quebec’s
Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, giving it full membership
even though it is not accredited by the ICC.120 Two other Canadian SNHRIs (the Yukon
112ICC, Sub-Committee on Accreditation, ‘General Observations’ (2008) para 6.6.
113Ibid.
114Ibid.
115ICC, ‘Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation’
(Geneva, 19–23 Nov 2012) s 2.1.
116Interview with OHCHR Staff Member, 13 Sep 2013.
117Since November 2012, Palestine has possessed non-member observer status at the UN General
Assembly.
118Pegram, ‘Global Human Rights Governance and Orchestration’ (n 6) 14.
119Given the paucity of SNHRIs in Africa, SNHRI membership is unlikely to become a significant
issue for the NANHRI.
120Association Francophone des Commissions Nationales des Droits de l’Homme, ‘Les Membres
Votants’ http://afcndh.org/membres/les-membres-votants/ accessed 15 November 2014.
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Human Rights Commission and the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission) were
granted non-voting associated member status.121
V.II SNHRIs in ombudsman networks
While SNHRIs have – with a few exceptions – not been fully accepted in NHRI-specific
networks, they have been made much more welcome in the existing system of ombudsman
networks which generally accepts SNHRIs alongside national-level ombudsman
institutions.122 At the global level, for example, the IOI has 63 sub-national-level members
out of a total of 164 member institutions.123 At the regional level, the percentage of sub-
national members varies widely. Sub-national institutions make up the majority at the
European Network of Ombudsmen and Ibero-American Federation of Ombudsmen, where,
respectively, 60 out of 89124 and 84 out of 103125 member institutions have sub-national
mandates. In both cases, all or nearly all member SNHRIs are from autonomous regions or
provinces (and their equivalents, such as cantons and länder), rather than municipalities. On
the other hand, the Asian Ombudsman Association has only nine sub-national-level
members out of 29 institutions.126 The Pacific Ombudsman Alliance has one sub-national
member (the New South Wales Ombudsman) out of a total of nine member institutions.127
The Association of Mediterranean Ombudsman has a membership restricted to national
institutions.128
V.III SNHRIs in other transgovernmental networks
While many SNHRIs have ombudsman (or human rights ombudsman) forms, there are also
SNHRIs with a range of other institutional types. In common law countries, equality or
human rights commissions predominate, while other localities have more idiosyncratic or
local forms. There are far fewer transgovernmental networking opportunities for these other
institutional types, but some exceptions exist. In North America, for example, the
International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies is mostly made up of human
rights commission-type members from sub-national jurisdictions in the United States,
121Association Francophone des Commissions Nationales des Droits de l’Homme, ‘Les Membres
Associés’ http://afcndh.org/membres/les-membres-associes/ accessed 15 November 2014.
122The Ibero-American Federation of Ombudsmen, for example, explicitly welcomes member
institutions from the national, state, regional, autonomy, and provincial levels. Federación
Iberoamericana del Ombudsman, ‘Qué es la FIO’ http://www.portalfio.org/inicio/pagina-principal/
que-es-la-fio.html accessed 15 November 2014.
123IOI, ‘IOI Directory 2014’ (n 98).
124European Network of Ombudsmen, ‘Regional Ombudsmen’ http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/
en/atyourservice/regionalombudsmen.faces accessed 15 November 2014.
125Federación Iberoamericana del Ombudsman, ‘Miembros de la FIO’ http://www.portalfio.org/inicio/
ombudsman-pais.html accessed 15 November 2014.
126Asian Ombudsman Association, ‘Heads of Member Institutions’ http://asianombudsman.com/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=182&Itemid=147 accessed 15 November 2014.
127Pacific Ombudsman Alliance, ‘About the Pacific Ombudsman Alliance’, http://www.
pacificombudsman.org/about/index.html accessed 15 November 2014.
128Association of Mediterranean Ombudsmen, ‘Members’ List’ http://www.ombudsman-med.org/
admin/ang/download_ang/upload/MembersAOM.pdf accessed 15 November 2014.
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Canada, and Bermuda.129 Meanwhile, in Europe, the European Network of Ombudspersons
for Children includes children’s rights ombudsmen and commissions from mostly
national jurisdictions from across the continent, along with a handful of sub-national
members.130
V.IV SNHRIs in translocal networks
While NHRI networks necessarily involve multiple countries, this need not be the case with
SNHRI networking. In many countries, domestic translocal networks have been established,
and constitute the most important networking fora. Examples include the Australian Council
of Human Rights Agencies, the Canadian Association of Statutory Human Rights Agencies,
the Associação Brasileira de Ouvidores/Ombudsmen, the Federación Nacional de Personeros
de Colombia, the Associazione Nazionale dei Difensori Civici (Italy), and the Asociación
Defensores del Pueblo de la República Argentina. In a number of cases, NHRIs have taken
the lead in establishing formal networks or periodic meetings with the various SNHRIs in
their home country.131 In addition, domestic SNHRI networking associations have also been
established at the sub-national level; examples from the United States include the
Massachusetts Association of Human Rights Commissions, the League of Minnesota
Human Rights Commissions, and the California Association of Human Relations
Organisations.
VI. Implications
As the previous sections indicate, there are significant differences in the degree of networking
opportunities available to NHRIs and SNHRIs. NHRIs have access to the ICC, as long as
they are found to be compliant with the Paris Principles. NHRIs also have access to regional
NHRI networks and in some cases sub-regional or inter-regional NHRI networks. Many
NHRIs also are members of global and regional networks of ombudsmen.
SNHRIs, on the other hand, have – with a few significant exceptions – been denied
access to the ICC and regional NHRI networks. Ombudsman-form SNHRIs often have
access to ombudsman networks, however the level of their participation varies significantly by
region and participation is very rare for municipal ombudsmen. Commission-form SNHRIs,
on the other hand, usually lack any transgovernmental networking opportunities. In some
countries, SNHRIs have access to domestic networking opportunities.
There are tangible implications to these conclusions. First of all, SNHRIs have fewer
options than NHRIs (and in the case of non-ombudsman types, sometimes no options) to
receive the information-sharing, cooperation, and standard-setting benefits of networking.
According to Slaughter, this will, all else being equal, lead to reduced convergence with
129International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies, ‘Human/Civil Rights Organizations’
http://www.iaohra.org/members/ accessed 15 November 2014.
130Sub-national members include the Flemish Children’s Rights Commissioner, the Ombudsman for
Children of Republika Srpska, and the Children’s Commissioner for Wales. European Network for
Ombudspersons of Children, ‘ENOC Members’ <http://enoc.eu/?page_id=210> accessed 30 March
2015.
131Wolman, ‘Relationship between National and Sub-National Human Rights Institutions’ (n 12) 456.
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international standards and lesser international cooperation.132 Secondly, SNHRIs do not
have an effective group voice at the UN or other international bodies because the IOI has
only minimal engagement with international organisations, while the ICC and regional
NHRI associations participate much more fully in international and regional organisations.
Thirdly, individual SNHRIs have less of an external incentive to adopt best practices, because
their membership in international networks (and concomitant international legitimation)
does not depend on them doing so. Fourthly, network-based acculturation forces that have
been leading to isomorphism around a Paris Principle-based model in NHRIs will be more
likely to lead to isomorphism around a classical ombudsman-based model for those SNHRIs
that participate in ombudsman networks. Fifthly, individual SNHRIs will in many cases be
unable to participate robustly in international mechanisms or the UN, because the UN only
awards privileged status to bodies that have been accredited by the ICC, and the ICC does
not award A status to SNHRIs (with the exception of UK bodies).
These implications are, I would argue, largely negative for SNHRIs. SNHRIs are often
weak bodies, in need of the legitimation that transgovernmental networks can provide, and
that the ICC has, according to Brodie and Cardenas, provided to NHRIs through the
accreditation process.133 SNHRIs also tend to have small staffs and budgets, making it
difficult for them to access best practice information, training, and capacity-building
assistance without membership in a network dedicated to the provision of those services. In
short, SNHRIs would be stronger and more capable if they had access to appropriate
networks. In addition, SNHRIs sometimes (but certainly not always) desire to participate
directly in international mechanisms, and would be able to provide helpful perspectives
beyond those already contributed by NHRIs and other institutional types.134 Without
networks facilitating this participation, these perspectives are lost. Finally, SNHRIs would be
able to promote and protect human rights more effectively if their networking environment
socialised them into a human rights culture (as is the case in NHRI networks) rather than the
good administration culture more evident in ombudsman associations. The following section
will argue that SNHRIs can most effectively attain the full positive effects of networking if
the ICC were to inaugurate a separate institutional category for SNHRIs, with membership
based on accreditation under a set of standards based upon (but not identical to) the Paris
Principles.
VII. ICC and SNHRI Membership
There is a range of possible avenues for SNHRIs to access greater benefits of networking.
One solution would be to create one or more new SNHRI networks not based on traditional
ombudsman associations. Another option would be to transform existing ombudsman
associations into explicitly human rights-focused networks. Neither of these developments
seems likely. The formation of new transgovernmental SNHRI networks would be costly,
time-consuming, and extremely unlikely to convey legitimacy or achieve access to the UN.
Efforts to transform ombudsman networks into SNHRI networks would require complete
shifts in their mandates, and current members who are not SNHRIs would presumably
132Slaughter, ‘New World Order’ (n 20) 24.
133Brodie (n 6); and Cardenas ‘Chains of Justice’ (n 50) 49.
134See A Wolman, ‘Welcoming a New International Human Rights Actor? The Participation of
Subnational Human Rights Institutions at the UN’ (2014) 20 Global Governance 437.
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object to such a shift.135 In any case, these networks would not provide legitimacy or UN
access in the way that the ICC does for NHRIs.
Other options would promote greater opportunities for SNHRIs to access networking
benefits indirectly. One possibility would be for the ICC and other influential actors to
encourage NHRIs to coordinate more closely with SNHRIs in their jurisdictions by, for
example, conveying SNHRI concerns in those international fora that NHRIs have access to
because of their ICC accreditation. This has been attempted in a few countries, with limited
success, and in any case would only in small part allow SNHRIs to benefit from existing
networks.136 Another indirect option would be to increase coordination and cooperation
between the IOI and ICC, and in fact this is already occurring, with the IOI, for example,
engaging with the ICC in order to address perceived difficulties that ombudsman institutions
face in the ICC accreditation process.137 However, this type of indirect relationship between
SNHRIs and the ICC (mediated by the IOI) would likewise convey few of the networking
benefits discussed above.
I would argue, therefore, that the only practical way for SNHRIs to attain the same level of
networking benefits as NHRIs would be through membership in the ICC, given that the ICC
has a long-standing focus on human rights capacity-building, an unparalleled ability to convey
legitimacy through the accreditation process, a respected voice in international fora, and the
ability to provide a privileged status at the UN through membership. Unfortunately, however,
efforts to integrate SNHRIs into the existing ICC system to date have been haphazard and
inconsistent, hobbled by the undeniable fact that the Paris Principles were not drafted with
SNHRIs in mind. I would propose a solution that has yet to be tried; namely, the establishment
of a separate membership category for SNHRIs at the ICC. This membership category would
admit accredited SNHRIs based on their conformance with a set of standards derived from the
Paris Principles, but revised so as to assure their applicability to sub-national institutions.
It would of course be challenging to work out all the details necessary for this proposal to
be successful. While it is not possible to anticipate all the logistical and substantive issues of
SNHRI membership in the scope of this paper, it is clear that questions regarding SNHRI
voting power and representation at the ICC Bureau would have to be resolved, and the ICC
Statute would have to be revised so as to incorporate SNHRIs as a new membership
category.138 Similar regulatory and administrative changes would be required of the affiliated
regional NHRI networks, assuming that they followed suit in the recognition of a new class
of SNHRI members (as would be likely, given that the regional networks have to date tended
to follow the ICC’s lead on membership issues). Opposition could be expected from certain
quarters, potentially including the established ombudsman networks (which would risk
135While some ombudsman networks such as the IOI actively encourage the use of human rights
norms and engagement with other human rights institutions, their main focus remains on
administrative justice and good governance. See IOI Bylaws, art 2(1) (2012) (citing ‘respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ as one of seven purposes for the IOI). See also IOI,
‘Wellington Declaration’ (13 Nov 2012) (stating that the ombudsman concept includes the promotion
and protection of human rights).
136Wolman, ‘Relationship between National and Sub-National Human Rights Institutions’ (n 12) 456.
137IOI, ‘IOI Attends ICC’s 27th Annual Meeting’ (21 Mar 2014) <http://www.theioi.org/news/ioi-ioi-
attends-icc-s-27th-annual-meeting> accessed 15 November 2014. IOI, ‘Annual Report 2012/13’
(n 96) 45; and IOI, ‘Annual Report 2011/2012’ (2012) 38.
138Revisions of the ICC Statute are only possible at a General Meeting of the ICC. ICC Statute, art. 58
(2008, as amended in 2012).
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losing some of their relevance) and certain states that are not used to allowing sub-national
entities a voice at the international level.
Perhaps the most contentious aspect of this proposal would be the necessity of drafting a
new set of principles (based on the Paris Principles) to apply to SNHRIs. The drafting
process would have to be appropriately inclusive and transparent, incorporating the input of
SNHRIs themselves, as well as civil society organisations, NHRIs, and the OHCHR. While
the substance of these new principles would emerge from stakeholder discussions, they would
ideally differ only slightly from the existing Paris Principles. For example, they should not be
phrased in language that refers to the ‘country’, the ‘nation’ or ‘national’ institutions. In
addition, the new set of principles should probably omit the requirement to promote new
treaty ratification, which is arguably more appropriate for NHRIs, given that sub-national
entities cannot ratify treaties. The new principles should also provide guidance for
coordination between SNHRIs and NHRIs, where applicable. For the most part, however,
the guidelines from the Paris Principles can simply be integrated into the new set of
principles; minimising changes would be the best strategy to preserve the high degree of
legitimacy and credibility that has accumulated around the Paris Principles over the years.
There would be several advantages to a proposed new membership category for SNHRIs.
SNHRIs would be incentivised to comply with a set of best practice principles in order to
receive accreditation by a respected body (with the legitimisation which that implies). Those
SNHRIs that successfully attained membership would receive acculturation in a human rights-
focused environment, would have a respected group voice in the UN, and would potentially be
eligible for greater participation in regional and global fora, as is currently the case for accredited
NHRIs. In addition, the creation of a new avenue for ICC membership for SNHRIs would
reduce the pressure on strongly federal states to adopt NHRIs that are ill-suited to their political
system, merely to conform with Paris Principle guidelines that presume that a unitary NHRI is
necessary, regardless of the particularities of a country’s internal system.
There would also, of course, be certain dangers inherent in establishing a separate ICC
membership category for SNHRIs. Some might fear that adding a new membership category
would incrementally decrease the prestige or legitimacy associated with membership. There
might also be a danger that opening up the Paris Principles for review – even in the narrow
context of SNHRIs – might lead to a weakening of standards, especially if sovereign state
representatives play a major role in the renegotiation process. This has indeed been a
common fear whenever advocates have suggested renegotiating the Paris Principles in the
NHRI context.139 In this case, however, the Paris Principles would remain the same for
NHRIs with no possibility of being watered down (or strengthened). While it is conceivable
that the new set of principles applicable to SNHRIs would end up with provisions that are
weaker than those in the Paris Principles, most stakeholders (namely SNHRIs, NHRIs, and
OHCHR) would be unlikely to favour such an outcome.
A potentially more serious issue would be the prospect that if SNHRIs became more
prominent actors at the international level through the influence of the ICC (i.e., by gaining
a voice at UN proceedings), it would result in incrementally less time and attention for other
actors such as NHRIs and NGOs.140 This may occur if one assumes that international
139Sidoti (n 60) 96.
140Similar arguments have been made in favour of limiting NHRI involvement at international fora.
See G de Beco, Non-Judicial Mechanisms for the Implementation of Human Rights in European States
(Bruylant, 2009), 150.
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bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council have only a limited amount of time to spend
on analysing country practices and that this time is currently fully occupied by other actors.
However, if one believes that SNHRI have a valuable perspective that can add to what is
already being discussed, then this would not necessarily be a negative outcome.
Others might object that, even if this proposal were workable, most SNHRIs would be
unlikely to apply for ICC membership. In fact, this is a possibility. Many SNHRIs are lightly
staffed, with small budgets and little interest or capability of effectively engaging with the UN
or peers in other countries. Other SNHRIs, however, have already demonstrated a desire to
join the ICC, or otherwise to engage with their peers at the international level.141 A number
of SNHRIs have already expressed a desire to attain the standards laid out in the Paris
Principles, despite the principles not being drafted with SNHRIs in mind.142 In any case, a
small or selective membership is not necessarily a negative; after all, even at the national level,
some NHRIs have not applied for membership in the ICC.
VIII. Conclusion
As this article has shown, while some ombudsman-type SNHRIs actively participate in
transgovernmental networks, there are many other SNHRIs that do not engage with their
peers in other countries. Even those SNHRIs that have joined ombudsman networks do not
have access to the same benefits of transgovernmental networks that NHRIs enjoy through
the ICC and its affiliated networks. This article proposes the establishment of a new form of
membership for the ICC, which would be accessible to SNHRIs. This would open up new
avenues of international participation for SNHRIs, allow them to interact and learn from
their peers, and provide them with greater legitimacy. In order to join NHRIs at the ICC
credibly, however, SNHRIs would have to comply with a set of guidelines similar (although
not identical) to the Paris Principles. This article therefore proposes the drafting of a new set
of principles that can effectively provide guidance for SNHRIs while remaining true to the
spirit of the Paris Principles.
141See, generally, Wolman ‘Welcoming a New International Human Rights Actor?’ (n 134).
142See, e.g., Bermuda Human Rights Commission, ‘2010 Annual Report’ 22 http://parliament.bm/
uploadedFiles/Content/Home/HRC%20Annual%20Report%20%202010.pdf accessed 15 November
2014; Ontario Human Rights Commission, ‘Guiding Principles’ http://www.ohrc.on.ca/zh-hant/node/
9767 accessed 15 November 2014; and Estado de Chiapas, Decreto no 233, Ley de la Comisión Estatal
de los Derechos Humanos (19 Aug 2013).
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AND THE DOMESTICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
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Abstract
While the domestication of international human rights law has been intensively studied 
in recent years, little attention has been paid to the domestication role of sub-national 
human rights institutions, meaning those ombudsmen, human rights commissions, 
and similar independent non-judicial governmental institutions that possess sub-
national mandates, and whose mission includes the implementation of human rights 
norms. Th is article demonstrates that sub-national human rights institutions around 
the world are not simply local institutions implementing local norms. Rather, they are 
increasingly involved in the domestication of international human rights law through 
their quasi-judicial resolution of disputes, promotion of governmental compliance with 
international norms; promotion of international norms in civil society; promotion of the 
use of international norms by the courts, and use of international norms as standards 
in human rights monitoring. Th e article explores the implications of these actions, and 
how the sub-national human rights institutions add to the existing domestication of 
international norms by national-level actors.
Keywords: domestication; human rights; National Human Rights Institutions; 
ombudsmen; sub-national human rights institutions
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, scholars have focused considerable attention on the means by 
which international human rights norms are transmitted to the domestic sphere. 
Empirical legal scholars have examined the domestication role of domestic courts, 
compiling databases of cases and conceptualising the diff erent ways in which judges 
use international law.1 Drawing from the ground-breaking work of Sikkink, Risse, 
and others, political scientists have studied the conditions under which international 
human rights norms can be internalised into domestic practice.2 Socio-legal and 
anthropological approaches have highlighted the role of both international and 
local non-governmental organisations in ‘localising’ international human rights 
norms within particular cultural contexts.3 A small but active group of academics 
have focused their attention on National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), those 
national human rights commissions, human rights ombudsmen, and other institutions 
that have emerged around the world in recent years with – in many cases – the express 
goal of domesticating international human rights law.4 Th e sustained academic 
attention to the issue of domestication is in part a refl ection of the growing consensus 
of its importance to human rights advocacy: in short, human rights practitioners have 
realised that the weakness of international human rights mechanisms means that 
domestic institutions must play the leading role in actually applying international 
human rights norms, if those norms are to actually make a signifi cant diff erence in 
people’s lives.
Th is article will extend this attention to sub-national human rights institutions 
(SNHRIs), those sub-national equivalents of NHRIs that are defi ned here as independent 
non-judicial governmental institutions that possess a sub-national mandate, and whose 
1 André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (OUP 2011); Magnus 
Killander (ed), International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa (Pretoria 
University Law Press 2010); Michael Kirby, ‘Domestic Courts and International Human Rights Law 
– Th e Ongoing Judicial Conversation’ (2010) 6 Utrecht L Rev 168.
2 Th omas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), Th e Power of Human Rights: International 
Norms and Domestic Change (CUP 1999); Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘Incomplete 
Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law’ (2008) 18 Eur J of Intl L 725.
3 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights & Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local 
Justice (University of Chicago Press 2006); Koen de Feyter, Localizing Human Rights, University 
of Antwerp Institute of Development Policy and Management, Discussion Paper 2006/02 (2006); 
Zvika Orr, ‘Th e Adaptation of Human Rights Norms in Local Settings: Intersections of Local and 
Bureaucratic Knowledge in an Israeli NGO’ (2012) 11 J Human Rights 243.
4 Richard Carver, ‘A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights Institutions and the 
Domestication of International Law’ (2010) 10 Human Rights L Rev 1; Morten Kjaerum, National 
Human Rights Institutions Implementing Human Rights (Danish Institute for Human Rights 2003). 
According to one scholar, the domestication of international norms is the “raison d’être” for NHRIs. 
Sonia Cardenas, ‘Adaptive States: Th e Proliferation of National Human Rights Institutions’ (2004) 
Carr Center for Human Rights Working Paper T-01–04, <http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/
cache/kp/24.pdf> accessed 6 February 2015.
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mission includes the implementation of human rights norms.5 Th ese institutions – 
provincial and local ombudsmen, anti-discrimination commissions, defensores del 
pueblo, and the like – have become increasingly ubiquitous around the world. While 
some SNHRIs are focused on implementing civil rights norms from domestic sources 
with little attention to the corpus of international human rights law, this is not 
always the case. In fact, as this article will demonstrate, SNHRIs with diff erent legal 
traditions and institutional forms from around the world are increasingly involved in 
domesticating international norms in a myriad of ways.
Aft er a brief introduction to SNHRIs, this article will address the direct 
application of international human rights norms by SNHRIs by examining three 
related questions.6 First, what sources of human rights norms do SNHRIs use, and 
how do they relate to international norms? In particular, this section will examine 
the diff erent ways that SNHRI mandates refer to international norms, and the ways 
in which SNHRIs have justifi ed the use of international human rights norms when 
such use is not explicitly provided for in their mandates. Second, in what functions 
have SNHRIs used international norms? Th is section will explore fi ve broad manners 
of use, namely the use of international norms in adjudicating claims; promotion of 
governmental compliance with international norms; promotion of international 
norms in civil society; promotion of the use of international norms by the courts, and 
the use of international norms as standards in human rights monitoring. Th ird, what 
are the implications of SNHRI domestication of international norms? Th is section 
will focus on exploring what SNHRI domestication of international norms adds to 
the existing human rights regime beyond the domestication role already played by 
NHRIs and other actors.
2. SUB-NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
While the proliferation of NHRIs in the past two decades is a well-known and 
relatively straight-forward story, far fewer people are aware of the simultaneous and 
similarly striking growth in independent human rights institutions at the sub-national 
level.7 In some places, the two types of institutions developed in tandem: in Russia, 
5 To date, the domestication of international law by SNHRIs has been the subject of relatively little 
academic attention, and those studies that have taken note of the trend have largely focused on 
entities within a single country. See, eg, Risa Kaufman, ‘State and Local Commissions as Sites for 
Domestic Human Rights Implementation’ in Shareen Hertel and Kathryn Libal (eds) Human Rights 
in the United States: Beyond Exceptionalism (CUP 2011); Lesley Wexler, ‘Th e Promise and Limits of 
Local Human Rights Internationalism’ (2010) 37 Fordham Urban L J 599.
6 For the purposes of this article, the term ‘international human rights norms’ will be used to refer 
to those norms contained in international human rights treaties, customary international law, and 
declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
7 On NHRI proliferation, see, eg, Cardenas (n 4); Anna-Elina Pohjolainen, Th e Evolution of National 
Human Rights Institutions – Th e Role of the United Nations (Danish Institute for Human Rights 
2006); Jeong-Woo Koo and Francisco Ramirez, ‘National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: 
Sub-National Human Rights Institutions and the Domestication 
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India, and Morocco, for example, the establishment of human rights commissions or 
ombudsman institutions at the national level was accompanied by the authorisation 
(and, over time, the establishment) of analogous institutions at sub-national levels.8 
Elsewhere, especially in the US, Canada and Australia, pre-existing sub-national 
anti-discrimination institutions gradually began adopting more of a human rights 
focus.9 Meanwhile, classical ombudsman institutions around the world turned more 
and more to human rights10 while ‘human rights ombudsman’ institutions (with an 
explicit human rights implementation mandate) were established at national and sub-
national levels in newly democratised countries in Southern and Eastern Europe and 
Latin America.11 Most recently, new grass-roots movements have begun to emerge 
in cities to promote human rights at the local level, leading to the establishment of 
entirely new and innovative forms of SNHRIs.12
Th e SNHRIs that emerged through these various processes are now present on 
every continent of the world, and in signifi cant numbers. Th ere are 71 regional human 
rights ombudsmen in Russia;13 47 state human rights commissions in the US;14 23 
state human rights commissions in India;15 at least 1,000 personeros municipales 
(human rights ombudsmen) in Colombia,16 and an estimated 900 sub-national human 
Worldwide Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966–2004’ (2009) 87 Social Forces 
1321.
8 Federal Constitutional Law on the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation, N 
1-FKZ, Art 5 (26 February 1997) [Russia]; Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 [as amended by the 
Protection of Human Rights (Amendment) Act, 2006-No 43 of 2006] art 21 (1994) [India]; Dahir no 
1–11–19 du 25 rabii I 1432, art 28–31 (1 March 2011) [Morocco].
9 Shubhankar Dam, ‘Lessons from National Human Rights Institutions Around the World for 
State and Local Human Rights Commissions in the United States’ Report Prepared for Harvard 
Executive Session on Human Rights Commissions and Criminal Justice (August 2007) 10.
10 Linda Reif, ‘Ombudsmen and Human Rights Protection and Promotion in the Caribbean: Issues 
and Strategies’ in Victor Ayeni, Linda Reif and Hayden Th omas (eds) Strengthening Ombudsman 
and Human Rights Institutions in Commonwealth Island and Small States (Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2000) 163.
11 Linda Reif, ‘Transplantation and Adaptation: Th e Evolution of the Human Rights Ombudsman’ 
(2011) 31 Boston College Th ird World L J 278.
12 Charlotte Berends and others (eds), Human Rights Cities: Motivations, Mechanisms, Implications 
(University College Roosevelt 2013).
13 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ‘Fourth Report on the Russian Federation’ 
CRI (2013) 40, 18.
14 Kenneth Saunders and Hyo Eun Bang, ‘A Historical Perspective on U.S. Human Rights 
Commissions’ Executive Sessions Papers: Human Rights Commissions and Criminal Justice (June 
2007) 13. In addition, the US has hundreds of local human rights commissions, including over 60 in 
California alone. ibid 11.
15 Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Aff airs, Response to Unstarred Question no 3963 
(18  February 2014) <http://mha1.nic.in/par2013/par2014-pdfs/ls-180214/3963.pdf> (accessed 
11 April 2015).
16 Th e Federación Nacional de Personeros de Colombia currently includes as members 1,093 personeros 
municipales and personeros distritales. Federación Nacional de Personeros de Colombia, ‘Directorio 
de Personerías’ <http://fenalper.org/index.php/2014–08–04–04–41–56/directoriopersonerias> 
(accessed 11 April 2015).
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rights boards in Turkey.17 According to a Council of Europe report, there are several 
hundred regional ombudsmen and close to 1,000 local ombudsmen in Council of 
Europe Member States.18 Clearly, these SNHRIs comprise a very diverse institutional 
category. SNHRIs exist at virtually all administrative levels, from cities and counties to 
provinces and vast autonomous regions. While by defi nition all are engaged in human 
rights implementation, they do so in diff erent ways: many receive and investigate 
complaints from the public, but others concentrate on promotional activities, 
monitoring, or providing sub-national governments with advice and guidance. Some 
SNHRIs are mandated to implement the broad sweep of human rights, while others 
focus on particular rights, such as the rights of children or the elderly. Nevertheless, 
SNHRIs are increasingly viewed as a coherent (if poorly defi ned) group by other actors 
in the international system. In recent years the UN Secretary General, the Offi  ce of 
the High Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR), the Commonwealth Human 
Rights Initiative, and others have issued recommendations specifi cally geared toward 
“sub-national human rights institutions”, signifying a recognition that the category is 
practically meaningful, at least in the eyes of the international community.19
3. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND 
SNHRI MANDATES
While SNHRIs (by defi nition) are concerned with implementing human rights, 
they vary quite widely as to which norms they implement, and where those norms 
originated. Fundamentally, one can point to three types of normative sources in 
use. First, some NHRIs are explicitly mandated to implement one or more forms of 
international human rights norms. Second, some NHRIs are mandated to implement 
a set of human rights norms contained elsewhere in the (national or sub-national) 
domestic laws of the country where the SNHRI is located. Th ird, the mandates of 
17 Kirsten Roberts and Bruce Adamson, ‘Chapter 23 Peer-Review Mission: Human Rights Institutions’, 
Delegation of the EU to Turkey (January 2011) 8.
18 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Eff ective Protection of Human Rights in 
Europe: Enhanced Co-operation between Ombudsmen, National Human Rights Institutions, 
and the Council for Europe Commissioner for Human Rights,’ Background Paper for 10th Round 
Table of European Ombudsmen and the Council for Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 
CommDH/Omb-NHRI(2007)1 Rev 3 (April 2007) para 16 (some of these ombudsmen would 
address classic maladministration issues without implementing human rights, and thus would not 
be considered SNHRIs according to the defi nition used here).
19 Address by Navanetham Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights, to the Annual Meeting of 
the Coordinating Council of Sub-national Ombudspersons of the Russian Federation, ‘National 
Human Rights Protection Systems: Th e First Ports of Call’ (18 February 2011) <www.ohchr.org/
en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10798&LangID=E> (accessed 11  April 2015); 
Report by the Secretary General: National Institutions for the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights, A/66/274 (8 August 2011) para 95; Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, ‘Th e 
Parliamentary Committee as Promoter of Human Rights: Th e UK’s Joint Committee on Human 
Rights’ (2007) 17.
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many NHRIs are silent or ambiguous as to the sources of the human rights norms 
that are to be implemented. Of course, in some cases, these three categories of sources 
will be combined, so that a SNHRI will be mandated to implement both domestic 
norms and certain international treaties, or will have a general mandate to promote 
“human rights” (with source undefi ned) but will be mandated to use specifi c domestic 
or international norms to resolve disputes.
3.1. SNHRI MANDATES TO IMPLEMENT INTERNATIONAL NORMS
An increasing number of SNHRIs are explicitly mandated to directly implement 
international human rights norms in their work. Th ese SNHRIs include both 
commission and ombudsman-types at the municipal level and the provincial 
level, from every region of the world. Th ere are signifi cant diff erences in the type 
of international norms that are specifi cally included in these mandates. At the 
expansive end, some SNHRIs are mandated to use generally recognised norms of 
international law20 or to use norms from international treaties without reference to 
ratifi cation status.21 In these jurisdictions, SNHRIs may act as entryways for human 
rights norms not yet explicitly accepted at the national level. More commonly, many 
SNHRIs are mandated to implement the international human rights treaties that 
have been ratifi ed by the SNHRI’s home country. Th is is the case for the Yucatán 
Human Rights Commission,22 the Scottish Commission on Human Rights,23 the 
Cordoba (Argentina) Defensor de los Derechos del Niño,24 the Oaxaca Human Rights 
Commission25 and the Yukon Human Rights Commission.26
In some cases, a broad treaty mandate is either supplemented (as in the 
case with the Yukon Human Rights Commission27 and Moscow Child Rights 
Ombudsman28) or replaced (as in the case with the Eugene and Portland Human 
Rights Commissions29) by reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). From a practical perspective, the use of the UDHR has a few implications. 
20 Th is broad guidance is relatively common in Russia and Eastern Europe. See, eg, Primorsky Krai 
Law N 110-CP (11 December 1997) art 4(1) [Russia]; Novgorod Regional Law N 552-OZ (3 November 
2005) art 3 [Russia]; City of Novi Sad Decree no 47, Ombudsman (2008), art 4, 26 [Serbia].
21 See, eg, Regolamento per la disciplina delle funzioni del Difensore Civico della Provincia di Biella 
[Italy], Approvato con DCP 98 (5 September 2000) art 2.
22 Estado de Yucatán Decreto 152/2014 (28 February 2014) s 2(x).
23 Scottish Commission for Human Rights Act 2006 s 2(b).
24 Ley Provincial 9.396, art 4 (2007) [Cordoba].
25 Ley de la Defensoría de los Derechos Humanos del Pueblo de Oaxaca, Decreto No 823, art.  2 
(14 February 2012) [Estado de Oaxaca].
26 Human Rights Act, RSY 1986 (Supp), c 11, s 1.
27 Ibid.
28 City of Moscow Law No 43, On the Ombudsman for Childs Rights in the City of Moscow (3 October 
2001) art 5.
29 Eugene Council Ordinance No 20481 (29 November 2011); City of Portland Ordinance No. 181670 
(19 March 2008).
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First, it increases the SNHRI’s room for interpretation, given that the UDHR is 
more vaguely phrased than the major UN conventions and has not been the subject 
of authoritative interpretation by treaty bodies. Second, the acceptance of the 
preeminent status of the UDHR by virtually all of the world’s countries (despite its 
technically non-binding status) gives the UDHR legitimacy as a normative source 
even in countries (such as the US) that have not ratifi ed all of the core human rights 
treaties. On the other hand, the UDHR’s non-binding nature may in some cases 
make it easier for governmental bodies to reject SNHRI recommendations based 
solely upon the UDHR.
For other SNHRIs, only a smaller subset of ratifi ed treaties or other international 
norms are cited as sources of law. Sometimes these are particularly fundamental 
or well-accepted treaties. For example, in India, where the federal legislation 
authorising the establishment of a national human rights commission also 
defi nes state human rights commission mandates, human rights are defi ned as 
encompassing constitutionally guaranteed rights as well as those rights embodied 
in the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR) or International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and enforceable by 
Indian courts.30 Th e European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) is singled out 
for implementation by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission31 as well as 
provincial and sub-provincial human rights boards in Turkey.32 It should be noted 
that the ECHR is essentially a civil and political rights convention, so singling out 
this treaty may be problematic from the perspective of the indivisibility of human 
rights.
In other cases, where a SNHRI only addresses a specifi c area of human rights, 
the mandate refers only to sources related to the narrower subject area. Th is is 
most commonly the case in the area of children’s rights. Th us, the mandates of 
the Northern Ireland Commission for Children and Young People,33 the Flemish 
Children’s Commissioner,34 and the Balamban (Philippines) Municipal Council for 
the Protection of Children35 refer specifi cally to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC). Th e Children’s Ombudsman of the Republic of Srpska36 is guided by the 
CRC as well as other international instruments related to the protection of the rights 
and interests of children. Interestingly, the CRC is also the only international treaty 
30 Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 [as amended by the Protection of Human Rights 
(Amendment) Act, 2006–No 43 of 2006] art 2(f).
31 Northern Ireland Act, 1998, s 69(11)(b).
32 Regulation on the Establishment, Duties, and Working Principles of Provincial and Sub-Provincial 
Human Rights Boards (Turkey) (23 November 2003) art 11(a).
33 Th e Commissioner for Children and Young People (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 no 439 (NI 11) 
(2003) art 6(3).
34 Decree of 15  July 1997 establishing a Children’s Commissioner and Creating the Offi  ce of the 
Children’s Commissioner, art 4–6.
35 Municipality of Balamban Children’s Code (14 July 2009) sec 83 [Philippines].
36 Law of Ombudsman for Children of Republic of Srpska, No 103/08 (2008), art 1.
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source specifi ed in the organic law of the Catalan Síndic de Greuges (ombudsman), 
despite its mandate to address all types of human rights.37
In the case of NHRIs, scholars have at times attempted to quantify the percentage 
of mandates that directly refer to international sources.38 Th is article does not attempt 
to follow suit for SNHRIs. Such a task would be complicated by the high number of 
SNHRIs, the lack of readily accessible information about many SNHRI mandates, 
and the absence of a widely accepted list of recognized SNHRIs. Th e most that can 
be said is that signifi cant numbers of SNHRIs from a wide range of countries are 
mandated to use international norms, and that this group comprises a diverse range of 
SNHRI types: general and single-issue SNHRIs; ombudsmen and commissions; and 
SNHRIs at the municipal, provincial, and autonomous regional administrative levels. 
What is equally clear, however, is that not all SNHRIs are mandated to implement 
international norms. In the US, for example, such mandates are still very much the 
exception rather than the rule.39 According to one recent report, most US SNHRIs, 
despite focusing their attention on issues of racial discrimination, lacked even a basic 
familiarity with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD).40
3.2. SNHRI MANDATES TO IMPLEMENT DOMESTIC LAW NORMS
In many instances, SNHRIs are only mandated to implement domestic norms, such as 
the rights contained in a constitution, statute or charter. Th ese domestic sources can be 
adopted at the national or sub-national level. Even where the mandate does not mention 
international sources, however, SNHRIs may still be involved in the domestication of 
international norms. For one thing, the domestic norms that SNHRIs are implementing 
may have a normative content that overlaps with international norms. In fact, this will 
almost always be the case, to a certain extent, in human rights law.41 Sometimes, the 
overlap will be intentional, as the domestic norms will have been explicitly draft ed so 
as to implement international treaty obligations. In other cases, the domestic rights 
norms may not be intentionally based on international human rights law, and may 
even predate the adoption of major human rights treaties, but nevertheless contains 
much the same normative content. Regardless of the intent of the domestic law’s 
37 Act No 24/2009 of 23 December 2009 on the Síndic de Greuges (Generalitat de Catalunya), art 4.
38 See, eg, Brian Burdekin, National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia-Pacifi c Region (Martinus 
Nijhoff  2007) 31; Carver (n 4) 6–7 (fi nding that 45 per cent of NHRI mandates authorise the 
institution to apply international human rights treaty law, and an additional 45 per cent of mandates 
do not specify the source of the human rights norms to be implemented).
39 Tara Melish et al, ‘ U.S. Human Rights Network’s CERD Working Groups on Local Implementation 
& Treaty Obligations, A Report To Th e Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
on U.S. CERD Obligations and Domestic Implementation’ (February 2008) 10 <www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/usa/USHRN7.doc> (accessed 11 April 2015).
40 Ibid 11.
41 Nollkaemper (n 1) 218.
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draft ers, where substantive overlap exists, the SNHRI will be engaged in indirect 
domestication (to use Nollkaemper’s terminology) of international law.42 Indirect 
domestication may have somewhat diff erent eff ects than direct implementation of 
international norms, however, as in many cases the jurisprudence developed by local 
courts will diverge signifi cantly from the recommendations and comments of treaty 
bodies, even when both are dealing with an identical textual starting point.43 Th us, 
SNHRIs that rely on this accumulated domestic precedent will be implementing a 
diff erent set of norms than SNHRIs that rely directly on international treaties (or on 
international actors’ interpretation of treaty norms).
Direct implementation of international norms may also be possible, at least in some 
contexts. One way that international norms have been directly implemented is through 
an SNHRI’s interpretation that a domestic law mandate necessarily includes international 
law because the relevant country has a monist tradition of treating international law as 
binding in domestic settings. Th is type of interpretation has been given to the mandate of 
Personeros Municipales (municipal ombudsmen) in Colombia. Th e Personero Municipal’s 
mandate is defi ned by the rights included in the Colombian Constitution.44 However, 
the Colombian Constitution takes a monist view of international human rights law, 
stating that ratifi ed human rights treaties prevail in the internal legal order.45 Th us, at 
least according to the guidance document produced by the Colombian Vice Presidential 
Offi  ce, Personeros must ensure that the content of all laws and administrative regulations 
are consistent with international human rights treaties.46
Even where SNHRIs are directly implementing domestic law, some SNHRIs use 
international norms as an interpretative tool to determine the content of the domestic 
norms. Th is interpretive strategy can be explicitly mandated, as is the case in the state 
of Victoria (Australia) Ombudsman, which fi elds complaints of state breaches of the 
Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities, and is explicitly authorised to 
use international law to help interpret the Charter’s provisions by the Charter itself.47
Sometimes, SNHRI mandates also contain references to international norms 
in their preambles, in which case the SNHRI can use these preambular references 
to justify the use of international norms as an interpretative tool. Th is can be 
42 Ibid 117.
43 Ibid 218–19. Other commentators, however, dismiss the substantive diff erence between direct and 
indirect implementation of international human rights law as unimportant, see Helena Pihlajasaari 
and Halvdan Skard, ‘Th e Offi  ce of Ombudsman and Local and Regional Authorities: Explanatory 
Memorandum’, Report for Council of Europe Congress for Local and Regional Authorities (2011), 
para 10.
44 Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH, Vicepresidencia de la República, ‘El Personero 
Municipal y la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de la Población Civil’ (2009) 36 <http://
historico.derechoshumanos.gov.co/Prensa/Destacados/documents/2010/destacados/Guia_para_
ElPersonero_2009.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2015).
45 Constitution of Colombia (1991), art 93.
46 Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH (n 45) 37.
47 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, No 43 (Victoria), art 32(2).
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accomplished either as a general matter of statutory interpretation or through explicit 
reference to the preamble in the statute’s operative clauses. Th us, for example, the 
Montréal Ombudsman is mandated to ‘if it is deemed necessary, refer to the Preamble’ 
in interpreting the substance of the Montréal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities, 
and the Charter’s preamble specifi es that citizens possess rights contained in the 
UDHR and human rights treaties ratifi ed by Canada.48
Finally, the use of international law as an interpretative tool can simply be 
initiated at the SNHRI’s discretion. Th is was the case in Quebec, where the Quebec 
Human Rights Commission has inferred the relevance of international norms in its 
interpretations of domestic law due to its conclusion that the Province of Quebec could 
not properly legislate in a manner incompatible with its international commitments.49 
Th is technique is an illustration of what is known in the US as the ‘Charming Betsy’ 
principle, which holds that statutes should wherever possible be interpreted consistently 
with a country’s international obligations.50 As a practical matter, there may be little 
substantive diff erence in outcome in cases where international law is used to interpret 
domestic norms compared to cases of the direct implementation of international norms.
3.3. MANDATES THAT ARE SILENT OR UNCLEAR ON THE 
SOURCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Finally, some SNHRI mandates are silent or ambiguous as to the precise domestic 
or international source of the norms that they implement. For example, they may 
simply be charged with promoting “human rights” or investigating the “fairness” 
of governmental actions. Th is ambiguity or silence may leave room for the SNHRI 
to choose to invoke international norms. To give one example, the Seattle Human 
Rights Commission is mandated to provide advice ‘in respect to matters aff ecting 
human rights and in furtherance thereof ’, without mention of what norms it should 
look to for guidance.51 In its 2013 work plan, the Commission specifi ed that it would 
work with an international human rights framework, including all treaties ratifi ed by 
the US, treaties signed but not ratifi ed, and US endorsed international human rights 
declarations.52 Th is expansive acceptance of international norms was prompted by a 
48 City of Montréal, Montréal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities (2005), art 34.
49 Lysiane Clément-Major, ‘International Human Rights Standards: Th e Quebec Perspective’ (Ontario 
Human Rights Commission Conference: Advancing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Implementing International Human Rights Standards into the Legal Work of Canadian Human 
Rights Agencies, Toronto, Ontario, December 2000).
50 Murray v. Th e Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US 64, 118 (1804). Variations of this principle are a 
feature of human rights jurisprudence in many common law countries. See Melissa Waters, 
‘Creeping Monism: Th e Judicial Trend Toward Interpretative Incorporation of Human Rights 
Treaties’ (2007) 107 Columbia L Rev 628, 660–66.
51 Seattle Municipal Code (1997), 3.14.931.
52 Seattle Human Rights Commission, 2013 Work Plan <www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/
SeattleHumanRightsCommission/SHRC_2013_workplan.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2015).
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Seattle City Council resolution declaring Seattle to be a Human Rights City committed 
to respecting, protecting and fulfi lling the full range of universal human rights.53 
Similarly, the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission has embraced an 
international human rights framework despite the absence of a clear mandate in its 
organic legislation,54 and even though the Ontario Human Rights Code (which was 
enacted in 1962) does not explicitly mandate the Ontario Human Rights Commission 
to employ international norms, the Commission itself has stated that it ‘relies upon 
international human rights treaties and Canadian human rights law to inform its 
research, policy development, outreach, advice, inquiries and interventions’.55
4. HOW DO SNHRIs IMPLEMENT INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS?
Th is section will attempt to clarify the diff erent ways in which SNHRIs work toward 
the domestication of international human rights law. Fundamentally, there are fi ve 
principle mechanisms by which SNHRIs can and do domesticate international norms 
(although others mechanisms may occasionally be used as well). First, those SNHRIs 
that function as quasi-judicial institutions can directly utilise international human 
rights law in their decisions when hearing petitions from individuals. Second, SNHRIs 
can promote compliance with international human rights law by governmental 
authorities, whether at the sub-national or national levels. Th ird, SNHRIs can focus 
on educating and raising awareness of international human rights within civil society. 
Fourth, SNHRIs can attempt to promote the use of international human rights law by 
the courts. Fift h, SNHRIs can employ international human rights norms as standards 
when carrying out human rights monitoring. Th ese domestication mechanisms are 
broadly similar to those used by NHRIs.
4.1. QUASI-JUDICIAL USAGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS NORMS
Many SNHRIs have a mandate to hear and rule upon petitions from individuals 
alleging human rights violations. Th is is always the case with ombudsman-style 
SNHRIs, who indeed oft en have a petition-handling mandate that goes beyond rights 
53 City of Seattle Resolution 31420 (4 December 2012).
54 County of Los Angeles Community and Senior Services, ‘For the First Time, State Department 
Asks State and Local Human Rights Agencies to Help US Comply with its Human Rights 
Treaty Obligations’ (26  May 2010) <http://css.lacounty.gov/Data/Sites/1/FolderGalleries/Press/
humanrightstreatypressrelease_5–26–10_rev_3_2_f_3.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2015).
55 Letter from Ontario Human Rights Commission to High Commissioner of Human Rights re 
OHCHR Th ematic Study on Participation of Persons with Disabilities in Political and Public 
Life (14  October 2011) <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/re-ohchr-thematic-study-participation-persons-
disabilities-political-and-public-life> (accessed 11 April 2015).
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abuses to also encompass maladministration or corruption.56 It is also true of many 
state and local anti-discrimination commissions in the US, Canada and Australia, 
although there are also some commissions with a purely advisory mandate. With 
ombudsman-type institutions, petitioners are generally required to allege that the 
human rights violations have been perpetrated by a sub-national governmental 
entity; however, many anti-discrimination commissions can also hear cases alleging 
discrimination by certain private sector actors.57 As is the case with NHRIs, the 
decisions made by SNHRIs are generally not considered binding, and compliance 
with SNHRI recommendations varies by jurisdiction.
Th e use of international standards in the complaint-handling process is an 
element of many SNHRIs’ work. Oft entimes, these international norms will be used 
in conjunction with analogous domestic norms so as to emphasise the universality 
and importance of these domestic norms, but in some cases international law can 
provide standards that go beyond those embraced elsewhere in domestic law. In some 
ways, however, the use of international standards to rule on individual complaints 
is likely to have relatively little impact in the broader society. Th e decisions of 
SNHRIs will only rarely be read or discussed by the general public. Even in common 
law jurisdictions, the precedential value of SNHRI decisions is likely to be slim (or 
none), especially outside of the SNHRI’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, over time, the 
enforcement of international norms may lead to their internalisation, help develop 
new rights jurisprudence, and provide additional recourse where domestic law 
standards provide less protection than international rights law.58
4.2. PROMOTION OF GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Another common task for SNHRIs is to promote government implementation 
of international human rights law. Th is can involve three conceptually diff erent 
tasks. First, SNHRIs can pressure the (national or sub-national) executive to follow 
international human rights norms in their policy-making and policy-implementation 
roles. Th us, for example, the British Columbia Ombudsman has provided advice to 
56 Roy Gregory and Philip Giddings, ‘Th e Ombudsman Institution: Growth and Development’ in Roy 
Gregory and Philip Giddings’ (eds) Righting Wrongs: Th e Ombudsman in Six Continents (IOS Press 
2000) 3–4 (surveying ombudsman defi nitions, all of which involve a complaint-handling function).
57 In the US, for example, state and local human rights commissions can typically investigate certain 
complaints of private sector discrimination, see Saunders and Bang (n 14) 1. Provincial Human 
Rights Commissions in Canada can hear complaints of discrimination by private sector entities 
regulated at the provincial level. Tina Piper and A Wayne MacKay, ‘Th e Domestic Implementation 
of International Law: A Canadian Case Study’, in Errol Mendes and Anik Lalonde-Roussy (eds) 
Bridging the Global Divide on Human Rights (Ashgate, 2003) 120–1.
58 Gaylynn Burroughs, ‘Realizing Domestic Social Justice through International Human Rights: Part 
I: More than an Incidental Eff ect on Foreign Aff airs: Implementation of Human Rights by State and 
Local Governments’ (2006) 30 NYU Rev L and Social Change 411, 421–22.
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the British Columbia provincial government on implementing the CRC into domestic 
policies,59 while the Conseil Lyonnais pour le Respect des Droits has lobbied the French 
national government to maintain a Children’s Ombudsman offi  ce in compliance with 
a recommendation of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.60
Second, SNHRIs can review pending (national or sub-national) legislation or 
promote new legislation with an eye towards ensuring consistency with international 
human rights norms. For example, Scotland has recommended that the UK (as well as 
the Scottish) government incorporate the Convention on the Elimination of all forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) into domestic laws61 and the Jalisco 
(Mexico) Human Rights Commission urged the state of Jalisco to pass new legislation 
to implement CEDAW and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women.62 Th e Río Negro 
(Argentina) Defensor del Pueblo has urged local law reform to ensure compliance 
with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traffi  cking in Persons, especially 
Women and Children (Palermo Protocol).63
Th ird, SNHRIs can advocate for the ratifi cation or acceptance of as-yet unaccepted 
international norms, as is commonly done by NHRIs, and indeed is explicitly 
mentioned in the Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (Paris 
Principles), a set of principles adopted by the UN General Assembly that have evolved 
into authoritative guidelines for NHRIs.64 While this type of advocacy seems to 
play a much less prominent role in the work of SNHRIs than NHRIs, it is not always 
ignored. For example, the Mexico City Human Rights Commissioner has called upon 
the Mexican government to ratify the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.65 Similarly, 
59 Linda Reif, Th e Ombudsman, Good Governance and International Human Rights System (Martinus 
Nijhoff  2004) 111.
60 Letter from Conseil Lyonnais pour le Respect des Droits to Prime Minister re la suppression de 
défenseur-e des droits de l’enfant, 5  November 2009 <www.respect-des-droits.org/attachedfi les/
download.php?id=1965,3221> (accessed 11 April 2015).
61 Scottish Human Rights Commission, ‘Submission – Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women’ (25  June 2013) <www.scottishhumanrights.com/resources/
policysubmissions/cedawnews2013> (accessed 11 April 2015).
62 Editorial, ‘CEDHJ pide al Congreso crear marco legal para proteger a las mujeres’ La Jornada Jalisco 
(14  November 2012) <www.lajornadajalisco.com.mx/2012/11/14/cedhj-pide-al-congreso-crear-
marco-legal-para-proteger-a-las-mujeres/> (accessed 11 April 2015).
63 Defensor del Pueblo de Río Negro (Argentina) Resolución No 28 del 2011 (17 October 2011).
64 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, UNGA Res 48/134 (20 Dec 1993) 48th Session (1993) UN Doc A/
RES/ 48/141 para 3(c). While the Paris Principles were explicitly draft ed with national institutions 
in mind, in some instances SNHRIs have nevertheless used them for guidance. See, eg, Bermuda 
Human Rights Commission, ‘2010 Annual Report’ (2011) 22; Ontario Human Rights Commission, 
‘Reviewing Ontario’s Human Rights System’ (2005) 19; Estado de Chiapas (Mexico), Decreto no 
233, Ley de la Comisión Estatal de los Derechos Humanos (19 Aug 2013).
65 Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal de México, ‘Se pronuncia CDHDF porque el 
Estado mexicano ratifi que el Protocolo Facultativo del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, 
Sociales y Culturales’ (14  October 2011) <www.portalfi o.org/inicio/noticias/item/7562-méxico-
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the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commissions has requested the Canadian federal 
government to voice its support for the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.66
Although formal ratifi cation of international human rights norms can only take 
place at the national level, the Salt Lake City Human Rights Commission and the 
San Francisco Commission on the Status of Women in the US have also urged local 
adherence to unratifi ed treaty norms (CEDAW, in both cases).67 While this type of 
sub-national human rights incorporation provides an interesting new sub-national 
entryway for international human rights norms, and has been lauded by many 
advocates, the potential also exists for confl ict with national-level foreign policy control; 
as Martha Davis notes, ‘even these seemingly benign, inwardly focused instances of 
domestic incorporation of human rights norms might be seen as impinging on federal 
foreign aff airs prerogatives that have been expressed through inaction’.68
4.3. PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
IN CIVIL SOCIETY
SNHRIs can also promote international human rights norms among civil society or 
the general public. Th is is intended to ultimately create ‘a culture of human rights so 
that every individual in society shares the values that are refl ected in the international 
and national human rights legal framework’.69 Th e promotion of international human 
rights norms in civil society should also have an indirect eff ect on government policies, 
as it encourages individuals to stand up for their rights against government actors 
and insist that governments respect their rights.70 Promotional activities can include 
human rights training and education programs, as well as awareness-raising activities. 
Th ese tasks can be carried out by the SNHRI itself, through its own publications and 
df-se-pronuncia-cdhdf-porque-el-estado-mexicano-ratifi que-el-protocolo-facultativo-del-pacto-
internacional-de-derechos-económicos-sociales-y-culturales.html> (accessed 11 April 2015).
66 Letter from Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission to Prime Minister Stephen Harper re 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples <www.shrc.gov.sk.ca/media_room/corr-declar-
indigenous.html> (accessed 11 April 2015).
67 Salt Lake City Human Rights Commission, ‘Discrimination Report’ (July 2009) 36; Columbia 
Law  School Human Rights Institute, ‘Implementing Recommendations from the Universal 
Periodic  Review: A Toolkit for State and Local Human Rights and Human Relations 
Commissions’  (2011) <www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/UPR%20
Toolkit.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2015).
68 Martha Davis, ‘Upstairs, Downstairs: Subnational Incorporation of International Human Rights 
Law at the End of an Era’ (2008) 77 Fordham L Rev 411, 421.
69 OHCHR, ‘National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles, and Responsibilities’ 
(2010) 57 <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PTS-4Rev1-NHRI_en.pdf> (accessed 
11 April 2015).
70 As Amnesty International states with respect to NHRIs, ‘a population which is educated in their 
human rights is an asset to assist NHRIs to carry out their task’. Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty 
International’s Recommendations for Eff ective Protection and Promotion of Human Rights’ AI 
INDEX: IOR 40/007/2001 (1 October 2001) 18.
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programs, or by funding and sponsoring events carried out by third parties, such as 
human rights symposia or fi lm festivals. SNHRI activities to promote international 
norms are relatively common, and vary widely in their nature and eff ect. For example, 
in Pakistan, the Punjabi Ombudsman Offi  ce has translated the CRC into Urdu, 
which it distributed as a promotional brochure.71 In the US, the Barnstable County 
(Massachusetts) Human Rights Commission organises a Human Rights Academy to 
bring together students from each Cape Cod high school to learn about the UDHR.72 
Of course, SNHRIs will vary in the extent to which they engage in civil society-
oriented promotional activities; those that hew closely to the traditional ombudsman 
model may be more focused on handling complaints, although even ombudsman-style 
SNHRIs increasingly consider human rights promotion as part of their mandate.73
Among the various avenues for promoting international norms, two particular 
techniques stand out as particularly common. Th e fi rst of these is the display of 
international human rights treaties or the UDHR on the SNHRI webpage (or 
alternatively the provision of a link to the text of these norms at the OHCHR website or 
elsewhere). Th is is common, even among SNHRIs that are not specifi cally mandated 
to implement international human rights norms.74 Some SNHRIs go a step further by 
displaying or reporting on recommendations from international treaty bodies or the 
Universal Periodic Review process.75 Webpage awareness-raising has obvious appeal 
for SNHRIs that oft en lack the budget and staffi  ng to engage more directly with the 
community. It also has its disadvantages, however, most notably its ineff ectiveness in 
reaching those people (oft en the most vulnerable) who lack internet access or awareness, 
and its fundamentally passive nature; in order to view the treaties or UDHR, members 
of the public must fi rst come to the SNHRI’s website and click on the relevant link.
71 Offi  ce of the Ombudsman Punjab, ‘How We Work’ <http://ombudsmanpunjab.gov.pk/children-
complaint-offi  ce/how-we-work/> (accessed 11 April 2015).
72 Barnstable County Human Rights Commission, ‘Human Rights Academy’ <www.bchumanservices.
net/barnstable-county-human-rights-commission/#Human_Rights_Academy> (accessed 11 April 
2015).
73 See, eg, Linda Reif, ‘Enhancing the Role of Ombudsman Institutions in the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (Speaking Truth to Power – the Role of the 
Ombudsman in the 21st century conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 14 November 2012) 19.
74 For example, these SNHRIs display the UDHR on their websites: Defensor del Pueblo de Río Negro 
(Argentina) <www.defensoriarionegro.gov.ar/drn/orden-juridico/> (accessed 11  April 2015); 
Bermuda Human Rights Commission <www.gov.bm/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=495&Pa
geID=0&cached=true&mode=2> (accessed 11 April 2015); Th e following SNHRI websites display 
the text of international treaties: Victoria (Australia) Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
Commission <www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/index.php/the-law/international-law> 
(accessed 11  April 2015); Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission <www.nihrc.org/index.
php/human-rights-law/un-conventions-and-treaties> (accessed 11 April 2015).
75 Scottish Human Rights Commission, ‘Universal Periodic Review’ <www.scottishhumanrights.
com/international/uprinternational> (accessed 11 April 2015); Victoria (Australia) Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunities Commission, ‘Media Statement on the UN Human Rights Committee 
fi ndings on the police assault of Corinna Horvath in 1996’ <www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.
au/index.php/news-and-events/media-releases/item/802-media-statement-on-the-unhcr-fi ndings-
on-the-police-assault-of-corinna-horvath-in-1996> (accessed 11 April 2015).
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Another commonly used technique is for the SNHRI to take advantage of one 
of the various ‘days’ set aside by the UN General Assembly to promote the relevant 
international norm, either through the issue of a press release or through sponsoring 
other awareness-raising activities such as a public seminar or celebration. Th e most 
commonly celebrated day is probably December 10, known as ‘Human Rights Day’, 
which commemorates the adoption of the UDHR.76 For example, the International 
Association of Offi  cial Human Rights Agencies (IAOHRA), an association of US and 
Canadian SNHRIs, adopted a resolution, whereby members committed to ‘utilize 
Human Rights Day […] to raise awareness of the UDHR and encourage residents to 
take action to support its principles’77 and has specifi cally encouraged its members 
to commemorate Human Rights Day through the use of proclamations, op-eds, 
community events and educational e-mails.78 Other days commonly commemorated 
by SNHRIs with the promotion of international norms include March 8 (International 
Women’s Day); March 21 (International Day for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination), and December 3 (International Day of Persons with Disabilities).79
4.4. PROMOTION OF THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS BY 
THE COURTS
In addition to promoting international norms to government agencies and civil 
society, some SNHRIs have attempted to promote the use of international norms by 
the courts. One way that this has been accomplished has been through the fi ling of 
amicus curiae briefs in ongoing cases, urging compliance with international norms. 
76 Th e Maharashtra (India) Human Rights Commission held a public Human Rights Day program 
publicising the ICCPR and UDHR. Maharashtra Human Rights Commission, ‘Celebration of 
International Human Rights day on 10th December, 2012’ (December 2012) <www.mshrc.gov.in/
downloads/10%20Dec%202012.pdf> (accessed 11  April 2015); Amherst (Massachusetts) Human 
Rights Commission held a community reading of the UDHR on Human Rights Day. Amherst 
Human Rights Commission, ‘Celebration of Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (10 December 
2013) <http://amhersthumanrights.blogspot.kr/2013/12/celebration-of-universal-declaration-of.
html> (accessed 11 April 2015).
77 IAOHRA, Resolution no 1, ‘International Human Rights’ (31 August 2010).
78 Letter from Risa Kaufman and Leon Russell to IAOHRA Members re Celebrating Human Rights 
Day (November 2009) <www.iaohra.org/storage/November%202009%20-Celebrating%20
Human%20Rights%20Day.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2015).
79 For example, the Kaliningrad Human Rights Ombudsman issued a news release highlighting and 
linking to the CPD, see Commissioner for Human Rights in the Kaliningrad Region, ‘International 
Day for the Rights of the Disabled’ <http://ombudsman39.ru/news/mezhdunarodny-deny-
boryb-za-prava-invalidov> (accessed 11  April 2015). In Argentina, the Defensora del Pueblo 
de Río Negro published an article quoting CEDAW in the local newspaper on International 
Women’s Day, see Nadina Díaz, ‘Día Internacional de la Mujer’ Diario El Cordillerano (8 March 
2014) <www.elcordillerano.com.ar/index.php/notas-de-opinion/columnas-abiertas/item/11621-
dia-internacional-de-la-mujer> (accessed 11  April 2015). In the US, the IAOHRA distributes a 
resource packet to member SNHRIs to promote CERD compliance on the International Day for 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, see IAOHRA, International Day for the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination <www.iaohra.org/international-day/> (accessed 11 April 2015).
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For example, the Mexico City Human Rights Commission submitted an amicus 
brief to the federal Supreme Court, that was intended to ensure that the Court’s 
jurisprudence complied with the requirements of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CPD).80 Th e City of Buenos Aires Defensor del Pueblo urged 
the Buenos Aires Tribunal Superior de Justicia to use the ICESCR and other relevant 
international norms in interpreting the right to housing in Argentina.81 In Canada, 
the Saskatchewan, Ontario and Alberta Human Rights Commissions fi led an amicus 
brief in the Supreme Court of Canada arguing that the British Columbia Code should 
be interpreted consistently with the CPD.82
Some commission-type SNHRIs can also promote the use of international norms as 
litigants. Th is type of litigation can take place either in specialised human rights tribunals 
(where, for example, the Quebec Human Rights Commission has regularly advocated 
the use of international human rights law83), administrative courts,84 or in the general 
court system.85 Of course, the downside to this method of human rights promotion is 
that participating in litigation as a party can be expensive and time-consuming, so such 
actions are likely to be rare except in jurisdictions where SNHRI appearances before 
human rights tribunals or appeals to the courts are expressly anticipated.
Finally, SNHRIs may in some cases promote the use of international norms by the 
courts outside of a litigation context. For example, the Mexico City Human Rights 
Commission recently issued a press release criticising the Mexican Supreme Court’s 
failure to cite international law.86 Such overt criticism of the courts is rare, however, 
and even NHRIs have been reluctant to directly criticise court decisions.87
80 Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, ‘La CFHDF pide a la SCJN observar 
los  estándares internacionales que obligan a México en materia de capacidad jurídica’ (9  July 
2013) <www.portalfi o.org/inicio/noticias/item/12771-mexico-df-la-cdhdf-pide-a-la-scjn-observar-
los-estandares-internacionales-que-obligan-a-mexico-en-materia-de-capacidad-juridica.html> 
(accessed 11 April 2015).
81 Defensora del Pueblo de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Amicus Curiae Brief, Expte N 
6153/08 Ministerio Público – Asesoría General Tutelar de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires c/ 
GCBA s/ acción declarativa de inconstitucionalidad (2009).
82 Joint Intervention of Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, Ontario Human Rights 
Commission and Alberta Human Rights Commission in Frederick Moore on behalf of Jeff rey P. 
Moore v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the 
Ministry of Education, et al, Court File Nos 34040 & 34041 (Supreme Ct Canada, 2012).
83 Clément-Major (n 50).
84 Eg Re Brisbane Housing Company Ltd (No 3) [2012] QCAT 529 (16 October 2012) [Queensland] 
para 23 (Queensland Anti-Discrimination Commission highlighting rights to adequate standard of 
living, food, clothing and housing in ICESCR and CPD).
85 Eg Yukon (Human Rights Commission) v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, Dawson Lodge #1, 1993 CanLII 
3415 (YK CA).
86 Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, ‘Prevalecen normas locales sobre Tratados 
Internacionales en materia de DDHH de las personas con discapacidad’ (20 February 2012) <www.
portalfi o.org/inicio/noticias/item/8915-méxico-df-prevalecen-normas-locales-sobre-tratados-inter 
nacionales-en-materia-de-ddhh-de-las-personas-con-discapacidad.html> (accessed 11 April 2015).
87 Andrew Wolman, ‘National Human Rights Institutions and the Courts in the Asia-Pacifi c Region’ 
(2013) 19 Asia Pacifi c L Rev 237, 247.
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4.5. USE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AS 
MONITORING STANDARDS
Th e fi nal domestication mechanism commonly used by SNHRIs is the use of 
international norms as standards when monitoring a particular situation, policy or law. 
For example, the Puebla Human Rights Commission conducted an analysis of local 
legislative compliance with the full slate of human rights treaties to which Mexico 
is a party.88 Other reviews focus on a single treaty. Th us, the Andaluz Defensor del 
Pueblo reviewed the compliance of Andaluz autonomous legislation with the CPD,89 
the Salt Lake City Human Rights Commission reviewed the status of women while 
using CEDAW as a guiding document,90 and both the Madrid Defensor del Menor 
and the Flemish Children’s’ Rights Commission have monitored their jurisdiction’s 
implementation of the CRC.91 While SNHRI monitoring may not directly lead to the 
implementation of international norms, it can have an indirect eff ect; by measuring rights 
under international norms, the SNHRI is providing an incentive for the government 
(and other actors, where relevant) to meet those norms, in order to show improvement.
Although many monitoring reports are aimed at domestic actors, some SNHRIs 
have monitored local conditions primarily in order to convey their fi ndings to 
international actors. In the US, Belgium, Australia, the UK, Mexico and Hong 
Kong, for example, SNHRIs have contributed their fi ndings to periodic reports for 
treaty bodies and the Universal Periodic Review (as submitted by either the national 
government or NHRI or, in the case of Hong Kong and certain Mexican states, as 
independent ‘alternative reports’).92 Of particular interest is the monitoring role 
that SNHRIs can play as independent mechanisms under the CPD and National 
Preventive Mechanisms under the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). 
While most States have formally nominated NHRIs to play those roles, both treaties 
state that parties can appoint multiple bodies to fulfi l these roles, and in fact a few 
States have offi  cially included SNHRIs among their bodies: the UK designated the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Scottish Human Rights Commission, 
88 Comisión Estatal de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de Puebla, ‘Puebla a la vanguardia en el 
estudio de la armonización legislativa local y tratados internacionales’ (22  August 2012) <www.
portalfi o.org/inicio/noticias/item/10443-puebla-puebla-a-la-vanguardia-en-el-estudio-de-la-
armonización-legislativa-local-y-tratados-internacionales.html> (accessed 11 April 2015).
89 Defensor del Pueblo Andaluz, Resolución formulada en la queja 11/6034 dirigida a Consejeria de la 
Presidencia. Relativa a: Adecuación de la normativa autonomica a la convención internacional sobre 
los derechos de las personas con discapacidad (21 March 2012).
90 Salt Lake City Government, ‘Mayor, Human Rights Commission to Release Report on Women in 
Salt Lake City’ (28 May 2013) <www.ci.slc.ut.us/mayor-human-rights-commission-release-report-
women-salt-lake-city> (accessed 11 April 2015).
91 Reif (n 60) 322.
92 Andrew Wolman, ‘Welcoming a New International Human Rights Actor? Th e Participation of 
Subnational Human Rights Institutions at the United Nations’ (2014) 20 Global Governance 437, 
442–43.
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the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, and the Equality Commission of 
Northern Ireland as CPD independent mechanisms,93 while Denmark has designated 
Greenland’s Ombudsperson as an NPM and the UK has designated the Scottish 
Human Rights Commission and Children’s Commissioner for England (among 
several other institutions) as NPMs.94 In Brazil and Argentina, several SNHRIs have 
been granted monitoring rights as ‘local preventive mechanisms’ that then coordinate 
their fi ndings with the national-level NPM.95 In Catalunya, the autonomous regional 
government has designated the Sindic de Greuges as a preventive mechanism, although 
this designation has not been offi  cially accepted by the Spanish central government.96
4.6. INWARD AND OUTWARD DOMESTICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS
SNHRI monitoring actions and SNHRI promotion of human rights norms in civil 
society are generally inward-oriented, meaning that the SNHRI will be monitoring 
rights within its jurisdiction (whether for the benefi t of local or extra-jurisdictional 
actors) or promoting human rights within its jurisdiction.97 Th is is also the case 
for SNHRIs in their complaints handling function, at least in the geographic sense; 
there are (exceptionally) some SNHRIs that can review the actions of national 
governmental entities that take place within the SNHRI’s sub-national jurisdiction.98 
SNHRI promotion of international norms in the courts and SNHRI promotion of 
international norms to governments, on the other hand, can sometimes be outward-
oriented, intended to infl uence jurisdictions outside of the SNHRI’s home. Usually, 
such outward-oriented actions will be aimed at infl uencing the national government 
or courts.99 Th ere are also instances of cooperation between diff erent SNHRIs 
93 ICC and Canadian Human Rights Commission, ‘Survey of National Human Rights Institutions on 
Article 33.2 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (August 2011) 53–54.
94 OHCHR, ‘OPCAT Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture: National Preventive Mechanisms’ 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/NationalPreventiveMechanisms.aspx> (accessed 
11 April 2015).
95 Association for the Prevention of Torture, ‘Local Preventive Mechanism’ <www.apt.ch/en/opcat-
database/?kid=39> (accessed 11 April 2015).
96 Act No 24/2009 of 23 December 2009 on the Síndic de Greuges (Generalitat de Catalunya), arts 
68–77.
97 Th is distinction is adapted for the sub-national context from an analogous distinction posited by 
Gaylynn Burroughs, who stated that inward-looking strategy ‘focuses on promoting the rights of 
people within the United States, while the outward-looking strategy focuses on promoting human 
rights in other countries’. Burroughs (n 59) 414.
98 Helena Pihlajasaari and Halvdan Skard (n 43) para 17(b).
99 For example, the Val d’Aosta Ombudsman publicly lent his support to pending national legislation 
that would bring Italian law into compliance with the CAT and OPCAT. ‘Reato di tortura, il 
Difensore civico valdostano aderisce alla proposta di legge’ Aosta Sera (23 January 2013) <www.
aostasera.it/articoli/2013/01/23/25550/reato-di-tortura-il-difensore-civico-valdostano-aderisce-
alla-proposta-di-legge> (accessed 11 April 2015). Th e Mexico City Human Rights Commission has 
urged the Mexican federal government to comply with the CRC. Comisión de Derechos Humanos 
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within a nation to jointly pressure their national government or courts to adopt or 
follow international norms.100 It is, of course, diffi  cult to evaluate the impact of such 
outward interventions. However, they do represent a conceptually interesting lever 
in international human rights governance, with sub-national governmental actors 
pressuring national governmental actors to apply international norms. Th is lever has 
rarely been recognised by international actors who are more used to promoting their 
norms directly to national governments.
Th ere have also been occasional attempts by SNHRIs to exercise an infl uence on 
the human rights situation in foreign nations. In Eugene, Oregon, for example, the 
local human rights commission draft ed a letter condemning Israeli actions in the 
Gaza fl otilla raid, but suspended work on a resolution aft er protest from local Jewish 
groups.101 Local human rights commissions in the US have occasionally gone a step 
further and called on their local governments to divest from investments in a human 
rights abusing country; for example, in 2010 the human rights commission in St. Louis 
Park, Minnesota, passed a resolution calling on the city to divest itself of investments 
in companies or nations ‘whose operations are complicit in aiding the government of 
Sudan or of the government of any nation that is supporting genocide’.102 Aside from 
substantive objections, these resolutions have sometimes been challenged by members 
of the public who feel that a human rights commission should focus its attention on 
local issues rather than international aff airs.103 Th is type of local activism has also 
sparked criticism from those who feel that a nation should speak with one voice at 
the international level.104 It should be emphasised, however, that such internationalist 
interventions by SNHRIs are rare; even NHRIs have so far proven extremely reluctant 
to express their views about human rights in foreign countries.105
del Distrito Federal de México, ‘Exhorta CDHDF al Estado mexicano a atender el mandato 
de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño’ (29  February 2012) <www.portalfi o.org/inicio/
noticias/item/8996-mexico-df-exhorta-cdhdf-al-estado-mexicano-a-atender-el-mandato-de-la-
convención-sobre-los-derechos-del-niño.html> (accessed 11 April 2015).
100 For example, the Canadian Association of Statutory Human Rights Agencies (‘CASHRA’) pressed 
the Canadian federal government to establish an independent monitoring mechanism in accordance 
with the CPD, see CASHRA, ‘Statement by the Canadian Association of Statutory Human Rights 
Agencies on Canada’s First Report Under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ 
(3 April 2014) <http://cashra.ca/news/statement-by-cashra-2014.html> (accessed 11 April 2015).
101 Ron Kampeas, ‘Oregon Rights Panel Coaxed to Table Resolution Slamming Israel’ JTA (19 January 
2011), <www.jta.org/2011/01/19/news-opinion/united-states/oregon-rights-panel-coaxed-to-table-
resolution-slamming-israel> (accessed 11 April 2015).
102 Mary Jane Smetanka, ‘Worldview in the Suburbs? It’s on the Agenda’ Minneapolis Star Tribune 
(15  February 2010) <www.startribune.com/templates/Print_Th is_Story?sid=84423117> (accessed 
11 April 2015).
103 Ibid.
104 Eg Lucien Dhooge, ‘Darfur, State Divestment Initiatives, and the Commerce Clause’ (2007) 32 
North Carolina J of Intl L & Commercial Regulation 391.
105 Chris Sidoti, ‘National Human Rights Institutions and the International Human Rights System’ 
in Ryan Goodman and Th omas Pegram (eds) Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change 
(CUP 2012) 115.
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5. IMPLICATIONS OF SNHRI DOMESTICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Having shown that SNHRIs can, and do, domesticate international human rights 
norms in a variety of ways, this section will examine the implications of SNHRI 
implementation of international norms. In particular, it addresses the question of 
whether SNHRI domestication of international norms adds any value to the existing 
human rights regime, given that domestication is already commonly carried out by 
NHRIs, courts, and other actors. It argues that SNHRI domestication of international 
norms adds to the existing domestication work of NHRIs in three principle ways. 
First, by providing sub-national actors with a greater opportunity to utilise 
international norms, SNHRI domestication allows sub-national actors to infl uence 
the interpretation of these norms, and potentially implement them more eff ectively 
than can be done at the national level. Second, SNHRIs can provide an independent 
domestication mechanism in countries where NHRIs or other independent actors are 
unable or unwilling to eff ectively domesticate international norms. Th ird, SNHRI 
domestication allows for the direct application of international norms to restrict sub-
national government actions, a task which can sometimes be diffi  cult or impossible 
for NHRIs and other actors to replicate due to division of powers concerns.
5.1. INCREASED SUB-NATIONAL ROLE IN INTERPRETATION 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS
First, and most obviously, the domestication of international norms by SNHRIs 
brings the domestication process down to a lower level of government, closer to the 
people, consistent with the international law principle of subsidiarity.106 Th is will have 
implications on both the way that international human rights law is interpreted, and 
on its eff ectiveness. From an interpretive standpoint, there are certain international 
human rights principles that are likely to be systematically under-emphasised at the 
national or international level, such as indigenous rights, minority rights, or the right 
to self-determination, because the main proponents of these rights rarely hold power 
at the national level. On the other hand, these rights are more likely to be embraced 
and given teeth by SNHRIs, at least in localities with large indigenous or national 
106 Risa Kaufman, ‘”By Some Other Means”: Considering the Executive’s Role in Fostering Subnational 
Human Rights Compliance’ (2012) 33 Cardozo L Rev 1971, 2002. Th e principle of subsidiarity 
can be characterised as holding that ‘[w]here a lower (political or social) level can eff ectively 
undertake a task, the higher level has to abstain from acting’. Markus Benzing, ‘Sovereignty and the 
Responsibility to Protect in International Criminal Law’ in Doris König et al (eds) International Law 
Today: New Challenges Today and the Need for Reform? (Springer 2008) 28. Th e principle is most 
prominently in European Union law due to its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty; while its relevance 
in other contexts is hotly contested, subsidiarity has been proposed by some as a structural principle 
of international human rights law, see Paolo Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of 
International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 Amer J Intl L 38.
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minority populations, or where self-determination is widely valued. Th us, for example, 
in February 2009 the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission adopted the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a set of minimum standards in the 
Commission’s work, at a time when the Declaration had still not been endorsed by the 
US at the national level.107
More generally, sub-national actors may contribute to the elaboration of rights 
interpretations that are more grounded in local cultures and traditions. Th is process 
has been theorised most thoroughly in Sally Merry’s work on the ‘vernacularisation’ 
of human rights, which Merry defi nes as the process whereby human rights 
are ‘translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and 
meaning’.108 Translation refers to the process of adjusting the language and structure 
of appropriated norms, programs or interventions to local circumstances. Th rough 
the vernacularisation process, new ideas are framed in ways that resonate with 
pre-existing ideas of justice and order, while preserving their essential attributes 
and potential to transform unequal or unjust local social relations.109 Merry places 
particular emphasis on the critical importance of the identity of the intermediary 
individuals and institutions that can act as ‘translators’.110 Th ese intermediaries, who 
‘straddle the global and the local’, reframe local grievances by portraying them as 
human rights violations, and also reframe international norms in locally relevant 
terms.111
SNHRIs are in many situations likely to act as translators. Th ey will generally have 
closer links to local traditions and cultures than their counterparts in national capitals. 
Th ey will also oft en possess the legitimacy that accompanies local self-government in 
the eyes of the governed. According to Merry’s theory, SNHRIs are likely to make real 
advances in expanding the human rights movement to new areas and increasing the 
likelihood of local disputes being viewed in rights terms. When translated into the 
107 Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission, ‘NNHRC Welcomes the 5th Anniversary of the U.N. 
Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples’ (13  September 2012) <www.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.
gov/PressReleases/2012/Sep/091312_NNHRC_welcomes_the_5th_Anniversary_of_the_U.N._
Declaration_on_the_Rights_on_Indigenous_Peoples.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2015). More recently, 
President Obama has expressed his support for the Declaration. See US Department of State, 
‘Declaration of U.S. Support for the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (16 December 
2010) <www.state.gov/documents/organization/184099.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2015).
108 Merry (n 3) 1.
109 Peggy Levitt and Sally Engle Merry, ‘Making Women’s Human Rights in the Vernacular: Navigating 
the Culture/Rights Divide’ in Dorothy Hodgson (ed) Gender at the Limit of Rights (U Penn Press, 
2010) 88.
110 According to Merry, ‘the extent to which human rights laws exert an impact at the grass roots 
depends on the work of these translators’. Sally Engle Merry, ‘New Legal Realism and the 
Ethnography of Transnational Law’ (2006) 31 Law & Soc. Inquiry 975, 992–93.
111 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ (2006) 
108 American Anthropologist 38, 39; Noha Shawki, ‘Global Norms, Local Implementation-How 
are Global Norms Translated into Local Practice?’ (2011) Globality Stud J <https://gsj.stonybrook.
edu/article/global-norms-local-implementation-how-are-global-norms-translated-into-local-
practice/> (accessed 11 April 2015).
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local vernacular, however, these rights will be interpreted and implemented diff erently 
in diff erent locales. Some might worry that this could detract from the universality 
of human rights or lead to the fragmentation of international law.112 Aft er all, the 
international human rights system is arguably premised on a system of shared values, 
and variability in the meaning of particular rights can complicate human rights 
advocacy.113 A certain amount of fragmentation, however is not necessarily a negative 
result; by losing some of its unitary meaning, international law may gain domestic 
relevance.114 Some would also argue that a degree of competition among human 
rights norm-entrepreneurs leads to greater opportunities for incremental positive 
developments in the law.115 In any case, the unitary nature of international human 
rights law certainly does not preclude the implementation of those norms in a manner 
that is consistent with local culture and practices, and indeed is likely strengthened by 
empowering a greater number of voices.116
In terms of eff ectiveness, many commentators claim that by moving human 
rights protection and promotion down to a level closer to the people being aff ected, 
the domestication of human rights is likely to be more successful and infl uential.117 
By this logic, SNHRI implementation of international norms will, all else being 
equal, be more successful than human rights implementation by NHRIs and other 
national-level actors. A number of diff erent reasons have been proposed to explain 
the greater eff ectiveness of subnational actors. Geographical proximity to the rights 
bearer may increase the accessibility and availability of human rights services.118 
SNHRI eff ectiveness may also be furthered by their greater social proximity to the 
local population; according to one commentator, ‘[n]ot only is the access easier, the 
[regional or local] ombudsman is also more acquainted with the regional and local 
authorities, localities, problems and customs’.119 At least in some countries, people 
may be more willing to adopt norms that have been introduced by members of their 
112 Nollkaemper (n 1) 221–22.
113 Douglas Lee Donoho, ‘Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a 
Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights’ (2001) 15 Emory Intl L Rev 391, 412.
114 Nollkaemper (n 1) 223.
115 Allen Buchanan, Th e Heart of Human Rights (OUP 2013) 211.
116 Calos Iván Fuentes, René Provost and Samuel Walker, ‘E Pluribus Unum – Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika? Universal Human Rights and the Fragmentation of International Law’ in René Provost and 
Colleen Sheppard (eds) Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism 55 (Springer 2013).
117 Upendra Baxi, Th e Future of Human Rights (OUP 2002) 101; Kaufman (n 107) 2002; Andrew 
Schapper, From the Global to the Local: How International Rights Reach Bangladesh’s Children 
(Routledge 2013) 175.
118 Th omas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Recommendation 
on systematic work for implementing human rights at the national level’ CommDH(2009)3 
(18 February 2009) para 7.2.
119 Felix Dünser, ‘Regional ombudsmen: An institution to defend citizens´  rights,’ Report for the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (2004) 7. See also Jesse 
Newmark, ‘Legal Aid Aff airs: Collaborating with Local Governments on the Side’ (2012) 21 Boston 
U Public Interest L J 195, 204.
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community rather than ‘faceless bureaucrats’ in Geneva (or even in their national 
capitals).120 Yet another explanation is that moving human rights implementation 
closer to the people allows the public to better see the benefi cial aspects of human 
rights, and especially economic and social rights, which in turn leads people to 
increase support of those rights.121
5.2. ALTERNATIVE ENTRYWAY FOR INTERNATIONAL NORMS
One of the general benefi ts of decentralised or federal governmental structures is 
that they provide multiple paths for human rights norms to gain acceptance.122 
Th is principle has perhaps been studied (and debated) most intently in the US, 
where the civil rights movement once met with greater success at the federal 
level, but contemporary movements to legalise gay marriage or expand access to 
health care have enjoyed more support at the state level (in certain states).123 Th e 
domestication of international norms by SNHRIs allows the same principle to play 
out, by providing an additional entryway for international law. Th is additional 
entryway will be of particular signifi cance in three particular scenarios. First, when 
there is no NHRI in a country, then SNHRIs can stand as the only independent 
governmental actors actively promoting international human rights norms or – in 
countries with strongly dualist legal systems – using international human rights 
norms to resolve disputes. Th is is most clearly the case today in the US, Hong Kong, 
and Italy.
Second, the domestication of international norms by SNHRIs provides for 
an important alternative entryway in cases where the NHRI is considered weak 
or lacking in independence. Th is is perhaps most striking in the case of Mexico, 
where the Mexican National Human Rights Commission has been widely viewed 
as weak and lacking in independence, while many of the sub-national human rights 
commissions (and in particular the Mexico City Human Rights Commission) play an 
increasingly prominent role in promoting international norms.124 In Indonesia, also, 
there is some evidence that local SNHRIs such as the Yogyakarta Ombudsman are 
institutionally stronger than the national ombudsman.125 Of course, in many other 
120 Burroughs (n 59) 420.
121 Wexler (n 5) 625–26.
122 Yash Ghai, ‘Th e Structure of Human Rights in Federations’ in Kamal Hossain et al (eds) Human 
Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Offi  ces: National Experiences (Kluwer 2000) 51.
123 Robert Schapiro, ‘Not Old or Borrowed: Th e Truly New Blue Federalism’ (2009) 3 Harvard L & 
Policy Rev 33.
124 On the weakness of the Mexican Human Rights Commission, see Jodi Finkel, ‘Explaining the Failure 
of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Offi  ce) aft er Democratization: 
Elections, Incentives, and Accountability in the Mexican Senate’ (2012) 13 Human Rights Rev 481, 
483.
125 Melissa Crouch, ‘Th e Yogyakarta Local Ombudsman: Promoting Good Governance through Local 
Support’ (2007) 2 Asian J of Comparative L 1, 28–9.
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situations, NHRIs will be institutionally stronger or more independent than their 
sub-national counterparts.
Th ird, SNHRI domestication can take on a more signifi cant role where local 
populations wish to fully embrace the human rights movement, but national governments 
prove unwilling to accept all international norms.126 In these cases, SNHRIs can move 
farther than the national government by explicitly embracing the UDHR, treaties that 
are unratifi ed at the national level, or soft  law norms. Th e movement by some US local 
human rights commissions to embrace CEDAW or the UDHR is one example of this 
phenomenon, but in fact the desire by local entities to go beyond their home nation in 
protecting human rights is more widespread. Th e Human Rights Cities movement has 
been one vehicle for eff ectuating this around the world at the municipal level, through a 
number of measures, centred on civil society actions but also including the establishment 
of SNHRIs in some cases. By embracing norms that are not accepted at the national 
level, local jurisdictions can gain reputations as human rights-friendly jurisdictions 
(with potentially benefi cial economic consequences)127 and act as beachheads for the 
norms to eventually become more established elsewhere in the country.128
5.3. LIMITATION ON DISCRETION OF SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS
From a federalist perspective, the eff ects of SNHRIs are complex. As described 
above, their establishment can, in a narrow sense, give more power to local entities to 
embrace new norms and interpret norms in innovative and locally relevant ways. In 
a broader sense, however, SNHRIs cabin the power of sub-national governments to 
develop and implement their own policies, by holding sub-national governments to 
human rights standards developed and adopted at the international level (and, usually, 
ratifi ed at the national level). From an international law perspective, sub-national 
compliance with international human rights norms is of course entirely desirable, 
as it is undisputed that international human rights law applies equally to all levels 
of government, whether national or sub-national.129 In practice, the importance of 
SNHRIs in holding sub-national governments to account for breaches of international 
human rights law is magnifi ed by the fact that international and domestic NGOs tend 
to underemphasise local government advocacy (as do NHRIs), while paying greater 
attention to national or international level aff airs.130
126 Wexler (n 5) 615.
127 David Law, ‘Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights’ (2008) 102 Northwestern U L 
Rev 1277, 1322; Newmark (n 121) 203–04.
128 Newmark (n 121) 253. Th is would be consistent with Brandeis’ famous characterisation of a federal 
system as a laboratory for democracy. New State Ice Co. v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (J 
Brandeis, dissenting).
129 International Law Commission, Draft  Articles on State Responsibility, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, 
art 4(1) (26 July 2001); Assanidze v Georgia, ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Reports 2004-II, paras 137ff .
130 Martha Davis, ‘International Human Rights from the Ground Up’ in Wendy Chavkin and Ellen 
Chesler, Where Human Rights Begin (Rutgers University Press 2005) 237; Antoine Meyer, ‘Local 
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Th e direct use of international norms by SNHRIs to restrict and infl uence the 
actions of sub-national governments is of particular importance in federal States 
where strong traditions of local and regional self-government makes it diffi  cult for the 
national government or an NHRI to directly enforce international norms that constrain 
sub-national governmental actors.131 While the challenge of how to implement 
international norms in federal States has been most widely noted in the US in the wake 
of the International Court of Justice’s Avena decision,132 it has also been a major issue 
in Australia and elsewhere.133 Although sub-national governments are involved in all 
areas of public aff airs, in many countries they have particular infl uence in issues of 
housing, education, water supply, the environment, and social welfare, meaning that 
SNHRI implementation of international norms of social and economic rights can be 
especially meaningful.134 Globally, the challenge of ensuring sub-national governmental 
compliance with human rights law has in fact become a more pressing issue in recent 
years with the current trend towards decentralisation of governmental authority.135
6. CONCLUSION
As this article demonstrates, SNHRIs represent an interesting and under-explored 
locus  for the implementation of international human rights norms. While not all 
SNHRIs use international norms as sources, many do, even in cases where their 
mandates do not explicitly refer to international norms. SNHRIs domesticate 
international norms while carrying out the same basic functions as NHRIs, namely 
complaint-handling, advising the government, public promotion of rights norms, 
litigation, and monitoring. Th e implementation of international human rights norms 
by SNHRIs has signifi cant institutional and normative implications, which appear 
largely positive from a human rights perspective, and the practice has accordingly been 
recognised and encouraged by international organisations and SNHRI associations.136
Governments & Human Rights Implementation: Taking Stock and a Closer Strategic Look’ (2009) 
3 Pace Diritti Humani 7, 14.
131 Frédéric Mégret, ‘International Human Rights and Global Legal Pluralism: A Research Agenda’ in 
René Provost and Colleen Sheppard (eds) Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (Springer 
2013) 83; Linda White, ‘Federalism and Equality Rights Interpretation in Canada’ (2013) 44 Publius: 
Th e J of Federalism 157, 158.
132 Eg Jordan Paust, ‘Medellín, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties and Relevant Executive Authority’ 
(2008) 31 Suff olk Transnational L Rev 301; Ted Cruz, ‘Defending U.S. Sovereignty, Separation of 
Powers, and Federalism in Medellín v. Texas’ (2010) 33 Harvard J of L & Public Policy 25.
133 Katharine Gelber, ‘Treaties and Intergovernmental Relations in Australia: Political Implications of 
the Toonen Case’ (1999) 45 Australian J of Politics & History 330.
134 Th omas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Local authorities 
could protect vulnerable people’ CommDH/Speech(2006)8 (1 June 2006); Meyer (n 132) 7.
135 Andres Rodiguez-Pose and Nick Gill, ‘Th e Global Trend Towards Devolution and its Implications’ 
(2003) 21 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 333.
136 Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Resolution 191 (2004) on Regional 
ombudspersons: an institution in the service of citizens’ rights, art 15–16; Declaración de Quito, 
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Further research is necessary to investigate the extent to which SNHRI 
domestication of international norms represents a growing trend or remains 
exceptional in nature. Further research can also shed light on the challenges SNHRIs 
face in eff ectively domesticating international norms, challenges that may include a 
lack of experience with international law, a greater comfort with domestic norms, and 
a lack of capacity to eff ectively engage with international norms due to, for example, 
low staffi  ng levels. Nevertheless, it is increasingly clear that the classic view of the 
international human rights system as a three-tier system with global, regional, and 
national components is oversimplifi ed. At the sub-national level, SNHRIs also play a 
role in the direct (as well as indirect) implementation of international human rights 
norms, a role that is worthy of more consideration and, arguably, cultivation by other 
national and international human rights actors.
Art 5, adopted at IX Congreso Anual de la Federación Iberoamericana de Ombudsman (November 
2004); IAOHRA (n 78).
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Abstract  
 
Over the last two decades, municipal human rights institutions have proliferated around the 
world. One of the newest examples of such initiatives is the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office, which was established in January 2013 as one of the core institutions 
of human rights protection in Seoul, Korea. This article will present a case study of the 
operations of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office based on interviews and 
documentary research. It will focus on the question of how this newly established institution 
fits into the existing human rights regime, and in particular address three distinct issues, 
namely the degree to which the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office reflects local 
versus national or international influences, the types of institutional relationships it has with 
other human rights actors, and the degree to which it implements local versus national or 
international human rights norms.   
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I. Introduction 
 
For much of the history of the human rights movement, norm-development and institution-
building have taken place almost exclusively at the national and international levels.1 Over 
                                                          
This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Support Grant of 2016–17. 
1 The most significant historical exception to this statement is the human rights commissions established in 
many US cities at an early date. However, even these human rights commissions were until recently far more 
engaged with domestic ‘civil rights’ norms than international ‘human rights’ law: Kenneth L Saunders and Hyo 
 
 
the last two decades, however, municipalities around the world have become increasingly 
engaged with human rights, and one manifestation of this has been the establishment of 
independent municipal bodies to promote and protect human rights. These have included 
committees, ombudsperson institutions, monitoring centres, and a range of locally developed 
institutions, sometimes focusing on a particular sub-category of rights, and sometimes 
tackling the full range of human rights issues. In many cities, especially in the civil law world, 
human rights ombudspersons – generally defined as ombudsperson institutions that have an 
explicit mandate to protect human rights – have been the preferred institutional form. 2 
Prominent examples include the Ombudsman de Montreal, Defensor del Pueblo de la Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires, and the Johannesburg Office of the Ombudsman. 
 Despite their increasing importance, municipal human rights institutions have 
received relatively little attention from academics.3 With the exception of a few country or 
region-specific studies, 4  the English-language literature has mostly dealt with municipal 
human rights ombudspersons somewhat tangentially, in articles that either focus more 
broadly on local human rights implementation or on the development of the national 
ombudsperson institution in a particular country or region.5 To a certain extent, major human 
rights advocacy organisations have likewise ignored local human rights institutions, 
preferring to lobby for change in national capitals or international centres.6  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Eun (April) Bang, ‘A Historical Perspective on U.S. Human Rights Commissions’ (Executive Session Papers of 
the Human Rights Commissions and Criminal Justice, Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University 
June 2007) 
<www.hks.harvard.edu/index.php/content/download/67468/1242682/version/1/file/history_of_hrc.pdf> 
accessed 6 January 2016. 
2 Linda C Reif, ‘Transplantation and Adaptation: The Evolution of the Human Rights Ombudsman’ (2011) 31 
BC Third World LJ 269, 279.  
3 International Council on Human Rights Policy, Local Rule: Decentralisation and Human Rights (2002); Noha 
Shawki, ‘Global Norms, Local Implementation – How are Global Norms Translated into Local Practice?’ (2011) 
26 Globality Studies J 1 <https://gsj.stonybrook.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/0026Shawki.pdf> accessed 6 
January 2016. 
4 See eg Predrag Dimitrijević, ‘Do We Need Local Ombudsman – Protector of Human Rights’ (2005) 3 Facta 
Universitatis, Series: Law and Politics 25; Germán Cisneros Farías, Jorge Fernández Ruiz and Miguel Alejandro 
López Olvera (eds), Ombudsman Local (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 2007). 
5  See eg Linda C Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System 
(Springer 2004); Fredrik Uggla, ‘The Ombudsman in Latin America’ (2004) 36 J Lat Am Stud 423; Emma 
Gilligan, ‘The Human Rights Ombudsman in Russia: The Evolution of Horizontal Accountability’ (2010) 32 
Hum Rts Q 575. 
6 Martha F Davis, ‘International Human Rights from the Ground Up: The Potential for Subnational, Human 
Rights–Based Reproductive Health Advocacy in the United States’ in Wendy Chavkin and Ellen Chesler (eds), 
Where Human Rights Begin: Health, Sexuality and Women in the New Millennium (Rutgers University Press 
2005) 237 (‘international human rights advocacy in the United States has generally centered on the obligations 
that international agreements impose on the federal government’); International Council on Human Rights 
Policy (n 3) 42 (‘international human rights NGOs rarely focus on local government’). 
 
 
This article will attempt to take a step towards filling this gap in the literature through 
a case study of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson. 7 It will focus in particular on how 
the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office relates to and fits in with the existing human 
rights apparatus and norms, an issue that is important for newly established sub-national 
human rights institutions all around the world, given that they are generally superimposed 
upon an already existing fabric of domestic, regional and global human rights institutions and 
norms.8 If new sub-national institutions duplicate the functions of existing mechanisms, lead 
to divergent jurisprudential interpretations, or draw resources away from more effective 
human rights institutions, then they arguably serve little purpose. On the other hand, if they 
fill an unmet need, build upon existing institutional strengths, and promote the development 
of a coherent normative framework, then such institutions can provide a valuable addition to 
the human rights regime.  
Thus, the study will address three particular questions. First, to what extent is the 
Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson a product of global or national influences, and to what 
extent is it the result of local initiatives? Second, what are the institutional relationships that 
have been forged between the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson and the many other 
existing human rights institutions at the sub-national, national and global human rights bodies? 
And third, to what extent does the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson use existing human 
rights norms from international or national law, and to what extent does the Ombudsperson 
                                                          
7 This article will use the term ‘Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office’ to refer to Seoul City’s human 
rights ombudsperson institution (시민인권보호관 in Korean). This is the English term that the ombudspersons 
themselves have used in various forums. See eg Seoul Metropolitan Government Human Rights Division, 
‘Seoul, a City Where Human Rights is Alive: Response to the Questionnaire of Human Rights Council 
Advisory Committee on Local Government and Human Rights’ (4 April 2014) 
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/AdvisoryCom/LocalGvt/Seoul%20Metropolitan%20Gover
nment.docx> accessed 6 January 2016.  Other English translations are sometimes used, however. For example, 
the Korea Human Rights Foundation calls the ombudsperson institution the ‘Citizens’ Human Rights 
Mechanism’ (which is a more literal translation from the Korean): Korea Human Rights Foundation, ‘Report on 
Local Government and Human Rights 2014’ (August 2014) 225 
<www.gwangju.go.kr/boardDown.do?boardId=BD_0000000468&seq=268736&fileLinkTp=F&fileLinkSeq=3> 
accessed 9 March 2017.   
8 Analogous questions regarding normative and institutional relationships with existing actors have also been a 
major focus of research on National Human Rights Institutions. See eg Brian Burdekin and Anne Gallagher, 
‘The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions’ in Gudmundur Alfredsson and others (eds), 
International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob TH Mholler (Springer 2001); 
Sonia Cardenas, ‘Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human Rights Institutions’ (2003) 
9 Global Governance 23; Rachel Murray, The Role of National Human Rights Institutions at the International 
and Regional Levels: The Experience of Africa (Hart Publishing 2007); Noha Shawki, ‘A New Actor in Human 
Rights Politics? Transgovernmental Networks of National Human Rights Institutions’ in Noha Shawki and 
Michaelene Cox (eds), Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: Actors and Issues in Contemporary Human 
Rights Politics (Ashgate Publishing 2009); Chris Sidoti, ‘National Human Rights Institutions and the 
International Human Rights System’ in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State 
Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions (CUP 2012). 
 
 
Office serve as a vehicle for developing and elaborating new human rights norms? These 
questions will be answered largely through a review of materials published by the bodies and 
commentary on their operations gleaned from conference presentations and local journals, as 
supplemented by e-mail and in-person interviews with actors directly involved in the 
operations of the office. 
There are a number of reasons why the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office 
can be a particularly interesting and important subject for a case study. For one thing, its 
sheer size makes the city of Seoul an important subject of research. With a population of 
slightly over 10 million, its human rights policies can affect the well-being of more people 
than, for example, the total population of Sweden. Second, Seoul is a particularly high-profile 
municipality in East Asia, and its human rights policies are likely to have an impact on other 
cities in the region (and indeed, arguably already are, as described below). This impact is 
likely to be particularly marked because municipal human rights institutions are still 
relatively rare in Asia, when compared to Europe or the Americas. 9  Finally, Seoul’s 
establishment of a human rights ombudsperson office (and other human rights institutions) is 
particularly interesting from a human rights governance perspective because it has emerged 
on largely virgin ground: unlike many western countries, there was no pre-existing municipal 
ombudsperson or civil rights commission that over time assumed a human rights competency. 
Rather, new bodies were designed from scratch, in ways that could potentially allow for the 
integration of norms and concepts from both local and international sources. 
 
 
II. Background to Human Rights in Korea 
 
In order to better understand the development of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson 
Office, this section will first provide contextual background on Korea’s engagement with 
human rights policies and institutions. For much of Korea’s modern history, human rights 
were not well protected by government at any level.10 From Korea’s independence in 1948 
                                                          
9 Seoul is one of the first major cities in Asia to establish a human rights ombudsperson office. The only 
previous examples of municipal human rights ombudspersons in Asia that I am aware of are those of Kawasaki 
City, Takefu City, and Kawanishi City in Japan (the latter focusing on children): Reif, The Ombudsman, Good 
Governance, and the International Human Rights System (n 5) 31. There are other examples in Asia of local 
human rights mechanisms that have some similarities to human rights ombudspersons, including Barangay 
Human Rights Officers in the Philippines, Japan’s Human Rights Protectors, and municipal human rights 
commissions in a few cities, such as Kaohsiung, Taiwan. 
10 Tae Ung Baik, ‘Stabilizing Democracy and Human Rights Systems in South Korea’ (2013) 35 U Haw L Rev 
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until its democratisation in 1987, the country was ruled by a series of military and dictatorial 
leaders who routinely engaged in arbitrary detention, torture, censorship, restrictions on 
freedom of association and other violations of basic civil and political rights. During this 
period, and especially after the passage of the authoritarian Yushin constitution in 1972, 
democratisation protesters nevertheless fought courageously against the regime, often at 
significant personal cost. Many of these protestors strongly identified with the human rights 
movement, including most prominently the future president and Nobel Prize winner Kim Dae 
Jung, who championed ‘human rights’ in speeches as early as 1983, and later publicly 
defended the human rights movement against the so-called Asian Values challenge that 
emanated from Singaporean and Malaysian politicians in the early 1990s. Several other 
democratisation activists were in fact human rights lawyers, including Roh Moo Hyun (who 
became president from 2003-2008), Park Won-soon (mayor of Seoul as of 2016), and Moon 
Jae-In (leader of Korea’s main progressive party, the Minjoo Party of Korea, from 2015-
2016).  
 After Korea’s post-1987 democratisation, the country gradually integrated itself into 
the global human rights system. Korea acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1990, 
the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1992, and the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1995.11 In 1994, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a Human Rights and Social Policy division, and 
Korea was a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights from 1993 to 1998.12 It took 
somewhat longer for Korea to develop strong human rights institutions at the domestic level. 
While the Ministry of Justice had established a Human Rights Division in 1962, it was 
viewed as window dressing until the 1990s.13 After years of debate, the National Human 
Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) was established in 2001 to promote and protect 
human rights within the country. Meanwhile, starting in 1996, a series of issue-specific truth 
commissions were set up to address past human rights abuses, culminating in the 
establishment of the more broadly mandated Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which 
operated from 2005 to 2010.14 
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 While human rights norms are now firmly entrenched in Korea’s domestic and 
international policies, human rights issues remain politically contentious in contemporary 
Korea. Since 1987, many of the leaders of Korea’s main progressive parties have been former 
democratisation activists who are quite comfortable with the language and politics of human 
rights (and, in several cases, self-identify as human rights activists). Conservative leaders, on 
the other hand, often are identified with the pre-1987 authoritarian leadership, and no one 
more so than President Park Geun Hye, whose father ruled Korea autocratically from 1961 to 
1979. Conservative politicians and their supporters have tended to view the human rights 
movement with suspicion, at least as applied domestically.15 According to one commentator, 
‘The struggle between the conservatives who support authoritarian regimes and the liberals or 
progressives who want to move ahead to achieve the consolidation of democracy and sound 
human rights systems is not over yet.’16 
Despite the salience of human rights in Korean political discourse and its increasing 
institutionalisation at the national level, there was until recently little attention paid to human 
rights at the local governmental level. In part, this was unsurprising:  there is no tradition of 
local government involvement in human rights institutionalisation in East Asia, and local 
governments in Korea (whether at the upper or lower level) possess relatively little autonomy, 
when compared to local governments in larger or more heterogeneous countries.17  
This lack of local rights activity began to change in 2005, when the small southern 
city of Jinju declared itself a ‘human rights city’.18 Gwangju Metropolitan City, which is a 
higher-level local administrative entity governing Korea’s sixth largest city, followed suit in 
2007 with the enactment of a democracy, human rights, and peace development ordinance, 
and later with its own ‘human rights city’ declaration and its establishment of a Human 
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Rights Division (in 2010), a Citizens’ Commission on the Promotion of Human Rights 
(2012), and a Human Rights Ombudsman (2013).19 Gwangmyeong City, near Seoul, adopted 
a human rights ordinance in 2011 and set up a human rights council in 2012.20 Dong Gu 
(borough) of Ulsan Metropolitan City also passed a human rights promotion ordinance in 
2011, and established a human rights commission in 2012. 21  While these early local 
initiatives reflected the influence of the global movement towards ‘human rights cities’, they 
were also inspired by local histories. In the case of Gwangju, human rights and 
democratisation was particularly important because Gwangju was the site of a brutal 
massacre of democratisation protestors in 1980.  Jinju city leaders were inspired by the 
Hyeongpyeong Movement, a movement for the abolition of status-based discrimination that 
started in Jinju in the 1920s, and Ulsan Dong Gu’s declaration emphasised workers’ rights 
because the locality has long been one of the centres of the Korean labour movement.22 In the 
few years following these early movers and the passage of the Seoul Human Rights 
Ordinance (discussed below), local human rights initiatives have become increasingly 
widespread: as of February 2015, 15 out of 17 first-level sub-national administrative 
divisions in Korea have passed human rights ordinances, as have 55 out of 227 second-level 
administrative divisions.23 In addition to Seoul, 19 sub-national jurisdictions in Korea have 
created sub-national human rights institutions (at the provincial, city and neighbourhood 
levels).24  
 
 
III. Legal Framework for the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson 
 
It was in this context of growing local governmental human rights activity that Park Won-
soon ran for the Seoul Mayor position in 2011. Park was at the time known as one of the 
country’s most prominent human rights lawyers. After attaining prominence as the defender 
of torture victim Kwon In Sook, Park co-founded and served as Secretary General of the 
Peoples’ Society of Participatory Democracy in 1994. In the following years, he helped 
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found the Korea Human Rights Foundation and later established the Beautiful Foundation, 
one of the country’s largest charities.25  It was not a complete surprise when Park proclaimed 
the Seoul Citizens’ Human Rights Declaration on 19 October 2011, as one of his highest 
profile campaign commitments. 26 The Declaration consisted of ten articles which largely 
focused on traditional economic, social and cultural rights (articles 3 and 6 to 10), but also 
protected the right to participate in and access information about city government (article 1), 
right to free assembly (article 2), right to life (article 4), right to access the city (article 5) and 
contained a non-discrimination commitment (preamble).27 Within a week of his election in 
November 2011, Park adopted the Declaration as the framework for his human rights policy, 
along with a plan to establish a human rights ombudsperson institution in the city.28 
 During the following months, the legal framework for the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office, along with other core elements of Park’s human rights policy, was 
drafted and enacted on September 28 as the Seoul Human Rights Framework Ordinance.29 
According to the Framework Ordinance, the Mayor is authorised to appoint up to five human 
rights ombudspersons, who must have human rights expertise and either have work 
experience in government or academia, or be recommended for the position by a civil society 
human rights organisation. 30  These ombudspersons are appointed to renewable two-year 
terms and are intended to act independently, with protection against dismissal. 31  The 
ombudspersons are mandated to investigate any complaint alleging  ‘human rights 
infringement’ by the Seoul City government, an administrative agency under its jurisdiction, 
a borough where the infringement is related to affairs delegated by the City, or certain 
institutions and welfare facilities established by or subsidised by the City.32  
 In addition to authorising the establishment of the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office, the Framework Ordinance also established the Seoul Human Rights 
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Centre and Seoul Human Rights Committee.33 The Human Rights Centre engages in a wide 
range of human rights activities, including human rights research, education, developing 
programmes to improve human rights, and consulting on human rights infringements.34 It is 
also specifically mandated to assist the ombudspersons in their work.35 In part, this is done 
through the establishment of a human rights protection team, which is in charge of 
counseling petitioners and registering cases to be reported to the Ombudsperson Office.36 In 
addition, the ombudspersons are able to use the Centre as a type of secretariat, for tasks such 
as on-site investigations, inspection of documents, and collecting of information or 
materials.37 Unlike the Ombudsperson Office, however, the Human Rights Centre operates as 
an administrative division of Seoul City Government and is not designed to be functionally 
independent.38 
The Seoul Human Rights Committee is a 15-member independent advisory board, 
that is mandated to deliberate and provide advice on the establishment and implementation of 
the City’s human rights plan, laws and policies affecting human rights, the operation of the 
Human Rights Centre, and other matters brought to the Committee's attention by the Mayor, 
the Committee Chairperson, or the three committee members. 39  Ombudspersons are 
permitted to attend Committee meetings and provide recommendations. 40  While the 
Committee does not participate in the ombudspersons’ decision-making process, it has made 
efforts to secure the institutional independence of the Ombudspersons Office during its 
establishment and early years.41 The establishment of separate human rights ombudsperson 
and human rights committee bodies in the same jurisdiction is somewhat unusual; in most 
cases around the world, a single body will handle both policy review and complaint handling 
functions. In Seoul’s case the decision to create two separate bodies has been a subject of 
controversy, and the precise division of workload between them is still a matter of debate.42 
On the one hand, separating the ombudspersons from the policy monitoring and advisory 
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functions allows them to devote their time exclusively to community complaints while 
retaining the image of independence that comes with greater separation from the policy-
making process. On the other hand, the existence of two bodies creates greater complexity 
and the potential for jurisprudential conflicts or turf wars. 
The Seoul Human Rights Ombudspersons Office, Human Rights Committee and 
Human Rights Centre are all physically located in the same open-plan office on the second 
floor of City Hall, and to a large extent can be viewed as different core elements of a single 
coherent municipal human rights system. However, they are supplemented by other human 
rights institutions that focus either on a particular issue area or a particular borough of the 
City. At the Seoul City level, there is a Centre for the Human Rights for Persons with 
Disabilities and a Committee on the Human Rights of the Child and Youth.43 At the borough 
level, Seongbukgu, Dongjakgu and Seodaemungu have all passed human rights ordinances.44 
Seongbukgu’s human rights system is most advanced, and provides for the establishment of a 
human rights administrative office and an independent human rights committee.45  
 
 
IV. Establishment and Operation of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office 
 
After a brief period of establishing the office, the Ombudspersons Office became operational 
in January 2013. 46  While the Seoul Human Right Framework Ordinance authorises the 
appointment of up to five ombudspersons, so far only three have served at one time; currently 
the three ombudspersons are Lee Eun Sang, Jeon Sung Whi, and Yoo Jae Hyeong.47 While 
Ombudsperson Lee has an activist background, Ombudspersons Jeon and Yoo came to the 
job from national-level commissions, respectively the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights 
Commission (ACCRC) and the Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of 
Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea.48  
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For such a young institution, the Ombudsperson Office has received a relatively 
significant number of complaints, perhaps illustrating that it is filling a need for local-level 
human rights complaint resolution. So far, from its establishment in January 2013 through 
January 2016, the Ombudsperson Office has received 726 complaints, of which it has 
investigated 326 cases and issued 38 recommendations.49 These cases covered a wide range 
of human rights violations, but workplace harassment (including sexual harassment), 
discrimination, right to privacy, and rights of the disabled have been particularly common 
subjects for complaints. All decisions have been taken on a consensus basis, although this has 
been done by custom rather than requirement, and the Ombudspersons Office has not yet 
established an official policy as to whether to decide based on majority vote or require 
unanimity in case of disagreement.50 While the Ombudspersons’ recommendations are non-
binding, as is the norm for ombudsperson institutions around the world, over 90 per cent of 
Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson recommendations have so far been followed by the 
City.51 
 One innovative programme that has been put into place to help integrate Seoul 
residents in the decision-making process is the so-called Citizens’ Human Rights Jury. Under 
this initiative, a group of 150 Seoul residents (above the age of 14) and 50 experts are 
impaneled, among whom eight residents and four experts can be chosen to form juries to rule 
on human rights petitions that are expected to have a particularly strong influence on 
society.52 Juries can be formed at the request of the Ombudspersons Office, Human Rights 
Committee or Mayor, but are only available with the petitioner’s permission.53 Verdicts are 
then approved by a favourable vote of two-thirds of the members, with the jury presided over 
by a non-voting expert appointed by the Ombudspersons.54 So far human rights juries have 
been established in three cases.55 The Ombudspersons can overrule a jury’s decision on any 
particular case, however (and in fact, this has already happened).56  
 In order to illustrate the work of the Ombudsperson Office, along with its potential 
challenges, three of the most significant cases to be decided so far will be examined in 
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greater depth. The first case involved a petition from Lee Chung Heon, in his role as 
president of the Chinese Residents’ Association of Seoul Korea.57 Lee alleged that the City 
of Seoul was engaged in discriminatory treatment of Hwagyo (Chinese nationals) who were 
residents of Seoul, because Korean nationals over the age of 65 could ride the Seoul public 
transit system for free and access various sites such as museums and royal tombs for free, 
while Hwagyo over the age of 65 with permanent residency in Korea were denied such 
benefits.58 According to Lee, this rule was unfair because Hwagyo residents paid full taxes 
and otherwise fulfilled the duties of citizens, with the exception of military service. The City 
defended its policy by claiming that they were already running the subway system at a 
significant deficit, and thus could not afford to change their policies. 
 On 28 June 2013, the Ombudsperson Office ruled in Lee’s favour. The decision stated 
that Hwagyo can be considered ‘Seoul citizens’ according to article 2 of the Framework 
Ordinance,59 emphasising that they share virtually equal local rights (with the exception of 
eligibility for a few local political offices) and local responsibilities with Korean nationals. 
The Ombudsperson Office then concluded that discrimination against permanent residents 
living in Seoul with regard to welfare benefits violated their human rights, as defined under 
article 2 of the National Human Rights Commission Act.60 This conclusion was supported by 
citing a decision of the Constitutional Court, a ruling of the NHRCK on equal rights, and the 
governments’ inclusion of migrant children in a welfare scheme under the Juvenile Welfare 
Support Act. Finally, the Ombudsperson Office compared Seoul’s policy unfavourably with 
practices in the United States and Europe, and admonished the City that continuing with such 
discrimination was inconsistent with its goal of becoming a ‘human rights city’. The 
Ombudsperson Office recommended a revision of various Seoul City policies toward foreign 
national permanent residents (including but not limited to Hwagyo), and specifically their 
inclusion in the senior citizen free-ride scheme for Seoul public transit. 
There was significant tension and political opposition regarding this recommendation 
from the public transit authorities, who reiterated their financial constraints.61 Eventually, 
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however, the policies on the Seoul bus and subway system towards permanent residents over 
the age of 65 were liberalised to allow for the withdrawal of one-time free-ride cards with a 
refundable deposit, and by June 2015, free travel was finally allowed on an entirely non-
discriminatory basis.62  
A second important migrant rights petition was received in 2014, this time from an 
unnamed petitioner on behalf of an unregistered migrant from Mongolia. 63  The petition 
alleged that the fact that unregistered migrants were ineligible to participate in Seoul City’s 
provision of free childcare for children under the age of six constituted impermissible 
discrimination. The petitioner argued that the exclusion of unregistered children from free 
childcare was inconsistent with the Framework Ordinance, the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, and a recommendation made by the NHRCK on the right to education of 
migrant children. 
The Ombudsperson Office referred this case to the Citizen Jury, which decided by an 
eight to four vote that the exclusion of unregistered children from social welfare service 
constituted a discriminatory policy prohibited by the Korean Constitution, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, the National Human Rights Commission Act, the Infant Care Act, the 
Seoul Human Rights Ordinance and the Ordinance on the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights of the Child and Youth. The Citizen Jury stressed that the interests of the 
children should be taken into account first, and recommended that the City take all 
appropriate administrative measures to guarantee necessary protection and ensure that a 
system is in place to make childcare subsidies and other benefits available to undocumented 
children. The Seoul Government’s initial reaction has been to state that it would consider the 
Ombudsperson Office’s recommendation.64 Specifically, it agreed to launch a study into the 
number of unregistered immigrants’ children currently residing in Seoul, before addressing 
issues of budgeting and other matters required to bring about a policy change.65 
A third case that attracted considerable public attention involved a petition alleging 
that the president of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra (Park Hyun-jung) had engaged in 
sexually and physically abusive behavior toward several of her employees since assuming 
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office in February 2013.66 The petition was delivered to the Ombudsperson Office two days 
after 17 orchestra employees sent a letter detailing the abuse to the media, with the 
allegations publicly refuted by Park.  Unlike the cases previously discussed, this case was not 
involved with the question of whether a law or policy was appropriate, but rather whether an 
individual in fact engaged in sexual harassment and workplace bullying, and if so whether 
these specific actions could be considered infringements on personal rights. 
After completing a fact-finding investigation, the Ombudsperson Office found that 
sexually humiliating expressions had been used by Park to both male and female employees, 
and that employees had been subject to insults and extreme expressions that in fact constitute 
workplace bullying and contravene the personal rights protections in article 10 of the Korean 
Constitution. The Ombudsperson Office also found that during the course of the investigation, 
the victims had been forced to work in the same space as the person who inflicted harm on 
them, which caused them further damage. The Ombudsperson Office therefore recommended 
to the Mayor that Park be subject to disciplinary measures and receive human rights 
education, and that the Orchestra should implement measures to prevent workplace bullying. 
Furthermore, it recommended that paid holidays and psychotherapy be provided to the 
victims, and that Seoul-affiliated organisations (like the Orchestra) should follow the Seoul 
City Guidelines on the Prevention of Recurrence of Sexual Harassment and Verbal Abuse. 
In the immediate aftermath of the ombudsperson recommendation, Park offered her 
resignation, which was accepted.67 This was not the end of the story, however. A police 
investigation soon cleared Park of the charges against her and, following a police raid on the 
orchestra’s office and network administrator, 10 of the 17 original petitioners were booked on 
charges of false accusation. 68 Eventually the wife of the orchestra’s conductor was also 
indicted on charges of defaming Park, and the orchestra’s conductor stepped down amid 
accusations of embezzlement.69 Beyond the ongoing drama and still-disputed facts, this case 
brings up interesting questions regarding the power of Seoul’s Ombudsperson Office and its 
place within the spectrum of justice institutions. At the end of the day, the ombudsperson’s 
investigatory conclusions were ignored and in fact directly contradicted by the parallel work 
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of police investigators who possessed greater authority and resources, and whose work could 
lead to the formal filing of criminal charges. In this case, the ombudsperson investigation 
could be seen as a waste of civic resources at best, and at worst as a way for the orchestra 
employees to gain credibility for their defamation of Park by choosing a forum that was 
perhaps more inclined to believe their claims of harassment while less able (compared to 
police investigators) to thoroughly examine counter-claims. 
 
 
V. Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office and the Broader Human Rights 
Regime 
 
This section will address in some more detail the question of how the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson Office fits into the broader international human rights regime. It will 
contextualise these questions with reference to the existing body of research into the 
relationship of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and sub-national human rights 
institutions with other human rights actors and norms. 
 
 
A. Local and Global Factors in the Establishment of the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson 
 
As a starting point, it is important to examine the role of other human rights actors in the 
establishment of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson. To what extent was its creation a 
result of influences from existing forces or a reaction to local concerns? At the national level, 
there is a considerable body of research into the establishment of NHRIs, including 
ombudsperson institutions.70 Some of this research highlights the importance of the United 
Nations and other major international actors such as the Council of Europe and the 
Commonwealth in the proliferation of NHRIs during the 1990s and 2000s.71 Pegram also 
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notes the importance of contagion from regional peers, 72 while other commentators have 
highlighted the importance of regional and global NHRI networks in encouraging the 
establishment of new bodies.73 In a few instances, NHRIs have been imposed by coercive 
external agencies, generally in the context of a peace agreement ending civil war or 
communal tensions. 74  Reif claims that the forces responsible for human rights 
ombudspersons’ proliferation include ‘democratization, public institution building, 
comparative law influences, limited state resources, international and regional movements to 
establish national human rights institutions, [and the adoption of treaties] that rely on NHRIs, 
for domestic implementation of international human rights obligations’.75 
While there has been less research into the factors accounting for the emergence of 
sub-national human rights ombudspersons, there are a few patterns that stand out. For 
example, it seems common for sub-national ombudspersons to be established in polities 
where there is also a human rights ombudsperson at the national level, examples being Spain, 
Mexico, Argentina and Russia.76 In some of these cases, the establishment of sub-national 
human rights ombudspersons (or commissions) was either encouraged or otherwise supported 
by the national institution.77 There has also been some research into the proliferation of 
‘human rights cities’, some of which have also established human rights ombudspersons. 
According to Oomen and Baumgärtel, the establishment of human rights cities was 
sometimes a civil society-driven initiative, but more frequently occurred at the initiative of 
local authorities who wanted to increase engagement with the human rights framework.78  
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Some of the external factors that have been instrumental in the establishment of other 
NHRIs and sub-national human rights ombudspersons have clearly not played an important 
role in the establishment of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson. International 
organisations such as the UN have so far been relatively silent regarding the promotion of 
local human rights ombudsperson institutions, in Korea or elsewhere, 79 as have regional 
organisations, at least outside of their own member states.80 Trans-governmental networks of 
municipal human rights ombudspersons are weak and largely unable to influence the 
development of new institutions.81 The Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson was not imposed 
by outside forces pursuant to any peace accords. It is also difficult to credit a contagion effect 
from regional peers because the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson is the first of its type in 
Korea, and indeed appears to be one of the first of its type anywhere in East Asia (with the 
exception of a few municipal human rights ombudspersons in mid-sized Japanese cities).82  
This is not to say that international actors were entirely irrelevant to the establishment 
of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson. Norms of local human rights institutionalisation 
that had developed mainly in Europe (especially those associated with the Right to the City, 
made popular by Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey) clearly had made their way to the 
Korean peninsula by 2011, most notably at the 2011 World Human Rights Cities Forum in 
Gwangju. This major conference, which is now repeated annually in Gwangju, hosted 
delegates from many cities around the world with experience in human rights implementation, 
and concluded by urging the development of local human rights institutions. 83  As a 
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prominent human rights lawyer, Park Won-soon would have been exposed to these 
international developments; reportedly he modeled his Seoul Citizens’ Human Rights 
Declaration in part on documents drafted in other ‘human rights cities’ around the world 
including Montreal, Barcelona, and Eugene, Oregon.84 
Within this context of awareness of the importance of the international trends in local 
rights implementation in Korean human rights circles by 2011 to 2012, two other local 
factors also appear of critical importance for the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson’s 
establishment: first, the importance of human rights (and their institutionalisation) to Park 
Won-soon and others on the Korean political left, and second, the complex contribution of 
the NHRCK to the Ombudsperson Office’s founding. 
In discussions with a current ombudsperson and the head of the Seoul Human Rights 
Division, both stressed the overwhelming importance of Mayor Park Won-soon’s vision in 
the establishment of Seoul’s human rights institutions. 85  Clearly, the creation of the 
Ombudsperson Office was a direct reflection of his longstanding embrace of the human 
rights movement (and association with it). While Park’s importance to the Office’s founding 
is unquestionable, it is important to emphasise that his proposals were consistent with a long-
standing idea in Korean left-wing politics that civil society human rights activists should be 
integrated into government as the best way to ensure progressive governance.86 The apex of 
this trend occurred during the progressive Roh Moo Hyun administration, when, according to 
one study, 158 government positions were filled by current or former members of People’s 
Society for Participatory Democracy (a human rights and social justice organisation of which 
Park was one time the Secretary-General).87 In a sense, the establishment of a human rights 
ombudsperson office is a continuation of this strategy of making a place for human rights in 
governance institutions, and the development of a local human rights system was always 
likely to follow the election of Park to the mayoralty. 88  Moreover, Park’s successful 
utilisation of human rights institutionalisation as a major campaign plank demonstrates that 
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human rights concepts already had a certain saliency among Seoul residents due to their long 
association with heroes of the political left such as Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun.  
Secondly, the NHRCK was a more complex factor in the background of the Seoul 
Human Rights Ombudsperson’s founding. In early 2008, the NHRCK started a campaign to 
encourage Korean municipalities to enact local human rights ordinances, and organised 
meetings for that purpose in Gwangju. 89 This campaign culminated in the issuance of a 
recommendation in April 2012 on the establishment of human rights cities, along with a 
model local human rights ordinance.90 In 2010, however, there were significant changes at 
the NHRCK, when conservative president Lee Myung Bak appointed a new chairperson, 
Hyun Byung-chul, who had no human rights experience and was widely perceived to be a 
weak human rights supporter.91 At this point, the NHRCK gradually stopped being trusted by 
many progressives and human rights advocates. 92  This weakness, in turn, became a 
justification for why it might be necessary to have other governmental institutions that could 
promote and protect human rights while staying out of the control of the now-conservative 
national leaders. In short, because the NHRCK could no longer be trusted as a strong 
independent voice for human rights, progressive local leaders were incentivised to create 
their own institutions.93 Ombudsperson Lee more diplomatically stated that the NHRCK’s 
inability to quickly respond to all the petitions that it received opened space for the Seoul 
Human Rights Ombudsperson to more promptly respond to inquiries regarding Seoul City 
government.94 
 
B. Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson and Relationships with Existing Human Rights 
Institutions 
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When the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson commenced its operations in 2013, it did not 
occupy a human rights vacuum; on the contrary, as discussed earlier Korea was already well-
integrated into the international human rights regime at the time, and a variety of 
governmental and non-governmental actors in Seoul were and are engaged in promoting and 
protecting human rights. The question thus arises: how does the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson interact with these other institutions? In other contexts, sub-national human 
rights ombudsperson institutions around the world have developed a range of different 
relationships. Some collaborate with their country’s national human rights ombudsperson 
institution, as is the case for example in Argentina, where there are formal collaboration 
agreements between the national human rights ombudsman and all provincial and municipal 
human rights ombudsmen in the country.95 Some have networked with their peers in other 
localities, whether on a formal or informal basis.96 A few ombudsperson institutions have 
participated in UN or regional human rights mechanisms, for example through contributing 
to periodic reports to UN treaty bodies, acting as Preventive Mechanisms under the Optional 
Protocol for the Convention against Torture or meeting with UN Special Rapporteurs.97  
In the case of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson, there appears to be relatively 
little contact between local human rights institutions and actors at the national, regional, or 
global level. There have been no meetings or cooperation between the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson and the national government. 98  There has been no formal coordination 
between the NHRCK and the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office, although there are 
informal contacts when needed, for example to discuss cases that are pending in both 
institutions, and NHRCK decisions have been cited on occasion. 99 Nor are there formal 
meetings with the national-level ACCRC, although informal contacts exist, as one of the 
current ombudspersons worked for the ACCRC. 100  Similarly, the Seoul Human Rights 
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Ombudsperson has not had any interactions with international institutions, with the minor 
exception of contributions to a UN Human Rights Council questionnaire response regarding 
Seoul human rights initiatives.101 Given the fact that the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson 
Office was established at the initiative of Mayor Park Won-soon and without the active 
support of the national government or international figures, this lack of formal cooperation is 
perhaps unsurprising. Whether or not this low level of institutional integration is a significant 
problem is of course a more difficult question. In general, however, there are good reasons to 
favour stronger relationships between sub-national human rights institutions and their 
national or international counterparts. Sub-national human rights institutions can provide 
valuable information and perspectives on local human rights issues to national or 
international monitoring bodies, while at the same time benefitting from the exposure to new 
norms and human rights expertise developed at the national or international levels.102 Sub-
national human rights institutions can also benefit politically from support by more powerful 
national bodies to ensure that their recommendations are carried out without undue delay; the 
ombudsperson’s recommendation in the Hwagyo case, for example, might have been carried 
out more promptly if the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office had been more 
successful in enlisting political backing from potential national-level allies. 
 While the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office has had few interactions with 
national or international human rights actors, it has made a concerted effort to interact with 
local citizens and civil society groups. The Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson has held 
twice a year meetings with civil society representatives and operates a hotline for feedback 
from the community.103 It also accepts complaints from civil society organisations (as well as 
individuals), and has had several important cases submitted by associations, including the 
Hwagyo case discussed above. On at least one occasion, the Ombudsperson Office has also 
consulted with a representative of a civil society organisation (Amnesty International Korea) 
for advice in deciding a case.104 In addition to this openness to dialogue with civil society 
organisations, Seoul human rights institutions have made a number of efforts at involving 
individual private citizens in its work. For example, the Seoul Human Rights Ombudspersons 
Office sometimes holds briefings for civil society representatives to attend when they are 
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releasing a particularly noteworthy recommendation.105 Perhaps the Citizens’ Human Rights 
Jury program described above represents the most concerted effort to solicit the input of 
private citizens.  
The Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson Office (along with its sister institutions) has 
also been proactive in interacting with other peer sub-national human rights institutions in 
Korea. For example, in March 2015, the Seoul Human Rights Committee and the 
Chungcheongnamdo (province) Human Rights Promotion Committee signed a formal 
cooperation agreement, and the Seoul Human Rights Division has also recently hosted a 
workshop targeted at 17 different local human rights offices to discuss best practices and 
ongoing initiatives.106 Separately, the Seoul Human Rights Ombudspersons have also met 
with their peers in cities such as Gwangju and Suwon on a mostly informal basis, and have 
been involved in trying to set up an official network of Korean human rights 
ombudspersons.107 Given Seoul’s position as the largest (by far) municipality in Korea, it is 
not particularly surprising that it is playing a leadership role with regards to other Korean 
local areas’ development of human rights institutions.  
 
C. Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson and Types of Human Rights Norms Used 
 
Finally, it is worth examining the types of norms used. There is already a small body of 
research examining the types of human rights norms that are used by sub-national human 
rights institutions.108 Fundamentally, one can point to three types of normative sources. First, 
some sub-national human rights institutions are explicitly mandated to implement one or 
more forms of international human rights norms. In a few notable cases, this has even led to 
municipalities embracing a wider range of human rights treaties than are accepted at the 
national level by their home country.109 Second, some sub-national human rights institutions 
are mandated to implement human rights norms contained elsewhere in the national-level 
laws or jurisprudence of the country where the sub-national institution is located. Third, local 
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normative sources can be developed by, for example, the passage of a human rights charter. 
This may allow for the development of new human rights norms or divergent interpretations 
of existing norms that reflect local values and interests.  
In the case of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson, the ombudspersons are 
mandated by the Framework Ordinance to investigate petitions of human rights 
infringements, with the term ‘human rights’ defined as ‘any of human dignity, self-worth, 
liberty and rights, which are prescribed by the Constitution and statutes, or acknowledged by 
international human rights treaties signed or ratified by the Republic of Korea and by 
customary international laws’.110 In practice, the ombudspersons have clearly made a point of 
employing a wide variety of norms. National-level norms have been most commonly cited. 
Out of 21 published decisions from the period of December 2012 to March 2015, 17 
decisions cite national statutes, including on several occasions the National Human Rights 
Commission Act, the Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination of Disabled Persons, and the 
Framework Act on Women’s Development. 111 In addition, 18 decisions cite the Korean 
Constitution, most commonly article 10, which protects the right to dignity and the pursuit of 
happiness.112  
Interestingly, however, the ombudspersons have also proved very willing to refer to 
international treaty norms, and even to take into account findings from other countries’ laws 
and jurisprudence. For example, the Ombudsperson Office has cited UN human rights 
treaties in eight out of 21 published cases. 113  In several other cases, a broad range of 
international norms have been cited from outside the UN treaty system. For example in a 16 
October 2014 decision, the Ombudsperson Office cited an International Labour Organisation 
Resolution, a UN Declaration, and a case from the US Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. 114  The following month, the Ombudsperson Office cited the European 
Framework Agreement on Harassment and Violence at Work as well as relevant laws in 
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Sweden, France and Japan. 115  Three decisions have cited the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Oftentimes, these international norms are cited in conjunction with relevant 
local or national norms, as was the case in the Childcare Support for Unregistered Migrants 
case reviewed above. 
Meanwhile, relatively few human rights norms from local (Seoul) sources have been 
used to determine the scope of rights protection, the notable exceptions being the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government Guidelines for the Prevention of Sexual Harassment, which was 
cited as a source in four of the 21 published cases, 116 and the Seoul Ordinance on the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights of the Child and Youth, which was cited on three 
occasions.117 In fact, there have been efforts by Mayor Park and the Seoul Human Rights 
Centre to draft a distinctive human rights charter for Seoul, but these efforts have so far been 
unsuccessful. Consistent with the human rights plan laid out in Park’s campaign declaration, 
in 2014 the Human Rights Centre selected a committee of 150 ordinary citizens and 30 
human rights experts to draft a charter that could be adopted by Seoul City.118 The end result 
was a draft document called the Seoul Citizens’ Human Rights Charter, which consisted of 
50 articles protecting a wide range of rights, including several economic, social, and cultural 
rights as well as rights regarding political participation and transparency. While the document 
in many ways reflects classic human rights norms, it also includes several clauses which are 
peculiarly suited to the urban context,119 and some that seem particularly consistent with 
Korean concerns, one example being the article 12 right to be protected from disasters and 
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accidents, which reflects Korea’s widespread revulsion at lax enforcement of safety standards 
in the wake of the April 2014 Sewol ferry disaster.120  
When Mayor Park attempted to adopt the Seoul Citizens’ Human Rights Charter, 
however, these various clauses were all overshadowed by a controversy centred on the fact 
that the anti-discrimination clause (article 4) protected sexual minorities (among many other 
groups), and the right to be protected from social violence (article 15) also specifically noted 
sexual minorities as an at-risk group.121 Conservative elements (particularly associated with 
certain Christian groups) fiercely protested the inclusion of these clauses, while criticising 
Park for going beyond the appropriate role of a local official in order to gain publicity for a 
potential presidential run.122 In the end Park decided not to adopt the Charter because of the 
lack of a social consensus on the issue.123 This decision was in turn harshly criticised by 
progressive activists who felt that Park had not stood up firmly for their rights.124 According 
to both Mayor Park and the head of the Seoul Human Rights Centre, the passage of the 
Charter will be at some point revisited, and it remains an important policy goal for the 
administration.125  
Finally it should be noted that there have been other interesting attempts to develop 
new human rights norms at the borough level in Seoul. Seongbuk-Gu, for example, has 
promulgated a Human Rights Charter, despite the objections of anti-LGBT rights 
protesters.126 In addition to those clauses commonly seen in human rights documents, the 
Seongbuk-Gu Charter also provides specific protection for senior citizens, marriage migrants, 
sexual minorities, the homeless, persons with infectious diseases, refugees, and North Korean 
refugees.127  
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VI. Conclusion 
 
In this case study, I have examined the operations of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson 
Office, one of the first examples of a local human rights ombudsperson institution to be 
established in East Asia. In particular, I have explored the connections between the Seoul 
Human Rights Ombudsperson and other governmental and civil society actors, both inside 
and outside of Korea. In short, my findings show that the establishment of the Seoul Human 
Rights Ombudsperson was largely the result of local political initiatives grounded in a 
national political landscape where human rights discourse has taken on a particularly strong 
relevance. The Ombudsperson Office has accordingly developed fairly independently, with 
few institutional links to the outside world, although it borrows liberally from human rights 
norms developed at the national and international levels. 
What can we learn from this case study about local human rights implementation in 
Asia? Firstly, it is clear that given the existence of human rights-friendly leadership, there is 
room for local human rights mechanisms to make a real difference in peoples’ lives, and 
especially to encourage political actors to take into account the voices of the powerless, such 
as non-citizens in the discriminatory treatment of Hwagyo and the unregistered migrant 
childcare cases. These local mechanisms are not necessarily imposed from above or 
developed according to international standards. Rather, the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson shows how a local politician can develop a local human rights system as a 
result of personal conviction and constituent expectations without significant support from 
other actors, and in fact can position the office as a response to a perceived weakness in 
national-level human rights policies. This dynamic is resonant of certain local initiatives in 
the West, for example the decision by the San Francisco Human Rights Commission to 
(successfully) promote municipal adherence to the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women, even though the treaty has not been ratified by the 
US. Local commissions can thus usher in stronger human rights policies in localities that are 
more progressive than the rest of the country in which they are located.128 
However, this case study also shows that more work needs to be done to integrate 
such institutions into a coherent human rights regime. Where there are multiple bodies 
capable of investigating the same complaint, there should be coordination to ensure that 
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forum shopping opportunities are kept to a minimum, and that a consistent human rights 
jurisprudence can develop among the different concerned entities. While the risk of parallel 
investigations was perhaps made most clear in the aftermath of the Seoul Philharmonic 
Orchestra harassment case, the lack of formal guidelines regulating jurisdictional overlap 
with the NHRCK and ACCRC may in the long run create greater risks of duplicative 
investigations or forum shopping. 
Finally, this case study demonstrates that opportunities exist for local human rights 
institutions to work towards the implementation and jurisprudential development of both 
local norms and international norms such as UN treaties and declarations. This normative 
mix may provide a good opportunity for local human rights institutions to engage in the 
localisation of human rights norms, meaning, according to one definition, ‘the active 
construction [of new norms] through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection of 
foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence 
with local beliefs and practices.’129 This process can facilitate the integration of local voices 
into the norm-development process and can perhaps produce new norms in areas such as the 
rights of the elderly that are particularly resonant in East Asian traditions but have been 
neglected at the global level.130 Critics might argue that this could lead to a certain degree of 
fragmentation of international human rights law, but this is not necessarily a bad thing; 
proponents of localisation accept that a degree of pluralism is both inevitable and welcome in 
today’s world.131  
Despite the potential benefits of greater local attention to the evolution of human 
rights norms, it is equally clear from the failed attempt to promulgate a Seoul Citizens’ 
Human Rights Charter that the process of implementing international norms or developing 
new norms at the local level can be fraught with political risks and the potential for conflict, 
just as it often is at the national or international levels. Smaller polities do not necessarily 
provide for a homogeneity of opinions. As local human rights mechanisms mature in Seoul 
and elsewhere, further research will be necessary to examine the substantive effects of 
moving the contested process of rights development to the realm of municipal institutions.   
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Abstract: In this article I outline and explore the arguments in favor of and in opposition to the 
establishment of sub-national human rights institutions (such as state and local human rights 
commissions, ombudsmen and the like) in nations that already possess national human rights 
institutions. This analysis will be based on an application of prior research findings in the 
broader field of administrative decentralisation as tailored to the particularities of human rights 
implementation. Where relevant I also examine the implications of institutional type for 
decentralisation, as well as the implication of different attributes of the relevant jurisdiction. As a 
conclusion, I lay out the circumstances under which the establishment of sub-national human 
rights institutions will be more or less advantageous.  
Keywords: Decentralisation; federalism; subsidiarity; national human rights institutions; 
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I. Introduction 
For the past twenty-five years, one of the most important human rights questions facing 
countries around the world has been whether or not they should establish national human rights 
institutions (‘NHRIs’). By and large, this is no longer an issue: the question has been answered in 
the affirmative. With a handful of (significant) exceptions, NHRIs are now considered as 
standard features of the modern democratic state.1 As of August 2016, 117 NHRIs have been 
accredited by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (‘GANHRI’), of which 
75 were deemed fully compliant with the UN-issued Paris Principles, the authoritative set of 
standards for the operation of NHRIs.2  
Within these nations that now possess NHRIs, there has in many cases been an important 
follow-up question: should analogous human rights institutions also be established at sub-
national governmental levels? Many jurisdictions, especially in Europe and the Americas, in fact 
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have established what I term sub-national human rights institutions (‘SNHRIs’), those human 
rights boards, human rights ombudsman, anti-discrimination commissions, and the like that can 
be defined as independent non-judicial governmental institutions that possess a sub-national 
mandate, and whose mission includes the implementation of human rights norms.3 In part, this 
reflects a strong global trend toward decentralisation of government services in recent decades.4 
In Africa and Asia, SNHRIs remain exceptional, although they are rapidly proliferating in certain 
countries in those continents, as well.5  
To date, there has been very little scholarly analysis of this question. Certain European 
trans-national institutions have recommended the establishment of SNHRIs (or, specifically, 
local ombudsmen).6 A number of academics have made arguments that states should promote the 
implementation of human rights at the local government level,7 and a few others have studied 
specific instances of NHRI decentralisation.8 However, there has been little informed debate 
regarding the implications of NHRI decentralisation, and its advantages or disadvantages. This 
article will make a first step towards filling the gap in the literature.  
 Specifically, in this article I will outline and elaborate upon the arguments in favor of and 
in opposition to the establishment of SNHRIs in nations that already possess NHRIs and, based 
on these arguments, very briefly lay out the circumstances under which the establishment of 
                                                          
3 This definition is elaborated upon and justified elsewhere. See Andrew Wolman, ‘Sub-National Human 
Rights Institutions: A Definition and Typology’, forthcoming in (2017) Human Rights Review. 
4 Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Roberto Ezcurra, ‘Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? A 
cross-country analysis’ (2010) 10 J Econ Geog 619, 619-21 (‘Over the last 40 years a decentralizing wave 
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8 See, eg, Teresa Rees and Paul Chaney, ‘Multilevel Governance, Equality and Human Rights: Evaluating 
the First Decade of Devolution in Wales’ (2011) 10(2) Soc Poly & Socy 219; Predrag Dimitrijević, ‘Do 
we need local ombudsmen?: Protector of Human Rights’ (2005) 3(1) Facta Universitatis: Law and 
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SNHRIs will be more likely to be appropriate.9 I will not attempt to provide a definitive answer 
to the general question of whether sub-national governments should establish SNHRIs (or the 
related questions of whether national governments should authorize or allow the establishment of 
SNHRIs). In this respect, I am in accord with Nicolaidis that ‘only on an ad hoc basis is it 
possible to know whether a particular topic or area in a given time and place is more properly 
regulated at one level of governance’. 10  However, the arguments for and against SNHRI 
establishment should help inform the decision-makers at any level that are struggling with this 
question. 
 The arguments in this article are explicitly built upon the existing research detailing the 
general implications of decentralising administrative functions, some of which dates back several 
decades.11 While the findings from this existing literature are the starting point for my arguments, 
however, they are not the end of the analysis. The application of findings from general 
decentralisation research to the question of SNHRIs requires further elaboration, both because 
human rights implementation differs in certain respects from ordinary service delivery, and 
because the implications of decentralisation of an independent government watchdog such as an 
SNHRI are difficult than those of an ordinary agency. I therefore supplement the decentralisation 
analysis with human rights-specific arguments, both conceptual and in some cases based on 
empirical observations of NHRI and SNHRI behavior. Where relevant I will also examine the 
implications of SNHRI type for decentralisation, as well as the implication of different attributes 
of the relevant jurisdiction. 
II. Conceptual Background 
 As a preliminary to my analysis, this section will introduce the relevant aspects of the 
most important concepts discussed in this article: namely, decentralisation, deconcentration, and 
subsidiarity, and discuss how they are relevant to the question of whether or not to establish an 
SNHRI in a country that already possesses an NHRI.   
A. Decentralisation 
The term ‘decentralisation’ has been defined in a number of different ways over the 
years. 12 At its broadest, it has sometimes been defined to include the delegation of powers, 
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divestment/privatization, deconcentration, and devolution to sub-national governments. 13 This 
paper, however, will use the narrower definition proposed by (among others) the International 
Center of Human Rights Policy, namely that decentralisation is the ‘transfer of power and 
responsibility from national (or central) government to subsidiary levels, which may be regional, 
municipal or local’.14 Decentralisation does not necessarily imply federalism, which commonly 
refers to ‘a constitutionally guaranteed division of competences between territorially defined 
governmental levels’, although there is significant overlap in the research studying 
decentralisation and the research explicitly focused on federalism.15 Rather, decentralisation can 
occur in every nation that has sub-national administrative divisions, which is to say virtually 
every nation in the world.16 
In this context, the establishment of SNHRIs where there is already an existing NHRI can 
be seen as a form of decentralisation, as powers and responsibilities (for human rights 
implementation by an independent body) that once existed only at the national level will now 
exist at the sub-national level as well. It is important to emphasize that decentralisation and 
centralization are not incompatible concepts, in the sense that expanding powers at the sub-
national level necessarily implies a reduction or absence of powers at the national level.17 Indeed, 
for countries with NHRIs, it is very unlikely that those NHRIs will be fully replaced by SNHRIs, 
because engagement with the national government and with supra-national bodies are important 
tasks that at this point are clearly better undertaken by national bodies (and sub-national bodies 
are in fact actively prevented from full access to the international system by GANHRI rules).18 
Rather, it is more likely that the NHRI and SNHRI will share responsibilities for human rights 
promotion, monitoring and education in the sub-national jurisdiction, and possibly share 
jurisdiction for complaint-handling as well. In some cases, however, an SNHRI will be 
established in an autonomous region where the NHRI previously lacked jurisdiction, or an 
SNHRI will focus exclusively on handling complaints that the NHRI is not mandated to 
handle.19 This would correspond to a non-overlapping jurisdictional arrangement (often called 
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Development, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy 
(1997) 5-6. 
14 International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Local Rule: Decentralisation and Human Rights’ (2002) 
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‘devolution’. UNDP (n 13) 5-6 (‘The transfer of authorities to [autonomous lower-level] units is often 
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15 Jan Biela et al, Policy-Making in Multi-Level Systems (ECPR Press 2013) 7.  
16 Edward Rubin, ‘Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America’ (2001) 574 Annals Am Acad Pol & 
Soc Sci 37, 39 (‘With the possible exception of some postage-stamp states … every nation is 
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17 UNDP (n 13) 1. 
18 See, Andrew Wolman, ‘Welcoming a New International Human Rights Actor? The Participation of 
Subnational Human Rights Institutions at the United Nations’ (2014) 20 Global Governance 437, 440. 
19 In Austria, for example, the Länder governments may choose to establish an ombudsman (as two have 
done) or alternatively to delegate the federal ombudsman the authority to address complaints about 
 
 
dual federalism, in the context of federal states), but this type of arrangement is relatively rare, 
both for SNHRIs and for other types of government service providers.20 
Decentralisation can, in general, be categorized as either a top-down or a bottom-up 
phenomenon.21 Top-down decentralisation is initiated by the national government, and normally 
pursues national-level objectives, such as shifting fiscal constraints to a lower level or increasing 
national well-being. Bottom-up decentralisation is initiated by local actors, and pursues local 
objectives such as increasing local innovation or catering to local preferences in government 
service delivery. Each of these types of decentralisation can be seen with the establishment of 
SNHRIs. Top-down decentralisation can be seen in the establishment of SNHRIs by national 
governments in some post-conflict zones, such as Northern Ireland or Mindanao.22 The SNHRIs 
established in some so-called ‘human rights cities’, on the other hand, are typically bottom-up 
initiatives, as (in general) are the human rights and anti-discrimination commissions of the 
United States.23 Other SNHRIs require initiative from both above and below, as is the case in 
India and Russia, where SNHRIs were first authorized by a central government, but later 
established by sub-national entities.24 This paper is not tailored to address one or the other type 
of decentralisation. However, the strength of the various arguments outlined here will evidently 
vary according to whether one approaches the issue from a position of national or local power. 
B. Deconcentration 
 Deconcentration can be defined as ‘situations in which central government offices are 
moved to the regions but remain under the control of central government’.25 In theory, it may be 
feasible to delineate a bright line between deconcentration and decentralisation. In practice, 
however, the two lie on either ends of a spectrum between total national control of a local office 
and total absence of control. In some systems, actual practice lies somewhere in the middle; this 
is certainly the case with many SNHRIs. To give some examples, in Morocco, the Regional 
Human Rights Commissions operate independently in responding to complaints, but 
commissioners are appointed by the National Council for Human Rights, the regional 
commissions follow national policies for human rights promotion, and the National Council 
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22 Northern Ireland Act [UK] 1998, ch. 47; Republic Act 9054 [Philippines] (2001), sec 16. 
23  See, generally, Charlotte Berends et al (eds), Human Rights Cities: Motivations, Mechanisms, 
Implications (University College Roosevelt 2013); Kenneth Saunders K and Hyo Eun Bang, ‘A Historical 
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supervises the regional commissions’ development of human rights observatories.26 In India and 
Russia, the SNHRIs operate independently, but implement a mandate determined by national-
level legislation. 27  In Mexico, the SNHRIs operate independently, but their rulings can be 
appealed to the Mexican National Human Rights Commission.28  
This paper does not address the question of whether (or when) NHRI deconcentration is 
beneficial. In fact, the international community has been quite clear in calling for 
deconcentration of NHRIs where needed to ensure adequate public accessibility.29 Thus the Paris 
Principles mandate that NHRIs shall ‘set up local or regional sections’30 and the GANHRI Sub-
Committee on Accreditation has on many occasions suggested that NHRIs open up branch 
offices in order to comply with the Paris Principles’ mandate of accessibility. 31   Amnesty 
International has likewise recommended that ‘local and regional offices are vitally important to 
the effective functioning of NHRIs in a large country, or a country with isolated and inaccessible 
centres of population, or where transportation is difficult’.32 Many NHRIs currently have large 
numbers of branch offices, while others have none, especially in small countries.33 
C. Subsidiarity 
 The principle of subsidiarity also plays an important role in questions of decentralisation 
for many issue areas, including human rights.34 There is no universally accepted definition for 
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30 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 48/134, ‘Principles Relating to the Status of 
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32  Amnesty International, ‘National Human Rights Institutions – Amnesty International’s 
Recommendations for Effective Protection and Promotion of Human Rights’ (2001) IOR 40/007/2001, 
§9.1. 
33  For example, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has nine branch offices, Venezuela’s 
Defensoría del Pueblo has 33 branch offices, Nepal National Human Rights Commission has eight branch 
offices, and the South African Human Rights Commission has nine branch offices; one in each provincial 
capital. Wolman, ‘The Relationship Between National and Sub-National Human Rights Institutions’ (n 20) 
448-50. 
34 See, generally, Paolo Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights 
Law’ (2003) 97 Am J Intl L 38. 
 
 
the concept, and in fact it is a notoriously vague and multi-faceted term.35 In general, however, 
subsidiarity has been characterized as ‘a presumption for local-level decisionmaking, which 
allows for the centralization of powers only for particular, good reasons’.36 Beyond this broad 
definition, subsidiarity is sometimes divided up into weak or strong versions. Thus, according to 
Jachtenfuchs and Krisch, weak subsidiarity involves ‘an easily rebuttable presumption—a 
presumption for the local that provides a low threshold and can be overcome by any reason that 
makes action on a higher level appear advantageous, be it for the sake of efficiency, efficacy, or 
justice’, while a stronger version puts forth a higher threshold, namely ‘a presumption in favor of 
local governance that can be rebutted only by strong reasons in exceptional cases’. 37 At its 
strongest, subsidiarity has been said to signify that, in the words of Halberstam ‘the central 
government should play only a supporting role in governance, acting only if the constituent units 
of government are incapable of acting on their own’.38 
 The arguments presented in this paper are relevant to a subsidiarity analysis in two 
distinct ways. First, to the extent that one finds the arguments in favor of SNHRI establishment 
to be generally convincing, then these arguments provide a justification for asserting an 
accordingly strong form of subsidiarity for independent human rights institutions (and 
conversely, if they do not seem like strong arguments, then only a weak form would be justified). 
Second, to the extent that one finds the arguments against SNHRI establishment to be convincing 
in a given concrete situation, this can provide the basis for overcoming the presumption for local 
governance that lies at the heart of the subsidiarity principle. 
III. Arguments in Favor of SNHRI Establishment 
 In this section, I will outline five of the principal decentralisation arguments that can be 
used to justify the establishment of an SNHRI in a nation that already possesses an NHRI, 
namely arguments based on physical proximity, cultural proximity, autonomy, human rights 
innovation, and robustness. 
A. Physical proximity 
One obvious argument for the establishment of SNHRIs is that by being located in close 
proximity to the people that they serve, SNHRIs are able to implement human rights more 
effectively than centralized NHRIs. Physical proximity to the area being served has always been 
one of the primary arguments for decentralisation of government services.39 Physical proximity 
to local populations conveys informational advantages to local administrators and decision-
makers. 40 It also allows for more rapid responses to changing local conditions, and cheaper 
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access to local sites. This general argument has been embraced in the realm of human rights 
implementation by many practitioners and advocates. For example the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights stressed the importance of doing human rights work ‘locally, 
close to the people’, because ‘geographical and personal proximity between inhabitants and local 
decision-makers … has obvious advantages’.41  
There are a number of component claims to the argument that human rights 
implementation is benefited by physical proximity between the service provider and recipient. 
One potential claim is that SNHRIS will be more knowledgeable about the local environment 
because they are physically based there.42 Another is that human rights monitoring is facilitated 
by a local presence, because human rights institutions can receive consistent feedback from the 
local population.43 A third is that local offices facilitate contact with grassroots NGOs, which in 
turn improves human rights implementation.44 A fourth is that victims of human rights violations 
will be better able to access justice through nearby complaint mechanisms.45 A final claim is that 
by having easier access to the local population, SNHRIs will find it easier to effectively engage 
in human rights promotion and training.46  
In my view, it would be difficult to rebut this argument. That is to say, while one may 
certainly argue against SNHRI establishment on other grounds (i.e., cost, independence, 
effectiveness, etc.), there is no credible argument that human rights are better protected through a 
lack of proximity to a particular population. The one caveat, though, is that physical proximity 
provides an equally valid argument for decentralisation and deconcentration. In those 
jurisdictions that already have NHRI branch offices, the physical proximity argument is no 
longer a good reason to support the establishment of an SNHRI rather than the support of an 
existing NHRI. 
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B. Cultural proximity  
 Another argument in favor of decentralisation is that SNHRIs will have a closer socio-
cultural proximity to local populations in pluralistic societies, which will improve their ability to 
promote and protect human rights, in at least three separate ways. First, human rights workers 
who come from the same socio-cultural background of the communities they serve will likely be 
more knowledgeable about the human rights issues facing their community. This should lead to 
human rights implementation that is targeted to those in society most in need. 
 Second, local populations may be more likely to accept human rights norms as legitimate 
(and local governments more likely to concede to human rights demands) if those norms are 
coming from their co-ethnics and social peers, rather than being imposed in a quasi-imperialist 
manner from a distant capital (or New York or Geneva).47 This may be especially true of socio-
economic rights that involve income redistribution, given evidence that people are most willing 
to engage in acts of self-sacrifice with respect to people with whom they feel a cultural affinity.48 
A corollary of this argument is that local victims of human rights violations might feel more 
comfortable approaching SNHRIs when the victims speak the same language and share life 
experiences with the SNHRI officers.49 
 Third, with decentralisation, services and regulations can be tailored more efficiently and 
flexibly to community needs, rather than centrally administered in a ‘one size fits all’ fashion.50 
To the extent that accepted universal norms are being implemented in culturally specific ways so 
as to have a more beneficial impact on local populations, this would seem to be an unqualified 
advantage: human rights scholars generally agree that human rights may be legitimately 
implemented in different ways depending on local conditions, as long as the core content of 
those rights are respected. 51  The risk, however, it that by implementing human rights in a 
manner acceptable to the majority in a sub-national jurisdiction, an SNHRI might end up 
alienating or even oppressing a group that is in the minority; for this reason, tailoring human 
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rights implementation to local needs is perhaps most effective in local jurisdictions that are not 
themselves heterogeneous (within countries that are heterogeneous).52 
More controversially, SNHRIs that share a socio-cultural proximity to the people that 
they serve would seem to be better placed (relative to NHRIs) to engage in the normative 
development implicit in the localization of human rights norms, defined as the ‘active 
construction of [new norms] through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection of 
foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with 
local beliefs and practices’.53 As stated more concisely, local human rights implementation by 
SNHRIs ‘gives meaning to human rights’.54 Some scholars argue that by drawing upon local 
traditions, localization will enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the universal human 
rights regime. 55  Of course, the idea of localization is controversial; some see pluralism as 
dangerous to the human rights project.56 This objection will be discussed in more depth below, in 
the section on human rights fragmentation.  
To a certain extent, socio-cultural proximity between an NHRI and local populations can 
be arranged through deconcentration as well as decentralisation, for example where local offices 
are staffed with local hires. However, deconcentration will almost necessarily be less effective in 
this regard, as NHRI policy priorities and ultimate decisions will be made at a central level, even 
if local office hires reflect the cultural make-up of the community.57  
C. Administrative Autonomy 
 Perhaps the strongest argument for the establishment of SNHRIs (rather than the mere 
deconcentration of NHRIs) is that SNHRIs are the best (or perhaps the only) way to influence 
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local government policy in jurisdictions that have a significant level of administrative or 
legislative autonomy. This argument has been made at times by the Council of Regions and other 
actors with an interest in preserving sub-national political authority.58 The argument progresses 
as follows. First, advocates for decentralisation will point out that local authorities are intimately 
involved in human rights protection and implementation, and in particular are generally heavily 
involved in developing and implementing policies that can impact social and economic rights, 
such as public health, housing, social welfare, education, employment, urban planning and 
environmental protection. 59  However, there is sometimes insufficient attention paid to local 
government’s impact on human rights, due to a systematic bias among human rights advocates 
and scholars to monitor developments at the national or supra-national level.60 Therefore, given 
the relevance of local government activities to human rights, and the relative lack of supervision, 
it is desirable for an HRI of some sort to monitor local government activities and provide 
appropriate recommendations when its laws or policies have violated or threaten to violate 
human rights. In countries where there is no NHRI, this means that an SNHRI should be 
established to fill the gap. Where there is an NHRI, the establishment of an SNHRI might still be 
necessary, because the NHRI might be legally prohibited from interfering with the actions of 
regional and municipal authorities when administration is divided into federal, autonomous, or 
highly decentralised jurisdictions.61 Even where it would be legally permissible for a national-
level body to pass judgment on the work of a lower-level autonomous governmental entity, it is 
worth bearing in mind that NHRI opinions are (in general) non-binding, and therefore only 
effective in as much as their addressee takes them into consideration and follows their 
recommendations. 62  If an autonomous entity would be systematically less likely to follow 
recommendations from a NHRI than from a local SNHRI due to autonomy concerns, then an 
SNHRI would end up as the more effective body for influencing local authorities. 
 The argument in favor of SNHRI establishment due to sub-national autonomy concerns is 
strong. There are a few other considerations, however. First, in many countries, lower 
administrative divisions are commonly subject to national oversight, and therefore autonomy 
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concerns would be relatively muted.63 Second, this argument is only valid to the extent that 
NHRIs focus their attention on influencing sub-national governments. Thus, for ombudsman-
type institutions that are generally focused on offering citizens a venue for appealing government 
human rights (and other) abuses, the establishment of SNHRIs may offer the optimal solution, as 
has been noted by Council of Europe experts.64 However, if a Commission-type NHRI is more 
interested in human rights promotion, research, training and the like (such as, arguably, the 
German Institute for Human Rights), then even strongly federal or autonomous administrative 
structures present little barrier to operation throughout the country.  
Third, the appropriateness of SNHRI establishment in an autonomous or decentralised 
region will to some extent depend on the nature of the SNHRI’s mandate, and specifically the 
sources of law which it draws from. Where SNHRIs implement human rights norms that have 
been either developed at the national level (in the form of constitutions or legislation) or 
accepted at the national level (by treaty ratification), then the SNHRIs are to some extent being 
delegated administrative authority, or the ‘right to act’ (in Braun and Keman’s terminology), 
rather than political authority, or the ‘right to decide’.65 In fact, the sub-national entity’s ‘right to 
decide’ in other policy areas may be limited by SNHRI pressure to comply with rights norms that 
were developed or accepted at the national level, leading to a de facto reduction in relative 
decision-making powers at the sub-national level. Of course, this de facto reduction in autonomy 
may be considered an advantage or a disadvantage, depending on the situation, and one’s 
perspective. 
Fourth, the establishment of an SNHRI in an autonomous region may serve as a symbolic 
indication of ‘national’ legitimacy, especially where it acts like an NHRI, for example by 
participating in UN mechanisms. The Scottish National Human Rights Commission, Somaliland 
National Human Rights Commission, and Kurdistan Human Rights Commission (none of which 
are based in recognized ‘nations’ in the international law sense) are good examples of this 
dynamic. Evidently, observers will differ as to whether these elements of symbolic nationhood 
are normatively desirable or not, but it is an element that should be considered in some cases. 
D. Human rights innovation 
 One classic argument in favor of decentralisation is that it promotes innovation at the 
sub-national level, as sub-national actors face an incentive to adopt best practices and invest in 
policy innovation in the face of mobile citizens who have an ability to choose which jurisdiction 
to live and work in.66 A corollary of this argument that is often cited in the US is Judge Brandeis’ 
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famous claim that states are ‘laboratories of democracy’ that can experiment with policies that, if 
successful, can then be adopted in other states or even at the national level.67 These innovations 
also come with decreased risk, as failure would be limited to a relatively small area rather than 
the entire nation.68 The innovation argument is also a product of sub-national heterogeneity, as 
discussed in the previous section, however in this case it is dependent not on cultural or ethnic 
differences, but rather in a variability in willingness to accept human rights norms and structures. 
 In the realm of human rights implementation, proponents of decentralisation have 
highlighted the importance of states and localities as laboratories for rights innovation. 69 
According to Chaney, ‘international literature suggests that regional governance may foster 
policy divergence and instances of innovation in equality and human rights practice’.70 In some 
cases, especially in ‘human rights cities’, much of this innovation has been structural or 
procedural in nature, involving the establishment of new committees, requirements of human 
rights budgeting or assessment, or public consultation processes. 71  Elsewhere, sub-national 
entities, including SNHRIs, have engaged in more substantive human rights innovation, by 
embracing and, at times, attempting to operationalize rights norms that were not yet accepted at 
the national level. In perhaps the best-known example of this phenomenon, dozens of US cities 
have passed resolutions in support of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
despite the US not being a party to either treaty, with San Francisco, Berkeley and Los Angeles 
going a step further to actually enact CEDAW principles into law.72 At times, SNHRIs have 
encouraged such policies. 73 Another example has been the gradual sub-national embrace of 
LGBT rights in recent decades.74 While national jurisdictions and supra-national bodies have in 
many cases been slow in embracing LGBT rights protections, some SNHRIs have been speaking 
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out on the issue for many years, even in areas that are not normally thought of as socially 
progressive, such as Michigan or the Basque Country.75 
There are different potential reasons why SNHRIs may desire to go beyond what an 
NHRI might undertake in the field of rights. In part, they may represent particularly progressive 
polities with broader conceptions of human rights. They may also be involved in ‘branding’ their 
jurisdictions as human rights-friendly, as a way of standing out from their peers or in order to 
attract new inhabitants. They may simply be more nimble and creative because they are smaller 
or less bound by detailed legislative mandates or oversight. From a human rights perspective, a 
stronger sub-national human rights commitment has been lauded as a way not only to improve 
conditions at the local level, but potentially also to place pressure on national governments or 
sub-national peers to improve their rights practices.76 
 There are a few qualifications to this argument, however. Some would argue that human 
rights protections should be equal for every person throughout a country; this claim will be 
discussed in detail below. Second, it is in theory possible that the opposite dynamic could also 
occur, and SNHRIs could choose to interpret human rights norms more restrictively than they are 
interpreted by NHRIs. 77 Third, the development of stronger human rights norms at the sub-
national level is of course not dependent on the establishment of an SNHRI. Many sub-national 
entities have legislatively embraced rights norms that go beyond those at the national level, 
obvious examples being the constitutional rights enacted by US states and Canadian provinces, 
or the municipal human rights laws or human rights declarations passed by cities and town 
councils around the world. However, while SNHRIs are not the only venue for normative 
development, they do provide certain advantages in that respect. Namely, SNHRIs are normally 
composed of human rights experts, are able to progressively develop norms through continuous 
attention to an issue (rather than the necessarily episodic law-making process), and are arguably 
able to go farther in their advocacy of rights norms because their independence acts as a shield 
from political backlash. 
E. Robustness 
 A final general argument in favor of decentralisation is that it is a way of providing 
robustness and resiliency in national and sub-national service provision.78 In the current context, 
this means that the establishment of SNHRIs can provide for greater robustness in human rights 
service delivery, in particular by introducing a hedge against situations where the local 
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population lacks sufficient human rights protection because the NHRI is ineffective or lacks 
independence. As Ghai notes, ‘if government at one level is not supportive of rights, citizens can 
go to the other level for protection.’79  
 In fact, there are a number of situations where the establishment of a SNHRI has been 
justified (before or after the fact) with reference to the deficiencies of a relevant NHRI. I have 
elsewhere demonstrated how the establishment of Korean SNHRIs coincides with (and arguably 
results from) a period of decreased independence at Korea’s National Human Rights 
Commission.80 In Indonesia, the Yogyakarta Ombudsman’s effectiveness has been contrasted 
with the declining effectiveness of that country’s national ombudsman.81 In a somewhat different 
context, Carver too noted that an argument in favor of multiple issue-specific human rights 
institutions in the UK was that ‘poor leadership of a single institution can have deleterious 
consequences on the human rights protection system as whole’.82 
A similar argument can be made in favor of establishing SNHRIs in jurisdictions where 
NHRIs do not hear complaints, in which case sub-national outlets may be the only non-judicial 
recourse. Even when NHRIs do hear complaints, they may be slow, ineffective or overly 
conservative in their rulings. SNHRIs can in these cases provide access to a better quality of 
justice. For example, a comparison of fair housing complaints handled by the US federal 
government with complaints handled by state and local human rights commissions found that 
southern commissions were more likely to provide an outcome favorable to the complainant, 
thus providing a justification for SNHRI complaint-handling (and perhaps countering 
expectations concerning local reluctance to enforce anti-discrimination laws in the southern 
US).83 
IV. Arguments against the Establishment of SNHRIs 
 Next, I will outline five principal arguments against the establishment of SNHRIs in 
countries that already possess NHRIs, based on general arguments against decentralisation. As is 
the case with the arguments in favor, these arguments will be more or less convincing depending 
on the circumstances in a particular jurisdiction, the normative preferences of the decision maker, 
the type of SNHRI in question, and many other factors. 
A. Redundancy  
Oftentimes, the first argument against decentralisation leading to shared jurisdiction over 
the same tasks is that the ensuing redundancy would be wasteful and overly complex in practice.  
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As Warner noted almost a century ago, ‘the existence of two independent systems of 
governmental activity causes expensive duplication and endless conflicts.’84 This argument may 
apply to the establishment of SNHRIs in countries that already possess NHRIs, because an 
SNHRI’s functions are, at least in large part, often already carried out by an existing NHRI.85 
Furthermore, proponents of this argument would claim that the redundant nature of SNHRIs 
where NHRIs already exist has real costs. Creating SNHRIs could take away (often local) 
funding that could be better used on education, parks, or other social programs. SNHRIs could 
draw public attention away from an NHRI that may already be struggling to closely engage with 
local populations. The existence of SNHRIs and an NHRI could also cause confusion in the 
complaint-handling process, as victims of human rights abuses will be uncertain which venue to 
approach, and other societal actors will be unsure of how to act in the event of divergence 
between an NHRI and SNHRI.86  
 There are a few possible replies to this argument. First, in some cases (as noted above), 
there will be little if any overlap or redundancy between SNHRIs or NHRIs, as the NHRI will be 
prevented from intervening with sub-national governments due to autonomy concerns.87 Where 
overlapping mandates do exist, they can be managed through coordination, as already occurs in 
several countries. This can involve regular meetings between the NHRI and SNHRIs, as occurs 
in Russia, India and Mexico; an annual conference including NHRI and SNHRIS as occurs in 
Spain; NHRI and SNHRI membership in a common networking association, as in Australia, 
Canada and Argentina, formal MOUs between an NHRI and SNHRIs, as occurs in Spain and 
Mexico, or informal consultations, as occurs in Korea.88  
Second, there are also scholars who view redundancy as a desirable feature of 
decentralisation. 89  It can promote reliability, because (as discussed above with respect to 
inefficient or non-independent NHRIs) if one part of government fails, another can step in to 
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provide services. 90 Martin Landau asserts that ‘redundancy serves many vital functions ... it 
provides safety factors, permits flexible responses to anomalous situations and provides a 
creative potential’.91 At least in the US context, there is empirical evidence that the existence of a 
sub-national human rights complaint procedure alongside a national one has a beneficial effect 
from an access to justice perspective, by increasing the total number of human rights complaints 
as compared with a solely national complaint system, even when the legal mandate is identical at 
both levels. In a 2008 analysis of anti-discrimination complaints in Kentucky, researchers 
compared the number of housing discrimination complaints filed in counties that had human 
rights commissions (and thus, the option of filing complaints either at the local or federal level) 
with the number of complaints in counties that lacked local human rights commissions (and thus 
could only file such complaints at the federal level).92 The study found that counties with local 
human rights commissions saw a significant increase in the number of disability discrimination 
complaints filed, with the odds of complainant success being identical at the local and federal 
levels. A similar study in North Carolina found that the presence of local commissions 
significantly increases the total number of rental housing complaints.93  
Finally, it should be noted that the strength of the redundancy argument will depend to a 
certain extent on the level of NHRI deconcentration. If an NHRI is highly centralized, it may 
have relatively few promotional, monitoring and protective activities in localities far from the 
capital, and there would thus be relatively little overlap with the activities of local SNHRIs.  
B. Economies of scale 
 One common argument in favor of administrative centralization is that it is cheaper due 
to the benefits of economies of scale. According to proponents of this argument, central service 
delivery is normally more efficient due to savings arising from reduced bureaucratic spending on 
policy design and implementation, as well as overhead, bulk purchasing, and other types of cost 
savings. 94 This general argument has also been made with respect to SNHRIs in particular. 
According to Bartlett, ‘A single institution can be, at least in theory, cheaper for the public 
budget than ten of them, with their corresponding ombudsmen and deputies’.95 While arguing for 
one NHRI instead of several focused on different rights issues, Carver claims that ‘a single 
human rights institution is able to make economies that allow it to be considerably more cost-
effective than multiple institutions’, in part because ‘the overwhelming majority of the budget of 
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these institutions thus goes on staff costs and office and information technology infrastructure, 
and only a very small proportion on projects or programme activity’.96 
 The main rebuttal to this argument is that as an empirical matter, it is unclear whether 
economies of scale can really result from any given centralization experience; some doubt 
whether this is normally the case. As Prud’homme notes, ‘the prevailing view is that there are 
few local public services for which economies of scale imply nationwide supply’.97 There are 
other countervailing considerations that might make SNHRIs more affordable, such as NHRIs’ 
‘elongated chains of command/supervision, [and] remoteness from the scene of action’. 98 
Among other factors, the precise activities undertaken by a particular SNHRI and NHRI will 
impact whether economies of scale potentially apply. While human rights research, the 
development of human rights training modules, and engagement with international mechanisms 
(among other tasks) may be more affordable when conducted by a single large NHRI rather than 
many small SNHRIs, human rights monitoring and complaint investigation necessarily involve 
significant periods on the ground in local areas (when done well), and, for these functions, the 
costs of travel back and forth from a distant capital may outweigh any savings from economies 
of scale.  
C. Administrative Ineffectiveness 
 A third general argument against decentralisation is that sub-national administration tends 
to be less effective than administration at the national level due to inferior human, financial or 
technical resources at the sub-national level.99  According to this line of thought, SNHRIs are 
likely to be systematically less effective than NHRIs (or NHRI branch offices). There are 
different elements of this claim. One problem could be that SNHRIs may be unable to attract 
employees with human rights education or expertise, especially in small or poorer jurisdictions. 
Staffing challenges has been generally claimed as a potential downside of decentralisation by 
some scholars, both because lower tiers of government may pay relatively lower salaries, but 
also because national governments may offer more desirable careers, with ‘greater diversity of 
tasks, more possibilities of promotion, less political intervention, and a longer view of issues.’100  
In the human rights field, SNHRI staffing concerns may be even more pronounced, in part 
because many SNHRIs operate on shoestring budgets or with volunteer personnel, and in part 
because human rights law often requires an advanced education and is studied by relatively few 
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people in some regions. As an empirical matter, adequate staffing has been noted as a problem 
for SNHRIs in India and Serbia.101  
Another issue could be that a lack of sufficient funding at the sub-national level could 
harm the effective administrative functioning of an SNHRI.102 This has arguably been the case in 
locations as disparate as India and Michigan.103 Lack of resources has also been used to argue 
against the establishment of local ombudsmen in Jamaica, where there is an ombudsman 
institution at the national level.104 Of course, this issue could be overcome if sufficient funding is 
provided by national-level sources to sustain adequate offices, and may not be a major issue in 
relatively wealthy jurisdictions. 
Finally, one common argument against decentralisation holds that local levels of 
government may be less effective because they are more likely to be corrupt105 or come under 
the control of local private interests.106 An analogous argument has also been made regarding 
SNHRIs; namely, that they are more susceptible to pressure from local elites, and therefore are 
less likely than national-level institutions to be fully independent.107 There are, however, many 
opponents to the general claim of greater corruption and co-option by local elites.108 Empirical 
research on the issue (as is so often the case in the decentralisation debate) is inconclusive.109   
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Presumably, outright corruption would be somewhat less of an issue with SNHRIs than with 
many other government offices, though, because SNHRIs would not normally be in charge of the 
distribution of expensive goods and services.  
D. Spillover effects 
Another well-known risk of decentralisation is that sub-national decision-making could 
lead to spillovers, or negative effects outside of a particular jurisdiction, because sub-national 
officials (unlike national officials) will not have an incentive to take into account the desires of 
the rest of the country.110 Spillovers are common in some issue areas, and far less common in 
others. In general, human rights implementation is likely to be an area with relatively few 
negative spillover effects, but there are (arguably) still some issues that could arise, which could 
be used as arguments against SNHRI establishment.  
For example, an SNHRI in a largely indigenous area could press for greater indigenous 
rights to control or use certain territories or goods. This would inevitably imply a reduction in 
power for external actors over such territory or goods. Or, to give another example, an 
autonomous region could argue that the right to self-determination implies greater local control 
over resources (or even secession), either of which would inevitably have significant effects on 
the rest of the country, effects that many would consider negative. Perhaps most controversially, 
an SNHRI could provide greater rights for undocumented immigrants, leading to (some would 
argue) the spillover effect of weakening a nationwide policy of deporting undocumented workers, 
and acting as a pull factor for irregular immigration.111 
Of course, in most circumstances, none of these spillover effects would be seen as 
particularly likely to occur, and at any rate SNHRIs might have limited influence to affect the 
debate with such high-profile political issues. In contrast, positive spillover effects would 
arguably be more likely to stem from SNHRI’s work to implement greater human rights 
protections. Free speech in one jurisdiction can be enjoyed across the country; due process rights 
are enjoyed by defendants regardless of their origin, and affordable tertiary educational 
opportunities are not usually restricted to the residents of a sub-national jurisdiction, to give just 
three examples of human rights issues with beneficial extra-jurisdictional effects.  
E. Fragmentation 
One of the classic arguments against decentralisation is that it can lead to greater 
inequalities or disparities among sub-national units.112 As Besley and Ghatak state, ‘there is 
clearly a tension between pursuing goals of equality in service provision and greater 
decentralisation and choice’.113 In general, the focus of criticism in this regard has been that 
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wealthier (or more administratively capable) sub-national jurisdictions will deliver a given 
service better than their peers, as for example with locally run schools.114 Disparities in the 
quality of human rights service delivery may be an issue for SNHRIs, at least to the extent that it 
contributes to other disparate outcomes; as Oomen notes, ‘a movement in which some cities 
become human rights cities and others do not runs the risk of contributing to inequality between 
cities’. 115  However, there are two somewhat different aspects of fragmented human rights 
implementation that are more relevant for the decision on whether to establish SNHRIs.  
First, there is the desire to avoid individuals within a single nation enjoying different 
types of human rights implementation. There is already evidence of distinctive sub-national 
human rights development in the context of UK devolution.116 While differences in the nature 
(as opposed to the quality) of services delivered may be of little concern (or even desirable) in 
certain issue areas, some would argue that human rights are different, and that it is important that 
all persons within a country enjoy the same human rights, in order to ensure that all citizens are 
treated as equals. In the Australian context, for example, one argument has been that ‘within a 
federation, the principle of equality between polities and the importance of consent suggest that 
matters such as rights protection, which lie at the heart of arrangements for the governance of the 
federation, ought to be dealt with on a national uniform standard’. 117 Carver has also argued that 
the existence of a consistent standard for all individuals is a reason to favor the establishment of 
one NHRI instead of multiple issue-specific human rights institutions.118  
Second, there is the broader concern that the proliferation of rights interpreting 
institutions implied by the establishment of SNHRIs could increase the fragmentation of an 
international human rights regime that depends on its universalism for it normative power. 
According to this argument, as the number of authoritative interpreters of human rights increases, 
the chances of divergences and even contradictions among them will naturally increase, as well, 
to the point that it will be difficult to say there is one corpus of international human rights law 
that apply to all humans.119 This is arguably an even greater risk with regards to sub-national 
actors, who may tend to have more particularistic perspectives on some rights issues, or engage 
in localization. As Parrish states, a ‘universalistic outlook is in tension with the idea of states as 
laboratories, each developing its own novel version of human rights’, and the greater the number 
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of sub-national actors interpreting human rights, the greater the fragmentation of human rights 
law.120  
Each of these arguments would be heavily contested, however, for a variety of reasons. In 
the domestic context, many would deny that human rights protection need be the same 
everywhere in a given country. Every nation’s political culture is different with regard to what is 
considered fundamental to citizenship, and in many autonomous or semi-autonomous 
jurisdictions, different rights are seen as important to a particular sub-national identity.121 At the 
global level, some legal pluralists would deny the existence of a universal body of human rights 
norms.122 Others would accept that universal standards exists but deny that local interpretations 
pose a threat, arguing instead that universal norms allow for some variation in content so as to 
make those norms locally relevant,123 or that it is possible to establish a compatibility between 
different interpretations due to the existence of networks or interpretative structures.124 Others 
might even accept that fragmentation due to a proliferation of authoritative institutions is a threat 
to universal norms, but deny that SNHRIs are likely to be authoritative enough to make a real 
difference, given that their judgments are normally non-binding, and their jurisprudence is (with 
a few possible exceptions) usually little-noted, even within a given jurisdiction.  
It is also worth noting that to the extent that one considers fragmentation to be a real 
danger, either at the domestic or international levels, there are ways that SNHRIs can be 
established so as to minimize the risk. For example, there can be appeals permitted of SNHRI 
decisions, either in the ordinary court system or to a particular NHRI. This would provide at least 
one mechanism for ensuring a level of conformity within a given nation. In addition, the degree 
to which fragmentation would be an issue may depend somewhat on the SNHRI’s normative 
mandate; a mandate that specifies the implementation of certain treaties or national constitutional 
rights would presumably lead to somewhat fewer jurisprudential divergences from international 
or national norms than a mandate that simply directed an SNHRI to implement ‘human rights’ 
without further guidance. Lastly, an SNHRI that focuses on human rights promotion or 
monitoring rather than complaint-handling may have fewer opportunities to issue authoritative 
opinions on issues of human rights interpretation. 
V. Conclusion 
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 Based on the arguments outlined above, it would of course be impossible to make a 
general conclusion that the establishment of an SNHRI is always desirable or never desirable in a 
jurisdiction that already contain an NHRI. One can, however, come to certain conclusions about 
the circumstances under which SNHRIs would be more desirable, and, presumably, more likely 
to be established, as follows. 
First, where the NHRI in a given country is presently weak or ineffective, then the 
robustness argument in favor of NHRIs becomes much stronger, as the human rights system in a 
given country is evidently not functioning appropriately. Conversely, the arguments that an 
SNHRI would be redundant or less effective than the NHRI would be less convincing if an 
NHRI has already demonstrated that it is not doing its job effectively.  
Second, in federal countries, or autonomous regions where there is an NHRI that lacks 
legal authority to engage with sub-national governments, then the establishment of SNHRIs 
would also seem more appropriate. In fact, as I have elsewhere described, this seems borne out 
empirically, as nine out of sixteen federal nations with NHRIs also have established SNHRIs at 
the highest sub-national level.125 To a certain extent, however, this conclusion depends on the 
justifications for a federal system in a given country; in nations such as Austria and Germany 
that utilize federalism primarily as a means of promoting administrative efficiency (rather than as 
a way to encourage locally appropriate responses to a heterogeneous population), then the 
autonomy-based argument for SNHRIs may be somewhat weaker.126  
Third, in countries that are particularly large or lack rapid transportation links with the 
capital, the physical proximity argument in favor of the establishment of SNHRIs becomes more 
convincing (with the caveat that this argument applies to deconcentration as well). 
Fourth, the establishment of SNHRIs is more likely to be appropriate in large or 
prosperous sub-national jurisdictions, because SNHRIs in such jurisdictions are more likely to be 
large enough that they will be able to themselves take advantage of certain economies of scale, 
and they will be less likely to suffer from administrative ineffectiveness due to financial or 
technical deficiencies. 
Fifth, in heterogeneous countries with locally distinct communities, the establishment of 
SNHRIs will make sense if one values the benefits of local innovation and cultural affinity more 
than the dangers of negative spillover and fragmentation. This will normally be the case where 
the initiative to establish the SNHRI starts at the sub-national level, as spillover and 
fragmentation (by their nature) are largely externalized costs, while innovation and localization 
are benefits enjoyed by the sub-national entity itself. 
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9. Conclusion 
9.1 Research Findings 
 Each article in this thesis addresses a series of closely related research questions, with the 
conclusions and accompanying discussion provided at the end of each individual article. When 
looked at as a whole, however, certain broad conclusions can be drawn. First, in response to my 
first (descriptive) research question regarding how SNHRIs currently interact with other 
elements of the international human rights system, it is clear that SNHRIs do not exist in 
isolation from the broader international human rights regime. They engage in a variety of ways 
with both international norms and international bodies, including through filing reports to the 
Human Rights Council or treaty bodies, acting as independent mechanisms under the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture, and engaging with the special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council. They also 
interact in differing ways with NHRIs and other domestic bodies, although these interactions do 
not always go smoothly, as was evident in my case study of the Seoul Human Rights 
Ombudsperson. I also find that SNHRIs commonly apply international norms in their work, 
including through their responses to individual complaints, provision of advice to government 
actors, public promotion of rights norms, and engagement with human rights litigation, and 
monitoring. The use of international norms is often explicitly mandated, but in some cases 
SNHRIs have decided for themselves to use international norms despite the lack of a clear 
mandate to do so in their organic legislation. While SNHRIs also engage with their peer 
institutions, these relationships are less robust and provide fewer benefits than the analogous 
networks of NHRIs. These conclusions run contrary to the common view of state and local 
human rights commissions in the United States (and to a perhaps lesser extent in other common 
law jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia) as purely local institutions, addressing local 
concerns, based on norms that may coincide with international human rights norms but are 
sourced from local or national texts. 
 My second research question explores the potential implications of SNHRI interaction 
with other actors and norms in the international system. Overall, I find that integration into the 
international system presents significant benefits for SNHRIs, as well as for other existing actors. 
Greater interaction with their peers through SNHRI networks can lead to a convergence of 
international standards, greater information sharing, acculturation, and the prospect of 
legitimation through an accreditation process. The use of international norms by SNHRIs can 
lead to the localisation of international human rights norms and the increased visibility of 
international norms at the local level. Meanwhile, SNHRI participation in UN mechanisms is 
likely to improve SNHRI effectiveness by increasing SNHRI familiarity with global human 
rights norms and techniques. Conversely, international bodies also could benefit from SNHRI 
engagement, for example by gaining greater access to independent information on local human 
rights conditions. Participation of SNHRIs in international mechanisms is also likely to increase 
the amount of attention paid to particular human rights norms that may be systematically under-
emphasised by nation-state representatives, such as the right to self-determination or the rights of 
indigenous persons.  
 As for the prescriptive element of my research – how can the relationship between 
SNHRIs and other international human rights actors be improved – I propose a number of 
specific measures in my articles. I argue that the UN should work towards increasing SNHRI 
 
 
engagement by, for example, providing more explicit guidance to the various human rights 
bodies as to how SNHRIs can be included in various situations and providing capacity-building 
assistance to SNHRIs in developing countries. I also propose certain measures that NHRIs can 
take to promote better SNHRI integration into the international system: namely, NHRIs should 
consult with SNHRIs where relevant prior to engaging with UN mechanisms, and NHRIs should 
play a more proactive role in training SNHRIs in their home country on how to best interact with 
international bodies.   
 Perhaps most controversially, I suggest that a new version of the Paris Principles be 
drafted that can apply specifically to SNHRIs.1 Then, SNHRIs could be accredited in the same 
way that NHRIs currently are, and those that comply with the terms of these new principles 
could be granted membership in the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 
(‘GANHRI’). This would at once provide qualifying SNHRIs with the considerable socialisation 
benefits and increased international access that NHRIs receive through GANHRI membership, 
while also providing a clear incentive for SNHRIs to maintain their independence, pluralism, and 
effectiveness, in order to qualify for full GANHRI accreditation. This proposal, along with the 
importance of standards more broadly, will be discussed in greater depth below. 
9.2 Practical Implications: How should SNHRIs Interact with other Actors? 
In addition to the specific prescriptive elements discussed in the articles themselves, there 
are also some broad recommendations that I believe can be drawn from the research in this thesis. 
In this section, I therefore suggest a few practical ways forward, while bearing in mind that 
although SNHRIs may form a discreet group of institutions, they also encompass significant 
variety within their ranks, so one size fits all proposals for how SNHRIs should interact with the 
broader human rights regime are unlikely to be useful.  
9.2.1 Focus on the Local  
 Analogising from the language of international trade, governance scholars examining 
federal and decentralised systems sometimes attempt to identify which level of government has a 
‘comparative advantage’ in the provision of particular administrative services.2 Given the limited 
resources available to devote to human rights services, it would be most efficient to deploy those 
resources where they are most useful. As Hafner-Burton notes, ‘[m]aking the whole system-
international law as well as the actions of stewards that support legal norms-work better requires 
a comprehensive strategy that deploys resources where they will be most effective’.3 Without 
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delving into this analogy too deeply, the basic concept is worth drawing out with respect to the 
work that SNHRIs conduct in the human rights system. 
To the extent that SNHRIs have a ‘comparative advantage’ over NHRIs or inter-
governmental actors in human rights implementation, to a large extent this advantage relates to 
their greater familiarity with local conditions, the greater ease with which they can monitor 
human rights in local areas, the greater comfort that local populations are likely to have in 
approaching SNHRIs, their greater authority with respect to local government institutions, and 
the greater facility with which SNHRIs can localise universal human rights norms, so as to make 
them legitimate in local communities while maintaining their fundamental universality. In short, 
their connections with the local is what makes SNHRIs important. SNHRIs should make the 
most of this advantage in their interactions with other actors in the human rights system.  
Specifically, SNHRIs should ensure that their contributions effectively highlight their 
local expertise and perspectives, rather than duplicating (or contradicting) the general work 
already being done by other actors. One example of this (as discussed in chapter 4) would be the 
submission of reports by US state and local human rights commissions to the US State 
Department on local implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Convention Against Torture, and Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for 
inclusion in the US state reports to the respective treaty bodies.4 This local information is not 
necessarily readily accessible to the US federal government, and certainly not to the UN treaty 
bodies. Another example (also discussed in chapter 4) would be the complaint submitted by the 
Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples on the state and federal government’s violation of the right to access a sacred 
site, a concern that national-level actors might be less likely to be aware of or take seriously.  
9.2.2 Maintain Independence 
 By the same token, when dealing with other local actors, whether in government or civil 
society, the main SNHRI advantage is not its ‘localness’, but rather its independence. This is the 
key to the benefits that SNHRIs can bring to local discourse, just as it is for NHRIs on the 
national level. At the national level, however, there is considerable research showing that the 
independence of NHRIs is often threatened, and in some cases is in fact taken away, such that 
NHRIs become little more than shills for those in power.5 While there is very little research on 
independence of SNHRIs, it is clear that in some circumstances they, too, might face threats to 
their independence, because of pressures from powerful forces at either the sub-national or 
national level. 6  In fact, there is some reason to believe (based on the general research on 
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decentralisation discussed in chapter 8) that SNHRIs may have more difficulty maintaining their 
independence than would NHRIs. 
 Thus, maintaining SNHRI independence should be a primary objective for those 
interested in assuring that SNHRIs can add value to the existing human rights system. There is 
no secret formula for SNHRIs to maintain their independence. Some of the methods suggested 
with respect to NHRIs would no doubt be helpful for SNHRIs as well, such as creating the 
institution through a legislative or constitutional mandate and providing adequate funding (as 
recommended by the Paris Principles)7 and providing staff with sufficient salaries and resources 
(as recommended by Amnesty International).8 
In the context of the subject of this thesis, however, I would argue that one of the primary 
roles that other human rights actors can play vis a vis SNHRIs is to assist them in maintaining 
their independence. There are many different ways that this can take place, a number of which 
are highlighted in this thesis. Outside funding can be provided to help maintain financial 
independence from the state; although there are some examples of this, it is still rare.9 Capacity 
building assistance can be provided, either by NHRIs or other actors, to allow SNHRIs to 
function effectively in an atmosphere of countervailing pressures from the state.10 While this too 
is uncommon, there are some examples of helpful engagement from states, 11  regional 
organisations,12 and the UN.13 It should be noted that capacity building assistance was critical in 
                                                          
7 See United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 48/134, ‘Principles Relating to the Status of National 
Institutions’ (1993) [Paris Principles], sec B(2)-B(3). 
8  Amnesty International, ‘National Human Rights Institutions – Amnesty International’s 
Recommendations for Effective Protection and Promotion of Human Rights’, IOR 40/007/2001 (1 
October 2001) sec 2.5-2.6. 
9 One example of this is the European Union’s funding of training projects by the Mexico City Human 
Rights Commission. Emilio Alvarez Icaza Longoria, ‘Address at the Executive Session on Human Rights 
Commissions and Criminal Justice’ (12 May 2006) 32 
<http://www.hrccj.org/pdfs/emilio_alvarez_transcript1.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016. 
10 There is no doubt a normative element to this type of interaction too; when a national or international 
actor provides funding or training, it is also likely to involve exposure to national or international values. 
11  One example is the work of the Danish Institute for Human Rights in supporting the regional 
ombudsmen of Arkhangelsk, Kaliningrad and Mari El, in the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, these 
projects are currently under review due to the increased difficulty of maintaining constructive 
partnerships with Russian state and regional authorities. Danish Institute for Human Rights, ‘Danish 
Institute for Human Rights in the Russian Federation’ (2015) 
<http://www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.dk/files/country_notes/13_russia_country_note_june_201
5.pdf> accessed 7 November 2016.  
12  Regarding Council of Europe work with the Kaliningrad human rights ombudsman, see Yulia 
Gradskova, ‘Regional Ombudsmen, Human Rights and Women – Gender Aspects of the Social and Legal 
Transformation in North-West Russia (Based on Ombudsman Reports)’ (2012) 39 Sov & Post-Sov Rev 
84, 105. 
13  UNHCHR has participated in capacity building projects for local Personeros in Colombia. See 
Procuraduría General de la Nación, ‘Programa Nacional de Capacitación en Derechos Humanos dirigido a 
Personeros y Personeras Municipales’ (2014) <http://www.procuraduria.gov.co/iemp/capacitacion-
personeros.page> accessed 7 November 2016. 
 
 
helping independent NHRIs proliferate during the 1990s.14 Other actors can also help confer 
legitimacy on SNHRIs by allowing them to participate at the national and international levels, 
which in turn will strengthen SNHRIs in the face of challenges to their independence, just as it 
does for NHRIs at the national level.15 Finally, trans-governmental SNHRI networks can step in 
to support members whose independence is threatened, as the regional and global NHRI 
networks have done with respect to NHRIs on many occasions.16 
9.2.3 Improve Coordination 
 One of the themes running through the articles in this thesis is that coordination between 
SNHRIs and other human rights actors is important for the effective attainment of common goals. 
Redundancy has costs, and localisation is only a desired outcome to the extent that it is 
consistent with the universal values underpinning the human rights movement. This does not 
necessarily mean that coordination (or cooperation) is necessarily the optimal strategy for 
interactions between SNHRIs and other parts of the state; as is the case with NHRIs, there will 
often be times when cooperation is worthwhile, and often times where confrontation is needed 
when faced with governments that refuse to follow their human rights obligations. 
Examples of successful coordination with other human rights actors include SNHRIs 
working together with their home-state NHRI to contribute information for human rights reports 
to treaty bodies, as has been done in Australia and Belgium, or SNHRIs acting as preventive 
mechanisms under the Optional Protocol of the Convention Against Torture, thus engaging in the 
types of visits to detention facilities that UN actors are ill-equipped to undertake.  The use of 
norms developed by other human rights actors can also be seen as a desirable type of cooperative 
behaviour, even if it takes place without explicit coordination, as was often the case with the use 
of international law norms by SNHRIs. On the other hand, without successful coordination, 
SNHRIs can become involved in turf wars, as has occurred in Catalunya, or (what is more likely) 
see a loss of influence and general dismissal by more powerful actors, as has occurred in Korea 
with the Park Hyun-jung case (described in chapter 7), or in India, where State Human Rights 
Commissions have been dismissed with disdain by the more powerful and respected National 
Human Rights Commission.17 
This coordination has been effectuated in a wide range of different ways. Some SNHRIs 
interact with their peers and NHRIs through trans-governmental organisations, however as 
discussed in chapter 5, these organisations are often regional or national rather than global, and 
limited to particular institutional types (such as ombudsmen). For other SNHRIs, conferences 
                                                          
14 Katerina Linos and Thomas Pegram, What happens when soft law hardens? National human rights 
Institutions and the international human rights system 6, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-
programs/faculty/facultyPubsPDF.php?facID=14278&pubID=6> accessed 7 November 2016. 
15 Ibid, 17; Meg Brodie, ‘Pushing the Boundaries: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in 
Operationalising the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework’ in Radu Mares (ed), The UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 252. 
16 See Gauthier De Beco, Non-Judicial Mechanisms for the Implementation of Human Rights in European 
States (Bruylant 2010) 146; Morten Kjaerum, National Human Rights Institutions Implementing Human 
Rights (Danish Inst for Hum Rts 2003) 7. 
17 National Human Rights Commission of India, ‘NHRC Convenes a Meeting of State Human Rights 
Commissions’, <http://www.nhrc.nic.in/disparchive.asp?fno=2138> accessed 17 October 2016. 
 
 
have been important venues for exchanging information on best practices and diffusing norms; 
one example of this is the annual World Human Rights Cities Forum, that has been held in 
Gwangju, Korea since 2011, and has contributed to the spread of the idea of the ‘human rights 
city’ in Korea, as discussed in chapter 6. At the purely domestic level, some SNHRIs interact 
with their domestic peers and home country NHRI through regular meetings, an annual 
conference, as in Spain or Argentina, or formal MOUs between an NHRI and SNHRIs, as occurs 
in Spain and Mexico. These mechanisms are discussed in chapter 3. Still other SNHRIs 
coordinate domestically through purely informal consultations, as was the case with the Seoul 
Human Rights Ombudsman office and Korea’s National Human Rights Commission.  
  Other human rights actors can play a role in facilitating this coordination, either by 
allowing SNHRI participation in already-existing forums (as I have proposed for GANHRI), or 
alternatively by helping develop new forums. One example of the latter was the involvement of 
the Council of Europe Commissioner of Human Rights in co-organising the Round Table for 
Regional European Ombudsmen in Barcelona in 2004.18 Whether in formal or informal ways, 
however, SNHRIs should have a seat at the table where human rights norms that affect their 
localities are being discussed, developed, or implemented. 
9.2.4 Develop Standards  
 Finally, this thesis has highlighted the absence of an authoritative set of standards that 
can be applied to SNHRIs. This is relevant to the interactions between SNHRIs and the rest of 
the human right system in two ways. First, such standards can be used to guide SNHRIs in their 
interactions with other actors. Second, other human rights actors could employ standards to 
evaluate or accredit SNHRIs. The Paris Principles play both roles vis a vis NHRIs. In fact, it is 
hard to over-emphasise the importance of the Paris Principles in the evolution of NHRIs.19 
However, the Paris Principles are by their terms (and according to their intent) inapplicable to 
sub-national bodies.20 
I argue in chapter 5 that a new version of the Paris Principles could be one solution that 
would not only provide helpful functional guidance but also an incentive to achieve best 
practices in order to be accredited. What would this new version look like, and how would it be 
arrived at? Regarding the negotiation process, it would as a primary matter be necessary to 
                                                          
18 At this time, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities called on the Council of Europe to 
‘facilitate the setting up and support of national and European networks of regional ombudspersons with a 
view to facilitating the exchange of experience and the sharing of information and good practice’ and 
‘give consideration to starting a network of Europe's regional ombudspersons’. Council of Europe 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, ‘Regional Ombudspersons: An Institution in the Service of 
Citizens’ Rights’, Resolution 159 (2004) art 24. 
19 According to Linos and Pegram, the Paris Principles and the system of peer review and monitoring that 
is based upon them are ‘critical to explaining the proliferation and strengthening of NHRIs worldwide’. 
Linos and Pegram (n 14) 3. 
20 Some SNHRIs nevertheless are mandated to follow the Paris Principles or explicitly look to the Paris 
Principles for guidance. See, eg, Bermuda Human Rights Commission, ‘2010 Annual Report’ 22 
<http://parliament.bm/uploadedFiles/Content/Home/HRC%20Annual%20Report%20%202010.pdf> 
accessed 12 November 2016; Ontario Human Rights Commission, ‘Guiding Principles’ 
<http://www.ohrc.on.ca/zh-hant/node/9767> accessed 12 November 2016; Estado de Chiapas, Decreto no 
233, Ley de la Comisión Estatal de los Derechos Humanos (19 Aug 2013).  
 
 
ensure that the SNHRIs themselves take the lead in standard development, just as NHRIs did in 
the negotiation of the Paris Principles. Of course, not all SNHRIs would be interested in this type 
of project (or abide by any eventual standards), but many would undoubtedly want to participate 
in the negotiation process. Second, the process should be transparent and allow for the 
participation in some respect of other important human rights actors, namely civil society groups, 
NHRIs (both individually and collectively), GANHRI, and the UN. It would be especially 
important that the UN and GANHRI are in favour of the eventual standards, because ideally they 
could be used by GANHRI to provide accreditation, and by the UN to provide privileged access 
(to accredited SNHRIs).  
The substance of the new set of standards should ideally emerge out of a consensus of the 
negotiating parties, but I argue in chapter 5 that the eventual standards should hew closely to the 
Paris Principles themselves, so that they don’t emerge as a competing set of norms. Certainly, the 
existing Paris Principles standards should not be watered down. Three types of changes would be 
likely. First, negotiators would need to delete Paris Principles sections that are deemed 
inapplicable, such as, for example, the requirement to address human rights issues ‘in any part of 
the country’ and (probably) the requirements to encourage treaty ratification (which can, after all, 
only be done by national rather than sub-national authorities).21 Second, new clauses would need 
to be added to address issues specific to sub-national institutions. One example could be a 
requirement that SNHRIs contribute local information to national reports to treaty bodies. Finally, 
there could be substantive updates that are not necessarily related to administrative level. To a 
certain extent, these updates could emerge from the interpretations that the GANHRI Sub-
Committee on Accreditation has developed over the years, in its NHRI accreditations. Thus, for 
example, the new principles could clarify that human rights ombudsman institutions qualify as 
SNHRIs (and how pluralism objectives apply to them), even though the original Paris Principles 
is ambiguous on this point with respect to NHRIs, because the Sub-Committee on Accreditation 
has developed relatively consistent and well-accepted rulings on the issue. 
 Aside from a Paris Principle-based global set of norms, there may be other types of 
standards and best practice guidelines that would be useful for particular types of SNHRIs, such 
as ombudsman institutions, anti-discrimination commissions, or human rights cities’ committees. 
These standards can usefully be produced outside of UN-based institutions, either in regional 
bodies such as the Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, or in trans-
governmental networks such as the International Ombudsman Institute (at the global level) or the 
various regional ombudsman groupings. While these ombudsman networks already do issue 
resolutions and reports on best practices and standards, they tend to be focused at national-level 
rather than sub-national level institutions, thus pointing to the need for more effective trans-
national organising for SNHRIs (or particular types of SNHRIs). 
9.3 Theoretical Implications 
 In addition to having important practical implications, the articles in this thesis engage 
with a number of different theoretical concepts and research findings, most conspicuously with 
those associated with global governance, localisation, and decentralisation. This section will take 
a closer look at how my studies have contributed to these three theories (or, otherwise put, to 
these three research programs, as there would be disagreement among scholars regarding the 
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extent that one can or cannot refer to a coherent global governance theory, localisation theory, or 
decentralisation theory; in part, this disagreement is due to a lack of agreed-upon definition of 
each concept).22 I will also discuss how these three theories (or research perspectives) could be 
useful for further research into SNHRIs. 
9.3.1 Global Governance 
The articles in this thesis in large part address SNHRIs through the global governance 
perspective described by Dingwerth, Pattberg and others.23 SNHRIs are viewed not as stand-
alone local institutions, but rather as nodes of a broader international human rights regime, that 
must be viewed through their dynamic relationship with other institutional actors and norms that 
may have arisen at the national or supra-national levels, or indeed through the work of non-state 
actors. As is commonly the case with global governance research, these articles look beyond a 
purely analytical or descriptive lens to address the normative question of what policies should be 
put into place so as to improve SNHRI coordination with existing actors and norms.  
These articles also build upon a number of specific research strands that can loosely be 
categorised as global governance research. Chapter 5, for example, utilises concepts of trans-
governmental networking that have been developed by Anne-Marie Slaughter, Kal Raustiala, 
and others. Slaughter defines trans-governmental networks as ‘pattern[s] of regular and 
purposive relations among like government units working across … borders’24 and has touted the 
potential of these links to improve cooperation and compliance with international standards.25  
Another research theme investigates the transmission of international norms through processes of 
socialisation. While national governments are critical in the formal acceptance of international 
human rights norms and in the passage of laws implementing those norms, the research of 
Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink questions when nations actually internalise 
                                                          
22 For the theoretical nature of ‘global governance’ see Matthias Hofferberth, ‘Mapping the Meanings of 
Global Governance: A Conceptual Reconstruction of a Floating Signifier’ (2015) 43(2) Millennium J Intl 
Stud 598. Regarding decentralisation as a theory, see UNDP, Decentralization: A Sampling of Definitions 
(1999) 1 <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/documents/decentralization_working_report.PDF> 
(accessed 23 October 23, 2016) (‘decentralization is not so much a theory as it is a common and variable 
practice in most countries to achieve primarily a diverse array of governance and public sector 
management reform objectives’), but cf Diana Conyers, ‘Future Directions in Development Studies: The 
Case of Decentralization’ (1986) 14(5) World Dev 593, 600 (noting that decentralisation theory ‘provides 
the basic framework’ for empirical studies in the field). 
23 Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, ‘Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics’ (2006) 
12 Global Governance 185. Other terms such as multi-level governance or polycentric governance are 
sometimes used to describe closely related concepts (or perspectives or theories). While the terms and 
research agendas differ to some extent, they have in common a view of governance that does not see the 
sovereign state as the sole relevant actor, but rather sees interactions of various influential actors and 
institutions. See, eg, Michael Zürn, ‘Global Governance as Multi-level Governance’, in Handbook on 
Multi-level Governance, eds Henrik Enderlein et al. (Northampton: Edward Elgar 2010), 80–102. 
24 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton U Press 2004) 14. 
25 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’ in Michael 
Byers (ed) The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International 
Law (OUP 2000) 204. 
 
 
those norms, and emphasises the role of other governmental and societal actors in this process.26 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have drawn on both these research tracks in their work, which 
posits three distinct mechanisms of social influence driving state behaviour: material inducement, 
persuasion, and acculturation.27  
At the broadest level, the articles in this thesis can be seen as helping to fill a gap in the 
global governance perspective on human rights by integrating SNHRIs as a new (or at least 
under-theorised) building block into the so-called ‘architecture’ of the human rights regime.28 
Too often, global governance in the human rights arena has been discussed as an essentially 
supra-national phenomenon, and the international human rights regime as stretching from the 
nation-state upwards to regional and global levels, but seldom downward to cities or provinces. 
Thus, human rights governance is too often conceptualised as a two-player game of the national 
and the international, of the self-interested sovereign that abuses the individual and the public 
good-minded supra-national body (UN, Council of Europe, etc.) that protects the individual.29 To 
a certain extent, the proliferation of NHRIs has complicated this picture. As my thesis shows, the 
proliferation of SNHRIs does so as well.  
Another interesting way that my research can be seen to contribute to global governance 
theories is by filling out the previously (conceptually) unoccupied space in a global independent 
human rights system. That is to say, where it has previously been common to talk about NHRIs 
primarily as (one of several) domestic governmental organs for human rights implementation, 
now we can perhaps look from a different perspective as to whether NHRIs, SNHRIs, regional 
human rights commissions, UN human rights treaty bodies, and perhaps even supra-national 
ombudspersons (like the European Ombudsman or the Office of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL 
and Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee) comprise a separate system of independent organs, and if so, 
how they interact with each other, challenge each other, preserve their independence – which is 
their defining feature – and collectively maximise their impact on improving human rights 
practices. 
                                                          
26 See, eg, Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (CUP 1999). 
27 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International 
Law (OUP 2013) 22. 
28 See, eg, Frank Biermann et al, ‘The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework 
for analysis’ (2009) 9(4) Global Environ Politics 14 (2009) 15 (defining governance architectures as ‘the 
overarching system of public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making 
procedures and organizations that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics.’) Previously, 
SNHRIs were oftentimes ignored (as too unimportant to be relevant), treated simply as components of (or 
footnotes to) other domestic institution, such as NHRIs, or, occasionally, dealt with as individual entities, 
but not as representatives of a larger conceptual group of SNHRIs. 
29 See, eg, James Nickel, ‘Human Rights’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010) 9 (‘the most 
basic idea of the human rights movement is... the idea of regulating the behavior of governments through 
international norms’); Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (OUP 2009) 13 (‘the central idea of 
international human rights is that states are responsible for satisfying certain conditions in their treatment 
of their own people and that failures or prospective failures to do so may justify some form of remedial or 
preventive action by the world community or those acting as its agents.’) 
 
 
The integration of SNHRIs into global governance theories opens up a range of new 
research agendas, both in line with traditional global governance perspectives (some of which I 
address in this thesis), but also in line with the emerging frameworks that form part of what 
Ruggie dubs ‘new governance theory’.30 Put simply, architecture affects outcome, so changes of 
architecture require a reevaluation of how systems function.31 One of the most intriguing new 
frameworks to examine this is Abbott and Snidal’s theory of orchestration.32 Under this theory, 
orchestration applies when a focal actor known as the orchestrator enlists a third-party actor 
known as an intermediary to address a shared governance objective in a separate administrative 
realm, known as the target. 33  Orchestration occurs when three conditions are met: ‘(1) the 
orchestrator seeks to influence the behaviour of the target indirectly via intermediaries, and (2) 
the orchestrator does not exercise control over the intermediary, which, in turn, (3) cannot 
compel compliance of the target’.34 The use of orchestration can help magnify the influence of 
international organisations; in Ruggie’s words, orchestration can help ‘achieve greater normative 
and regulatory coherence, larger-scale effects, and more robust outcomes.’35 It also can be used 
as an explanatory mechanism for the success or lack of success of global governance agendas.36 
While originally elucidated with respect to global economic governance, orchestration theory has 
also been applied by Pegram and others to the international human rights regime.37 
 By introducing a new building block into the architecture of the human rights regime, this 
thesis has opened the way for new studies of whether or how orchestration is occurring as a 
descriptive matter, and whether it makes sense as an analytical lens to view the role of SNHRIs. 
Due to their independence (in principle) from state control, SNHRIs would seem well-placed to 
act as intermediaries.38 Thus, one question would be whether international human rights actors 
(such as the UN) can be considered orchestrators and SNHRIs can be considered intermediaries 
in the shared objective of influencing State behaviour, either at the sub-national or (less 
                                                          
30 John Ruggie, ‘Global Governance and “New Governance Theory”: Lessons from Business and Human 
Rights’ (2014) 20 Global Gov 55. 
31  Thomas Pegram, ‘Governing Relationships: The New Architecture in Global Human Rights 
Governance’ (2015) 43(2) Millennium J Intl Stud 618, 627 (‘Evaluating the relationship between political 
units within global governance architectures is … essential to understanding outcomes’.) 
32  See, eg, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’ (2009) 42 Vand J Transn’l L 501; 
Kenneth Abbott et al, International Organizations as Orchestrators (CUP 2015). 
33 Kenneth Abbott et al, ‘Orchestration: Global Governance Through Intermediaries’ in Kenneth Abbott 
et al, International Organizations as Orchestrators (CUP 2015). 
34 Pegram, ‘Governing Relationships’ (n 31) 628. 
35 Ruggie (n 30) 12. 
36 Pegram, ‘Governing Relationships’ (n 31) 638. 
37 ibid; Thomas Pegram, ‘Global Human Rights Governance and Orchestration: National Human Rights 
Institutions as Intermediaries’ (2015) 21(3) Eur J Intl Rel 595. See also Xinyuan Dai, ‘Orchestrating 
Monitoring: The Optimal Adaptation of International Organizations’ in Kenneth Abbott et al, 
International Organizations as Orchestrators (CUP 2015). 
38 Pegram, ‘Governing Relationships’ (n 31) 638. 
 
 
frequently) national administrative level. 39 In chapters 4 and 6, my research provides some 
evidence of the linkages between SNHRIs and UN actors and norms that would be the 
prerequisite for such orchestration. However, more empirical study would be necessary to 
develop this theory. Another, perhaps more interesting possibility, would be whether national 
governments could be considered orchestrators and SNHRIs intermediaries, with the shared 
governance objective of ensuring sub-national compliance with human rights norms (or, perhaps, 
with the shared objective of restricting the scope of sub-national autonomy to introduce policies 
at variance with national objectives). In each of these cases, a follow-up question would be what 
type of orchestration that SNHRIs are involved in, among the four possible dynamics identified 
by Pegram.40 
9.3.2 Localisation 
The articles comprising this thesis are essentially engaged in an institutional analysis of 
SNHRIs and their relationships with other actors. They do not engage in a socio-legal or 
anthropological analysis of SNHRI impact on the ground, as characterises much of research into 
localisation, which has been defined by Acharya as ‘the active construction [of new norms] 
through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection of foreign ideas by local actors, 
which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices’.41 
Nevertheless, the research findings on localisation and vernacularisation influence the way in 
which the articles in this thesis analyse the implications of SNHRI implementation of 
international norms (in chapter 6) and the implications of establishing an SNHRI (in chapter 8), 
and form the broader backdrop for why SNHRIs matter, or matter in a different way than 
national or global human rights institutions. The most important way in which this thesis extends 
localisation theories is by shifting the field away from its traditional focus on civil society as the 
locus of localisation processes, as best exemplified by the research of Acharya, De Feyter, Merry 
and others.42  
Over the last few years, this original focus on civil society has been supplemented by a 
number of studies of the role that NHRIs can play in norm localisation.43 According to Hafner-
                                                          
39 Thus, sub-national governments would most commonly be the ‘target’ in Abbott’s terminology. 
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orchestration, cascade orchestration, and reverse orchestration).  
41 Amitav Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional 
Change in Asian Regionalism’ (2004) 58 Intl Org 245. 
42 See, eg, Amitav Acharya, ‘Local and Transnational Civil Society as Agents of Norm Diffusion’, Paper 
Presented to the Global Governance Workshop, University of Oxford (1-3 June 2012); Sally Merry et al, 
‘Law from Below: Women’s Human Rights and Social Movements in New York City’ (2010) 44(1) L & 
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Settings: Intersections of Local and Bureaucratic Knowledge in an Israeli NGO’ (2012) 11 J Hum Rts 243. 
43 Andrew Wolman, ‘National Human Rights Commissions and Asian Human Rights Norms’ (2013) 3(1) 
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Burton, ‘NHRIs are particularly intriguing [localisation actors] because these institutions have 
formal roles in national governance processes, and thus might be particularly effective conduits 
between international pressures and national policy and behavior’.44 It is a natural extension of 
this research strand to also consider the role that SNHRIs can play in norm localisation. One 
point of agreement among localisation researchers is that the identity of the localising agent 
(sometimes dubbed the ‘mediator’ or the ‘translator’) matters.45 According to Acharya, it is the 
agency role of local actors that is in fact the ultimate key to localisation.46 Thus, there are likely 
to be considerable implications to SNHRIs (instead of NGOs or NHRIs) engaging in human 
rights localisation. As Merry notes, translation ‘takes place within fields of unequal power’ and 
translators’ work is ‘influenced by who is funding them; their ethnic, gender, or other social 
commitments; and institutional frameworks that create opportunities for wealth and power’.47  
So far, however, scholars have largely overlooked the potential role of SNHRIs, the one 
exception that I am aware of being Ray and Purkayastha’s study of localisation by state human 
rights commissions in India. 48  This thesis highlights that SNHRIs should also be closely 
considered for the implications of their involvement with human rights localisation. My research 
affirms that SNHRIs can (and often do) closely engage with both international-level human 
rights norms and norms of domestic origin in their work, sometimes implementing both at the 
same time, as was common with the jurisprudence of the Seoul Human Rights Ombudsperson 
Office. My research also shows that SNHRIs exist within and interact with a network of local, 
national and international human rights bodies, which has been posited to be a prerequisite for 
human rights localisation.49 
More research is necessary, however, to gain a full understanding of the topic, and how 
SNHRIs may differ from local grass-roots organisations (or NHRIs) in their roles as localising 
agents for human rights. One key issue to examine is the nature of the relationship between 
SNHRIs and civil society. The mere fact that SNHRIs are established at a local administrative 
level does not necessarily mean that they retain close relationships with grass roots organisations, 
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46 Acharya (n 45) 15. 
47 Sally Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ (2006) 108 Amer 
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Titia Loenen, SIM Special no 38, SIM (2015); Charlotte Berends et al (eds), Human Rights Cities: 
Motivations, Mechanisms, Implications (University College Roosevelt 2013) 11 (localising human rights 
‘means applying these universal principles in local settings’). 
49 Gaby Oré Aguilar, ‘The Local Relevance of Human Rights: A Methodological Approach’, in The Local 
Relevance of Human Rights (CUP 2011) 115. 
 
 
local unions, women’s groups and the like. In fact, it is possible that civil society has fewer direct 
links to SNHRIs than to NHRIs, given that NHRIs generally have an explicit mandate to interact 
with civil society groups and (usually) have sufficient personnel and funds to reach out to such 
groups, neither of which may be the case for SNHRIs. It is also possible that different SNHRI 
types relate differently to civil society. Classic ombudsperson institutions, for example, may be 
less likely to interact with civil society groups or see them as stake holders, when compared to 
local human rights or human relations commissions. If some SNHRIs do lack strong links to civil 
society, then their potential utility for norm localisation would be lessened, and to the extent that 
one favours human rights localisation, one should attempt to cultivate greater linkages between 
civil society and SNHRIs. 
Apart from further socio-legal or anthropological research into the linkages between 
SNHRIs and civil society and other actors, a localisation research agenda may also benefit from 
a more classic legal or textual analysis of the various policy recommendations, decisions on 
complaints, and annual reports published by SNHRIs. These methodologies are often less 
feasible for research on civil society organisations that do not engage in explicit and official 
norm interpretations. One may, for example, be able to establish how SNHRIs develop a 
particular rights norm over time by closely examining the evolution of their jurisprudence on that 
issue when resolving individual complaints. 
A final important issue for further localisation research is the extent to which economic 
and social rights norms are effectively addressed by SNHRIs (or by different types of SNHRIs, 
as it is certainly possible that local ombudsperson institutions are less engaged with economic 
and social rights than are human rights commissions, especially those established as parts of 
‘human rights cities’). While there are different conceptions of localisation in the literature, to 
the extent that it is envisioned as a response to economic globalisation, then a reluctance by 
SNHRIs to engage with economic and social rights norms could limit their potential as localising 
agents.50 
9.3.3 Decentralisation and Subsidiarity 
 Theories of decentralisation have long played an important role in political debates about 
the appropriate administrative level for delivering government services. Until recently, human 
rights scholars have largely steered clear of this debate, with a few notable exceptions.51 First 
some researchers have broadly examined how local governments can best implement human 
rights norms, sometimes (but not always) in the context of decentralisation debates.52 Second, 
within the political science literature, there are a number of examinations of the human rights 
implication of certain types of federal structures. 53 Third, several authors have advocated a 
                                                          
50 Regarding localisation as a response to economic globalisation, see De Feyter (n 42). 
51 International Council on Human Rights Policy, ‘Local Rule: Decentralisation and Human Rights’ (2002) 
37 (‘the wide and varied literature on decentralisation makes almost no reference to human rights). 
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decentralisation of the human rights movement, by re-focusing attention towards human rights 
implementation at the local rather than the national or supranational levels. 54 Fourth, a few 
scholars have conducted case studies of the human rights implications of decentralisation in 
particular national circumstances.55  
Alongside these studies, which are often characterised by empirically grounded case 
studies of decentralised polities, there is also a line of more theoretically oriented human rights 
research that has examined issues of decentralisation (or centralisation) through the lens of 
‘subsidiarity’, a principle that has been characterised as ‘a presumption for local-level decision-
making, which allows for the centralisation of powers only for particular, good reasons’. 56 
However, while subsidiarity as a structuring principle has been utilised at the domestic level in 
certain contexts, human rights discussions of subsidiarity have tended to concentrate on the 
somewhat different question of whether supranational or national bodies are best for setting 
human rights policy and adjudicating human rights disputes.57 
 There has not been much attention so far to the specific question of whether (and when) 
the provision of independent human rights services themselves are best provided at the local, 
national, or supra-national level (ie by SNHRIs, NHRIs, or regional or global human rights 
commissions). There has also been little attention to the interactions between the different levels 
in a decentralised system of independent human rights implementation. 
In this thesis, I contribute to theories of decentralisation by addressing each of these two 
questions. In chapter 8, I explicitly apply the theoretical findings from generations of research 
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into decentralisation to an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of independent human 
rights implementation at the sub-national level compared to independent human rights 
implementation at the national level. As far as I know, this is the first time that this exercise has 
been attempted. In chapter 3, I examine in depth the interactions, hierarchical and otherwise, 
between NHRIs and SNHRIs in federal states, in order to gain insights into the precise ways in 
which decentralisation is operationalised in the specific context of human rights institutions. My 
research highlights the fact that the relation of SNHRIs to decentralisation is multifaceted and 
complex. On the one hand, SNHRI establishment can be an example of decentralisation; moving 
human rights implementation down to the local level. On the other hand, SNHRIs can operate as 
a check on the negative effects of decentralisation, by ensuring that decentralised government 
administrations abide by norms which (often) have been either drafted or ratified by national-
level actors.   
This research thus serves as the launching point for a number of different research 
agendas that can further our understanding of decentralisation and subsidiarity. At the practical 
level, it provides a framework for the application of a decentralisation (or subsidiarity) analysis 
to questions related to the establishment of a particular SNHRI. At the more theoretical level, by 
detailing the advantages and disadvantages of decentralised human rights implementation, my 
research can be used to justify (or reject) the application of the principle of subsidiarity to the 
provision of independent human rights services at the domestic level. Of course the answer to 
that question will depend on the objectives one posits for the provision of human rights services, 
which can range from maximising utility to international human rights law compliance, 
democratic accountability, service affordability, systemic coherence, or some combination of 
goals. Finally, my research opens up the door for a broader subsidiarity analysis of human rights 
implementation that includes not only local and national but also supra-national (regional or 
global) administrative levels. This would essentially combine the two existing questions that 
have dominated the discourse on subsidiarity in a way that has not yet been seriously attempted, 
but is entirely consistent with current understandings of the principle of subsidiarity. 
9.4 SNHRIs and the Need for Data  
 Obtaining more data on SNHRIs should be considered a prerequisite for conducting the 
type of research projects that would further our general understanding of the role that SNHRIs 
play (or could play) in global governance, localisation, decentralisation, or other theoretical 
models. To date, there have only been a small number of SNHRI case studies (whether from a 
sociological, political science, or legal perspective), and even less research on SNHRIs using 
quantitative methodologies. 
At the most basic level, future research into SNHRIs would benefit from the development 
of a data set encompassing those currently existing SNHRIs, along with the basic typological 
information that I outline in chapter 2 (administrative level, institutional form and breadth of 
mandate) and perhaps other potentially useful data, such as date of establishment or geographical 
location. While there are some data on SNHRI quantity in certain jurisdictions, there is nothing 
approaching a comprehensive worldwide set. Such a dataset would facilitate quantitative social 
science research that would be able to take advantage of the large number of SNHRIs to 
potentially arrive at more robust conclusions regarding (for example) the conditions that lead to 
the establishment of SNHRIs, the factors influencing which types of SNHRIs are established, 
and the reasons for SNHRI success or failure. To a certain extent, the potential avenues for 
quantitative research are highlighted by the studies that have taken advantage of similar datasets 
 
 
of NHRIs or truth commissions to introduce a ‘second generation’ of methodologically 
sophisticated studies into those institutional forms. 58  Unfortunately, developing an SNHRI 
dataset would be a much more difficult task, when compared to developing datasets for NHRIs 
and truth commissions, as there are far more SNHRIs operating, and far more possible places 
one would have to look for them (namely, all sub-national administrations). While compiling a 
list of all SNHRIs in the world may be unrealistic, even a non-comprehensive dataset would 
promote new types of research in the area. 
 Further qualitative data in the form of case studies and comparative analyses would also 
be very helpful in order to answer some of the important questions related to SNHRIs that are 
highlighted (but not answered) by my thesis. For instance, additional qualitative research can 
help determine the advantages and disadvantages of different SNHRI types, and, indeed, whether 
there may be an ‘ideal type’ of SNHRI. As discussed in chapter 2, SNHRIs currently come in a 
wide variety of institutional types, including many examples of institutions that are unique to a 
particular locality or country, such as the Ararteko in the Basque region of Spain, Personeros 
Municipales in Colombia, and municipal human relations commissions in the United States. This 
variety of forms contrasts, to a certain extent, with NHRIs, which have experienced a high 
degree of isomorphism in recent years, due largely to the effects of international accreditation 
based upon the Paris Principles. 59   Each of these patterns has plausible advantages and 
disadvantages. Isomorphism allows for easier evaluation and transfer of best practices, however 
a one-size-fits-all solution may be impractical and ineffective given the wide variety of local 
administrative cultures, levels of development, and funding situations of SNHRIs around the 
world. 
 More data on SNHRIs would also allow for greater empirical investigation (whether 
quantitative or qualitative) into SNHRI effectiveness, and in particular questions such as 1) how 
can SNHRI effectiveness best be measured?; 2) what are the institutional attributes associated 
with SNHRI effectiveness?; and 3) why are some SNHRIs more effective than others? To some 
extent, analogous studies have been conducted regarding NHRI effectiveness, although these 
studies have tended to revolve around questions of the suitability of the Paris Principles and 
GANHRI accreditation process, which are at best secondary questions for most SNHRIS. 60 
Stronger evidence regarding the effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of SNHRIs would 
contribute greatly to further research on some of the questions addressed in this thesis, such as 
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commission datasets exist through the Transitional Justice Database Project 
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the conditions under which the establishment of an SNHRI makes sense or the best way that 
SNHRIs can engage with international mechanisms. 
9.5 Conclusion 
 If there is one thing that the human rights movement has learned over the past twenty-
five years, it is the importance of human rights implementation on the ground. Norms simply are 
not enough, without an empowered civil society that is willing to insist on its rights and without 
the governmental institutions that are willing and able to hold the state accountable. This thesis 
has focused on the work of one institutional type – the sub-national human rights institution – 
and how it interacts with other actors and norms in the international human rights system. Sub-
national human rights implementation is an under-studied topic, and the articles in this thesis 
contribute to an increased attention to the topic. The articles are innovative in two principal ways. 
First, they address SNHRIs as a conceptually relevant group, rather than dealing separately with 
particular types such as human rights ombudsmen or municipal human rights commissions. 
Second, they do not simply focus on SNHRIs as local bodies in isolation from the rest of the 
international human rights regime, but rather examine the inter-connections within the regime, 
both as they exist today, and as can develop over time. The articles are intended to help develop 
academic study of SNHRIs, but they can also be of practical interest to policy-makers, advocates, 
and human rights officers working towards ensuring that SNHRIs interact optimally with other 
important human rights actors and add value to the existing human rights architecture. 
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